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BabyShark Malware Part Two -- Attacks Continue Using KimJongRAT and PCRat ![Clock Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-clock.svg) 9 min read * ![Profile Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-profile-grey.svg) By: * [Mark Lim](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/author/mark-lim/) * ![Published Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-calendar-grey.svg) Published:April 26, 2019 * ![Tags Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-category.svg) Categories: * [Cybercrime](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/cybercrime/) * [Malware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/malware/) * [Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) * ![Tags Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-tags-grey.svg) Tags: * [BabyShark](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/babyshark/) * [CowboyConverter](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cowboyconverter/) * [CowboyLoader](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cowboyloader/) * [KimJongRAT](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/kimjongrat/) * [PCRat](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/pcrat/) * [![Download Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-download.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/babyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat/?pdf=download&lg=en&_wpnonce=f6e4b1f2e6 "Click here to download") * [![Print Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-print.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/babyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat/?pdf=print&lg=en&_wpnonce=f6e4b1f2e6 "Click here to print") Share![Down arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/down-arrow.svg) * ![Link Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-share-link.svg) * [![Link Email](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-sms.svg)](mailto:?subject=BabyShark%20Malware%20Part%20Two%20–%20Attacks%20Continue%20Using%20KimJongRAT%20and%20PCRat&body=Check%20out%20this%20article%20https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbabyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat%2F "Share in email") * [![Facebook Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-fb-share.svg)](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbabyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat%2F "Share in Facebook") * [![LinkedIn Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-linkedin-share.svg)](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbabyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat%2F&title=BabyShark%20Malware%20Part%20Two%20–%20Attacks%20Continue%20Using%20KimJongRAT%20and%20PCRat "Share in LinkedIn") * [![Twitter Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-twitter-share.svg)](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbabyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat%2F&text=BabyShark%20Malware%20Part%20Two%20–%20Attacks%20Continue%20Using%20KimJongRAT%20and%20PCRat "Share in Twitter") * [![Reddit Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-reddit-share.svg)](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com//www.reddit.com/submit?url=https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbabyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat%2F&ts=markdown "Share in Reddit") * [![Mastodon Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-mastodon-share.svg)](https://mastodon.social/share?text=BabyShark%20Malware%20Part%20Two%20–%20Attacks%20Continue%20Using%20KimJongRAT%20and%20PCRat%20https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbabyshark-malware-part-two-attacks-continue-using-kimjongrat-and-pcrat%2F "Share in Mastodon") # Executive Summary In February 2019, Unit 42 published a [blog](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/) about the BabyShark malware family and the associated spear phishing campaigns targeting U.S. national think tanks. Since that publication, malicious attacks leveraging BabyShark have continued through March and April 2019. The attackers expanded targeting to the cryptocurrency industry, showing that those behind these attacks also have interests in financial gain. While tracking the latest activities of the threat group, Unit 42 researchers were able to collect both the BabyShark malware's server-side and client-side files, as well as two encoded secondary PE payload files that the malware installs on the victim hosts upon receiving an operator's command. By analyzing the files, we were able to further understand the overall multi-staging structure of the BabyShark malware and features, such as how it attempts to maintain operational security and supported remote administration commands. Based on our research, it appears the malware author calls the encoded secondary payload "Cowboy" regardless of what malware family is delivered. Our research shows the most recent malicious activities involving BabyShark malware appear to be carried out for two purposes: * Espionage on nuclear security and the Korean peninsula's national security issues * Financial gain with focus on the cryptocurrency industry based on the decoy contents used in the samples, shown in Figure 1. Xcryptocrash is an online cryptocurrency gambling game. [![](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/xCryptoCrash_decoy.png)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/xCryptoCrash_decoy.png) *Figure 1. Cryptocurrency related BabyShark malicious document decoy* We presume that the BabyShark malware toolset is shared among actors under the same umbrella or the same group has been assigned an additional mission. In our analysis, we found BabyShark attacks were using KimJongRAT and PCRat as the encoded secondary payload and thus were the "Cowboys". # Suspicious Access Logging BabyShark has a multi-stage infection chain with checks between each stage, as shown in Figure 2, to ensure only targeted hosts are advanced to the next stage before it finally beacons backs to the attacker. [![](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-2.-BabyShark-flowchart.png)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-2.-BabyShark-flowchart.png) *Figure 2. BabyShark malware overall structure* This is done by maintaining a list of denylisted IP addresses and computer names for those who have made suspicious access attempts, such as access with invalid parameters, to the server as a possible technique meant to make analysis harder. The IP addresses and computer names in the denylist are written in base64 encoded format at \[BASE\_URI\]/blackip.txt, shown in Figure 3. [![](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-3.-blackip.png)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-3.-blackip.png) *Figure 3. Denylisted IP addresses and computer names in blacktip.txt* When a new access attempt is made with data matching the denylist, the server will not proceed to the next stage and alerts the operator via a separate log file shown in Figure 4. [![](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-4.-susp_act_log.png)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-4.-susp_act_log.png) *Figure 4. Suspicious activity log report to operator* BabyShark's C2 server also logs access to its base URI and redirects to http://go.microsoft\[.\]com/. The purpose of this is likely to avoid its files being seen due to potential mis-configurations of the hosting web server. if($ff=fopen("resp\_suspect","a")) { fwrite($ff, $date . " " . $ip . " suspected access " . $useragent ."\\r\\n"); fclose($ff); } header('Location: http://go.microsoft\[.\]com/'); exit; # Remote Commands The operator can issue VBS and PowerShell based commands to victim systems infected with BabyShark. The remote commands we found from the C2 are in the below table, but BabyShark is not limited to these as the attacker can create more VBS or PowerShell command files. VBS based remote commands: |------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | **Command Name** | **Description** | | getfiles | Archive all files in the BabyShark base path as a ZIP archive, then upload to the C2 | | exe\_down | Download files for secondary payload: - a Cowboy, a custom encoded PE payload - an EXE type loader which decodes and loads Cowboy in memory - a DLL type loader which decodes and loads Cowboy in memory | | redirect\_vbs | Purpose of this command is not clear as key file is missing, but it is likely for changing C2 path | *Table 1. VBS based remote commands for BabyShark* PowerShell based remote administration commands: |------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | **Command Name** | **Description** | | keyhook | Two types of key loggers implemented using PowerShell and C# - PowerShell based key logger which is openly available on [GitHub](https://gist.github.com/dasgoll/7ca1c059dd3b3fbc7277). Result is saved in %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\ttmp.log - C# based key logger saves result in %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\ttmp.log | | dir list | Collect host information and save the result in %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\ttmp.log. The commands issued to collect host information include: - whoami - hostname - ipconfig - net user - arp -a - dir "%appdata%\\Microsoft" - dir "%systemroot%\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\" - vol c: d: e: f: g: h: i: j: k: l: m: n: o: p: q: r: s: t: u: v: w: x: y: z: - dir "%userprofile%\\Downloads" - dir "%userprofile%\\Documents" - dir "%userprofile%\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default" - tasklist Also, a test result for UAC accessibility, and Microsoft Office security setting from registry key values | | power com | Copy %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\delemd.tmp0 to %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\XXYYZZ.tmp, and load as DLL | | exe del | Clean up all files associated with secondary payload execution. - %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\desktop.r3u, encoded Cowboy payload - %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\fstnur, file