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BazarCall Method: Call Centers Help Spread BazarLoader Malware ![Clock Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-clock.svg) 9 min read Related Products [![Advanced Threat Prevention icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/strata_RGB_logo_Icon_Color.png)Advanced Threat Prevention](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/product-category/advanced-threat-prevention/ "Advanced Threat Prevention")[![Next-Generation Firewall icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/strata_RGB_logo_Icon_Color.png)Next-Generation Firewall](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/product-category/next-generation-firewall/ "Next-Generation Firewall") * ![Profile Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-profile-grey.svg) By: * [Brad Duncan](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/author/brad-duncan/) * ![Published Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-calendar-grey.svg) Published:May 19, 2021 * ![Tags Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-category.svg) Categories: * [Malware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/malware/) * [Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) * ![Tags Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-tags-grey.svg) Tags: * [BazaCall](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazacall/) * [BazaLoader](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazaloader/) * [Bazar](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazar/) * [BazarCall](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazarcall/) * [BazarLoader](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazarloader/) * [![Download Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-download.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bazarloader-malware/?pdf=download&lg=en&_wpnonce=279fa6c5e6 "Click here to download") * [![Print Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-print.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bazarloader-malware/?pdf=print&lg=en&_wpnonce=279fa6c5e6 "Click here to print") Share![Down arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/down-arrow.svg) * ![Link Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-share-link.svg) * [![Link Email](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-sms.svg)](mailto:?subject=BazarCall%20Method:%20Call%20Centers%20Help%20Spread%20BazarLoader%20Malware&body=Check%20out%20this%20article%20https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbazarloader-malware%2F "Share in email") * [![Facebook Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-fb-share.svg)](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbazarloader-malware%2F "Share in Facebook") * [![LinkedIn Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-linkedin-share.svg)](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbazarloader-malware%2F&title=BazarCall%20Method:%20Call%20Centers%20Help%20Spread%20BazarLoader%20Malware "Share in LinkedIn") * [![Twitter Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-twitter-share.svg)](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbazarloader-malware%2F&text=BazarCall%20Method:%20Call%20Centers%20Help%20Spread%20BazarLoader%20Malware "Share in Twitter") * [![Reddit Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-reddit-share.svg)](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com//www.reddit.com/submit?url=https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbazarloader-malware%2F&ts=markdown "Share in Reddit") * [![Mastodon Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-mastodon-share.svg)](https://mastodon.social/share?text=BazarCall%20Method:%20Call%20Centers%20Help%20Spread%20BazarLoader%20Malware%20https%3A%2F%2Funit42.paloaltonetworks.com%2Fbazarloader-malware%2F "Share in Mastodon") ## Executive Summary [BazarLoader](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.bazarbackdoor) (sometimes referred to as BazaLoader) is malware that provides backdoor access to an infected Windows host. After a client is infected, criminals use this backdoor access to send follow-up malware, scan the environment and exploit other vulnerable hosts on the network. The threat actor behind BazarLoader uses different methods to distribute this malware to potential victims. In early[February 2021](https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1356571665648537601), researchers began reporting a call center-based method of distributing BazarLoader. This method utilizes emails with a trial subscription-based theme that encourages potential victims to call a phone number. A call center operator then answers and directs victims to a website to unsubscribe from the service. Call center operators offer to personally guide victims through a process designed to infect vulnerable computers with BazarLoader. An example of the process can be found in [this YouTube video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAkeXCYcl4Y). This call center-based process of infecting computers with BazarLoader [has been dubbed the "BazarCall" method](https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1356571665648537601) (sometimes referred to as "BazaCall" method). Palo Alto Networks [Next-Generation Firewall](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/network-security/next-generation-firewall) customers are protected from this threat with a [Threat Prevention](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/subscriptions/threat-prevention) security subscription. ## Chain of Events for Infections Using the BazarCall Method BazarCall infections follow a distinct pattern of activity. See Figure 1 for a flow chart showing the chain of events. ![BazarCall flow chart campaign shows victims led through steps that infect their system with BazarLoader malware.