used to check for first time execution - %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\\*.tmp | | execute | Copy %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\deleme.tmp0 to %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\deleme.tmp, and execute it | *Table 2. PowerShell based remote commands for BabyShark* # KimJongRAT and PCRat are the Cowboys! The secondary malware is delivered as a set: * one EXE loader * one DLL loader * one encoded payload The functionality of the EXE and DLL loaders is the same: the only difference is the file type. These loaders are later run upon receiving an execution command: "execute" to invoke the EXE type loader or "power com" to launch the DLL type loader. We theorize the reason for having two different type loaders is to have redundancy for loading the payload in case of anti-virus software's disruption. Either loader will load the custom encoded secondary payload, the Cowboy, in memory, decode it, and execute it. In our [previous](https://malware.lu/assets/files/articles/RAP003_KimJongRAT-Stealer_Analysis.1.0.pdf) [research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/), we wrote about possible links between BabyShark and the KimJongRAT malware family. We based these possible links on the similarity of malware behavior, similar interests in the targets, and a freshly compiled KimJongRAT malware sample being seen from the same threat actor. In our latest analysis, we collected two secondary payload files, cow\_pass.gif and cow.gif, from BabyShark's C2 server. After decoding, we found these samples were KimJongRAT and PCRat respectively. Their metadata are in Tables 3 and 4. |-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | **SHA256** | f86d05c1d7853c06fc5561f8df19b53506b724a83bb29c69b39f004a0f7f82d8 | | **timestamp** | 2010-07-14 08:47:40 | | **size** | 124,928 | | **Import hash** | d742aa65c4880f85ae43feebb0781b67 | | **C2** | 173.248.170\[.\]149:80 | *Table 3. Decoded PCRat payload metadata* |-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | **SHA256** | d50a0980da6297b8e4cec5db0a8773635cee74ac6f5c1ff18197dfba549f6712 | | **timestamp** | 2018-12-25 11:11:47 | | **size** | 787,968 | | **Import hash** | daab894b81cc375f0684ae66981b357d | *Table 4. Decoded KimJongRAT payload metadata* PCRat is an infamous remote administration trojan with its source code openly available on the public internet. The malware is a variant of the Gh0st RAT malware family and it shares many similarities with Gh0st including its network beacon structure as shown in the Figure 5. ![](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-5.-PCRat-coms.png) *Figure 5. PCRat communication with the C2 at 173.248.170\[.\]149:80* Initially, we were curious about the sample's old timestamp and it being hardly modified from the original PCRat binary which had been publicly available for many years. However, the operator seemed to be actively operating the malware when we observed the communication between it and the C2 server at the time of our analysis. The decoded KimJongRAT sample seems to exhibit a few changes in the code from the variants [reported](https://malware.lu/assets/files/articles/RAP003_KimJongRAT-Stealer_Analysis.1.0.pdf) in the past. This sample added a substitution cipher to obfuscate API strings, as shown in Figure 5, to hide its intentions and removed its networking feature for C2 data exfiltration, possibly in favor of the password gathering discussed below. [![](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Figure6-2.png)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Figure6-2.png) *Figure 6. Encrypted API strings in KimJongRAT* As the original filename "cow\_pass.fig" suggests, KimJongRAT seems to be wholly used as a password extraction and information stealer tool by the threat actor, and the collected data are exfiltrated to C2 with support from other malware such as BabyShark or PCRat. The information that the KimJongRAT malware steals from victim machines include email credentials from Microsoft Outlook and Mozilla Thunderbird, login credentials for Google, Facebook, and Yahoo accounts from browsers Internet Explorer, Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Yandex Browser. All this information together with the victims machines' OS version are stored into the file "%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\ttmp.log". The contents in "ttmp.log" always begin with the string "AAAAFFFF0000CCCC" and then appended with base64 encoded stolen credentials. # CVE-2018-8174 We have not observed an in-the-wild case yet, but we did find a PHP sample exploiting [CVE-2018-8174](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-8174) (Windows VBScript Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability) on the BabyShark C2 server, and this suggests that the threat actor may be leveraging this vulnerability to make a target load BabyShark's first stage HTA via a watering hole attack or a malicious URL in a spearphishing email. The attacker's exploit script logs the victim's remote IP address and redirects to http://google\[.