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-60.jpeg) Figure 1. BazarCall chain of events Chain of Events for an Infection Using the BazarCall Method: * A trial subscription-themed email with a phone number to a call center for assistance. * Victim calls the phone number from the email. * Call center operator guides the victim to a fake company website. * Victim downloads a Microsoft Excel file from the website. * The call center operator instructs the victim to enable macros on the downloaded Excel file. * The vulnerable Windows computer is infected with BazarLoader malware. * The call center operator then tells the victim that the unsubscription is successful. * BazarLoader generates command and control (C2) traffic from the infected Windows host. * Backdoor access through BazarLoader leads to post-infection activities. These emails state that the victim's trial subscription is ending, and the victim's credit card will be charged. Phone numbers in these emails change at least daily, and occasionally we have seen two or more numbers appear during a single day. ## Posing as A Victim A video has been posted on YouTube documenting someone posing as a victim and having a [center operator guide them through the fake unsubscription process](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAkeXCYcl4Y). We contacted this call center on at least five different occasions, and the operator was a different person each time. All operators were seemingly non-native English speakers. Two of the operators were female, and three were male. Each operator followed the same basic script, but there were variations. The following conversation took place on Wednesday, April 14, 2021 using a phone number from the email shown below in Figure 2. ![Example of email conversation that took place on Wednesday, April 14, 2021 using a phone number from the email.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-61.jpeg) Figure 2. Email used by the person posing as a victim. Operator: Customer service. How may I help you? Victim: Hi. I got an email today from a company called Paradise Books. It says I have a subscription, and my credit card will be charged. But I've never dealt with Paradise Books. I don't remember doing anything or going to a website for Paradise Books or anything like that. Operator: Okay, sir. Do you have a subscription number? Victim: Yes, hold on. It's 040\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*. *\[Note: The last 9 digits of this number are purposely not shown here because this number identifies the recipient's email address.\]* Operator: Okay, I can repeat that back to you. It is 040\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*. Victim: Yes. Operator: Yes sir, just hold on a moment let me check our system. Victim: Okay. *\[hold music\]* Operator: Hello? Victim: Yes. Operator: Okay. It seems this account was opened by John Edwards, but your email starts with *\[victim's first name\]*. Victim: Yes, I'm *\[victim's first name\]*. I don't know any John Edwards. Operator: Okay, sir. You'll need to cancel the subscription. So what you need to do is go to worldbooks dot US. Operator: Worldbooks *\[states each letter phonetically\]* dot US. Victim: Hold on a second. Let me get that in my web browser. Operator: Yes? Can I read it back again? Victim: No thank you. I have it. *\[typing sounds\]* Operator: Hello? Victim: Yes, hold on. It looks like it's loading. Operator: Have you seen the website yet? Victim: Okay, here we go. It says "World Books." So I've got a web page. I've never seen this site before. Operator: No problem. We can just cancel the subscription. What you need is your subscriber number that you told me earlier. Victim: Okay. ![Screenshot of fake website used in BazarCall method.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-62.jpeg) Figure 3. BazarCall website from April 14, 2021. Operator: Can you see the subscribe button? Victim: Yes. Operator: When you click on that, you should be able to see unsubscribe. Victim: Okay, I'm clicking the subscribe button. Operator: Can you see unsubscribe? Victim: I see a line that says, "Do you want to unsubscribe?" ![Screenshot of subscribe page for BazarCall's fake website.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-63.jpeg) Figure 4. BazarCall website subscribe page with link to unsubscribe. Operator: That is where you need to go. Can you click it? Victim: Okay. Operator: And then you enter the subscription number. Victim: Gotcha. *\[typing sounds\]* ![Screenshot of the unsubscribe page for the BazarCall method's fake website.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-64.jpeg) Figure 5. BazarCall website unsubscribe page. Operator: Once you do that, you will receive a confirmation document. Victim: Okay, it's asking me what do I want to do with subscription 16184 something XLSB? ![The fake World Books website provides an Excel file to download.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-65.jpeg) Figure 6. BazarCall website unsubscribe page returns an Excel file. Operator: That is the confirmation document. That's where you have your confirmation code. Victim: Should I open it? Should I save it? Or what? Operator: You can open it, if you need the confirmation. The confirmation code is important. In case anything happens, you can call us and give us the confirmation code. Victim: Okay. Operator: So we can solve the issue. Victim: Gotcha. Alright. Operator: Did you get it? Victim: Alright. I'm opening it right now. I see Excel Office 365. This document is protected. Previewing is not available for protected documents. I have to press enable. ![Screenshot of Excel file to download while on BazarCall](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-66.jpeg) Figure 7. Screenshot of Excel file downloaded from BazarCall website. Operator: Click editing and enable content. Victim: Okay. *\[pauses\]* Alright. The spreadsheet changed. *\[pauses\]* It shows a form with a company name, first name, last name, birthdate, and all that stuff. ![Screenshot of Excel file, which changed its name after enabling macros.