\]com if the access is made more than one time from the same IP. This again is perhaps a tactic meant to thwart researchers. if(file\_exists($filename)) { if($ff=fopen("resp","a")) { fwrite($ff, $date . " " . $ip . " ".$useragent." reopen document." ."\\r\\n"); fclose($ff); } header("location: http://google\[.\]com"); exit; } if($ff=fopen("resp","a")) { fwrite($ff, $date . " " . $ip . " ".$useragent." open document." ."\\r\\n"); fclose($ff); } # Cowboy Converter During our research, we discovered a Graphical User Interface (GUI) based program likely created by the BabyShark malware author from a public malware repository. The file is to use as a file encoder tool to convert a PE file into a payload format loadable by the previously described Cowboy EXE and DLL loaders. We believe this tool is used by the BabyShark author to create their attack. Its metadata is in Table 5, below. |-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | **SHA256** | bd6efb16527b025a5fd256bb357a91b4ff92aff599105252e50b87f1335db9e1 | | **timestamp** | 2019-01-30 18:22:51 | | **size** | 24,576 | | **Import hash** | bde663d08d4e2e17940d890ccf2e6e74 | *Table 5. Cowboy converter metadata* This tool simply opens a file with the name of "cowboy" in the current working directory and encodes it into the Cowboy encoding format as detailed below. If a file with the name of "cowboy" is not found, it pops up a message box notifying "The file cowboy isn't there!" shown in Figure 7. [![](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-7.-Cowboy_Converter.png)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fig-7.-Cowboy_Converter.png) *Figure 7. Cowboy converter and cowboy file not found pop up message* The encoding is done via the following three steps: 1. Reverse the original byte content read from the file with the name of "cowboy" 2. Take the reversed bytes and Base64 encode them 3. Take the base64 encoded string and chop it into 10 blocks and reverse the blocks' order We have written a decoder script in Python and it is available in the appendix section of this blog. # Conclusion Since releasing our previous research, malicious attacks leveraging the BabyShark malware have continued. In fact, they have widened their operation to target the cryptocurrency industry. The malware's server-side implementation showed that the malware author has made certain efforts to maintain the operational security for operating the malware and C2 infrastructures. The threat actor leverages other commodity and custom developed tools in their campaigns. In this case, they were PCRat and KimJongRAT, but these may be changed to other malware families in the future. Malicious attacks using the BabyShark malware also seem likely to continue based on our observations and may continue expanding into new industries. Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from this threat in the following ways: * WildFire and Traps detect all malware families and vulnerability exploits mentioned in this report as malicious * C2 domains used by the threat actors are blocked via Threat Prevention * Pre and post infection network communications by the BabyShark and PCRat malware families are blocked by our IPS engine * CVE-2018-8174 exploit is blocked by our IPS engine AutoFocus customers can monitor ongoing activity from the threats discussed in this report by looking at the following tags: * [BabyShark](https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com/#/tag/Unit42.BabyShark) * [CowboyLoader](https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com/#/tag/Unit42.CowboyLoader) * [CowboyConverter](https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com/#/tag/Unit42.CowboyConverter) Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, in this report with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. For more information on the Cyber Threat Alliance, visit [www.cyberthreatalliance.org](https://www.cyberthreatalliance.org/). # Indicators of Compromise Malicious Word Macro Document 75917cc1bd9ecd7ef57b7ef428107778b19f46e8c38c00f1c70efc118cb8aab5, PCRat f86d05c1d7853c06fc5561f8df19b53506b724a83bb29c69b39f004a0f7f82d8, KimJongRAT d50a0980da6297b8e4cec5db0a8773635cee74ac6f5c1ff18197dfba549f6712, Cowboy Loader 4b3416fb6d1ed1f762772b4dd4f4f652e63ba41f7809b25c5fa0ee9010f7dae7 33ce9bcaeb0733a77ff0d85263ce03502ac20873bf58a118d1810861caced254 Cowboy Converter bd6efb16527b025a5fd256bb357a91b4ff92aff599105252e50b87f1335db9e1, # Appendix - Python Script for Decoding Cowboy import base64 with open('cowboy', 'r') as file\_in, open('cowboy\_clear.bin', 'wb') as file\_out: EncStr = file\_in.read() BlkSz = 10 len\_EncStr = len(EncStr) NonBlk10\_ptr = len\_EncStr - (BlkSz -1) \* (len\_EncStr // BlkSz) NonBlk10 = EncStr \[:NonBlk10\_ptr\] result = '' EncStr = EncStr \[NonBlk10\_ptr::\] \#print EncStr x = range (-1,BlkSz-1) Blksize1 = len\_EncStr // BlkSz for n in x: loop\_buff1\_ptr = n \* (len\_EncStr // BlkSz) loop\_buff1 = EncStr \[loop\_buff1\_ptr:loop\_buff1\_ptr+Blksize1\] \#print loop\_buff1 result = loop\_buff1 + result result = result + NonBlk10 clear = base64.b64decode(result)\[::-1\] print clear file\_out.write(clear) Back to top ### Tags * [BabyShark](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/babyshark/ "BabyShark") * [CowboyConverter](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cowboyconverter/ "CowboyConverter") * [CowboyLoader](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cowboyloader/ "CowboyLoader") * [KimJongRAT](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/kimjongrat/ "KimJongRAT") * [PCRat](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/pcrat/ "PCRat") [Threat Research Center](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com "Threat Research") [Next: Don't Panic Podcast - Watering Hole Attacks](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dont-panic-podcast-watering-hole-attacks/ "Don't Panic Podcast - Watering Hole Attacks") ### Related Articles * [New BabyShark Malware Targets U.S. National Security Think Tanks](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/ "article - table of contents") ## Related Resources ![Pictorial representation of post-exploitation identity misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE. 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The scene is illuminated with a futuristic blue and red glow.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/04_Malware_Category_1920x900-6-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) September 9, 2026 [#### Untracked Nightmares: The Threats Hiding Behind Commodity Infrastructure](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ppi-network-malware-campaign-analysis/) * [ARKTunnel](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/arktunnel/ "ARKTunnel") * [C2](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/c2/ "C2") * [CL-CRI-1171](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cl-cri-1171/ "CL-CRI-1171") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ppi-network-malware-campaign-analysis/ "Untracked Nightmares: The Threats Hiding Behind Commodity Infrastructure") ![Pictorial representation of attackers using AI tools to target Latin American organizations. A vibrant cityscape with silhouettes of numerous people walking along a bustling street. The scene is illuminated by bright urban lights and digital-like particles, creating a dynamic and futuristic atmosphere.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AdobeStock_768915868-2-1-786x373.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) September 3, 2026 [#### Attackers Expose Ongoing AI Tool Use Targeting Organizations in Latin America](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-tool-use-targeting-latam-orgs/) * [Agentic AI](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/agentic-ai/ "Agentic AI") * [ChatGPT](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/chatgpt/ "ChatGPT") * [CL-CRI-1131](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cl-cri-1131/ "CL-CRI-1131") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-tool-use-targeting-latam-orgs/ "Attackers Expose Ongoing AI Tool Use Targeting Organizations in Latin America") ![Pictorial representation of vishing campaigns in Microsoft Teams. A digital image of a skull formed by blue binary code on a black background, with scattered ones and zeros and digital noise, symbolizes how stealthy prompt injection attacks can exploit AI logic to bypass security controls.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/01_Malware_Category_1920x900-5-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 31, 2026 [#### Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/) * [Cloaked Ursa](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cloaked-ursa/ "Cloaked Ursa") * [Entra ID](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/entra-id/ "Entra ID") * [Microsoft Teams](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/microsoft-teams/ "Microsoft Teams") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/ "Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams") ![Pictorial representation of AI-enabled malware. A vibrant digital interface displaying various icons and graphs, resembling a futuristic network or data analysis dashboard. The scene is illuminated with glowing lights and patterns.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/AdobeStock_1270203474-2-1-786x368.png) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 25, 2026 [#### The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-enabled-malware-analysis/) * [Backdoor](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/backdoor/ "backdoor") * [Bitcoin](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bitcoin/ "Bitcoin") * [DLL hijacking](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/dll-hijacking/ "DLL hijacking") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-enabled-malware-analysis/ "The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution") ![Pictorial representation of identity abuse through trusted communication channels. Close-up view of a digital screen displaying a glitched and pixelated image of a skull-like shape.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02_Malware_Category_1920x900-2-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 20, 2026 [#### Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/communication-channel-identity-risks/) * [Authentication](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/authentication/ "authentication") * [Identity theft](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/identity-theft/ "identity theft") * [Malware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/malware/ "malware") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/communication-channel-identity-risks/ "Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels") ![Pictorial representation of Kimwolf botnet malware family. Digital screen with a warning sign reading "Malware." The background features lines of computer code and graphics, creating a sense of cybersecurity threat.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/07_Malware_Category_1920x900-3-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 11, 2026 [#### Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Botnet](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/kimwolf-v7-botnet-malware/) * [Android APK](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/android-apk/ "Android APK") * [Ethereum](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ethereum/ "Ethereum") * [HTTP](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/http/ "HTTP") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/kimwolf-v7-botnet-malware/ "Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Botnet") ![Pictorial representatiom pf Aeternum's blockchain C2. A close-up of a computer circuit board with a central microchip is depicted. Red digital data streams in the form of glowing binary numbers and arrows appear to flow in and out of the chip. The scene is illuminated with a futuristic blue and red glow.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/04_Malware_Category_1920x900-4-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 10, 2026 [#### The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum's Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and Communications](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/aeternum-blockchain-c2-analysis/) * [Aeternum](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/aeternum/ "Aeternum") * [Infection chain](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/infection-chain/ "infection chain") * [JSON](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/json/ "JSON") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/aeternum-blockchain-c2-analysis/ "The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum’s Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and Communications") ![Pictorial representation of ChainDrop, a self-propagating npm worm. An artistic depiction of a digital workspace featuring an open laptop with a red virus on the screen.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/03_Malware_Category_1920x900-7-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/top-threats.svg)High Profile Threats](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/top-cyberthreats/) August 6, 2026 [#### ChainDrop: Inside a Self-Propagating npm Worm](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chaindrop-npm-worm-analysis/) * [Blockchain](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/blockchain/ "blockchain") * [ChainDrop](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/chaindrop/ "ChainDrop") * [Claude code](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/claude-code/ "Claude code") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chaindrop-npm-worm-analysis/ "ChainDrop: Inside a Self-Propagating npm Worm") ![Pictorial representation of Token-jacking. A person types on a laptop with multiple digital interface elements projected, including an "AI" icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/AdobeStock_1246251272-2-786x369.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 6, 2026 [#### Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Could Be Stealing Your AI Resources](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-token-jacking/) * [AI API](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ai-api/ "AI API") * [AI gateway](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ai-gateway/ "AI gateway") * [API keys](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/api-keys/ "API keys") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-token-jacking/ "Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Could Be Stealing Your AI Resources") * ![Slider arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/slider-arrow-left.svg) * ![Slider arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/slider-arrow-left.svg) ![Close button](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/close-modal.svg) ![Enlarged Image]() ![Newsletter](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/unit42-footer-subscribe-desktop.png) ![UNIT 42 Small Logo](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/palo-alto-logo-small.svg) Get updates from Unit 42 ## Peace of mind comes from staying ahead of threats. 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