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-67.jpeg) Figure 8. Excel file after enabling macros. Note the different filename on the title bar. Operator: Okay, can you see the code? The code is the important one. Victim: I don't see a code, no. Operator: Okay. There are different pages. Can you see the next page? Victim: Where is this code supposed to be? Operator: There is a confirmation code in case you don't want to get charged but in case you get charged, that is what you call us with in order to cancel the charge. Victim: Okay, I still don't know where I'm supposed to find this code. Operator: Just hold on and let me check with the department of IT. Victim: Okay. *\[hold music for approximately 1 minute\]* Operator: Hello sir. Victim: Yes. Operator: I've checked with the IT department, and they are saying that the cancellation went through correctly. We are just having an issue with our servers, but the cancellation went through successfully. Victim: Okay. Operator: So nothing will be charged to your account. And they've given me a code on their end. Can I read it to you? Victim: Yes. Operator: The code is *\[spells out seven characters of an alpha-numeric code\]*. Victim: Okay. Operator: In case of any problem, you can just call back and give us that code. We will be able to resolve any issue. Victim: Okay. Thank you. Operator: You're welcome sir. And if you call back, you can ask for *\[operator's first name\]* , because we have many *\[garbled\]*. *\[Victim repeats operator's first name\]* Operator: Yes, that's my name. Victim: Alright, well thank you. Operator: Have a good day. Victim: Goodbye. Operator: Goodbye sir. ## Infection Traffic After macros are enabled on the downloaded Excel file, the BazarLoader DLL is dropped, and it generates a URL containing the string campo. This type of URL is called [Campo Loader](https://fr3d.hk/blog/campo-loader-simple-but-effective), which acts as a gateway that redirects traffic to malware. Some examples of Campo Loader URLs generated by a BazarLoader DLL are shown below in Table 1. |------------|------------------------------------| | **Date** | **URL** | | 2021-03-25 | hxxp://whynt\[.\]xyz/campo/w/w | | 2021-03-29 | hxxp://veso2\[.\]xyz/campo/r/r1 | | 2021-03-31 | hxxp://about2\[.\]xyz/campo/a/a1 | | 2021-04-07 | hxxp://basket2\[.\]xyz/campo/u/u1 | | 2021-04-08 | hxxp://dance4\[.\]xyz/campo/d8/d9 | | 2021-04-14 | hxxp://glass3\[.\]xyz/campo/gl/gl3 | | 2021-04-15 | hxxp://idea5\[.\]xyz/campo/id/id8 | | 2021-04-16 | hxxp://keep2\[.\]xyz/campo/jl/jl7 | *Table 1. Recent Campo Loader URLs generated by BazarCall spreadsheet macros.* Figure 9 shows a Campo Loader URL from April 14, 2021 redirecting to a URL for BazarLoader. ![Redirecting code for BazarLoader method.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-68.jpeg) Figure 9. Campo Loader URL successfully redirecting to a URL for BazarLoader. Examples of recent URLs for BazarLoader EXE files are shown below in Table 2. |------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------| | **Date** | **URL** | | 2021-03-25 | hxxp://whynt\[.\]xyz/uploads/files/dl8x64.exe | | 2021-03-29 | hxxp://admin.yougleeindia\[.\]in/theme/js/plugins/o1e.exe | | 2021-03-29 | hxxp://admin.yougleeindia\[.\]in/theme/js/plugins/rt3ret3.exe | | 2021-03-31 | hxxp://about2\[.\]xyz/uploads/files/ret5er.exe | | 2021-04-07 | hxxp://www.carsidecor\[.\]com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/cv76.exe | | 2021-04-08 | hxxp://dance4\[.\]xyz/uploads/files/10r3.exe | | 2021-04-14 | hxxp://glass3\[.\]xyz/uploads/files/hah5.exe | | 2021-04-15 | hxxp://idea5\[.\]xyz/uploads/files/ratan.exe | | 2021-04-15 | hxxp://idea5\[.\]xyz/uploads/files/rets.exe | | 2021-04-16 | hxxp://keep2\[.\]xyz/uploads/files/suka.exe | *Table 2. Recent URLs for BazarLoader malware.* The BazarLoader executable generates HTTPS C2 traffic noted below in Figure 10. ![An example of web traffic on an Excel spreadsheet for the BazarBackdoor C2 traffic.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-69.jpeg) Figure 10. Traffic from the BazarLoader infection. ## Forensics on Infected Windows Host This section describes forensics on an infected Windows host from April 14, 2021. SHA256 hash for the downloaded spreadsheet is: db53f42e13d2685bd34dbc5c79fad637c9344e72e210ca05504420874e98c2a6 Macros from the downloaded Excel file create artifacts in the Windows computer's C:\\Users\\Public directory as shown in Figure 11. ![Screenshot of a Windows computer's folders after macros are downloaded.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-70.jpeg) Figure 11. Artifacts were created after enabling macros from the downloaded Excel file on April 14, 2021 File information is shown below in Table 3. The first two are text files with the same SHA256 hash. The other file is a BazarLoader DLL. |---------------|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | **File name** | **File type** | **SHA256 hash** | | 130486.xlsb | ASCII text | 2632c0cc222a6d436b50a418605a7bd4fa8f363ab8d93d10b831cdb28a2ac1bc | | 130486.dot | ASCII text | 2632c0cc222a6d436b50a418605a7bd4fa8f363ab8d93d10b831cdb28a2ac1bc | | 130486.pgj | DLL | f3b5cf1e40aed4567a8996cf107285907d432b4bc8cc3d0b46aae628813d82d4 | *Table 3. Artifacts from a BazarCall spreadsheet seen on April 14, 2021.* 130486\.xlsb and 130486.dot consist of an American Standard Code For Information Interchange (ASCII) string with base64 text. This text represents the BazarLoader dynamic link library (DLL) file. Macro code from the downloaded Excel file converts the base64 text to a DLL named 130486.pgj and runs this DLL using the following script commands: * cmd.exe /c certutil -decode %PUBLIC%\\130486.dot %PUBLIC%\\130486.pgj * rundll32 %PUBLIC%\\130486.pgj,DF1 Keep in mind these files are from one specific example. Artifacts generated from other spreadsheets have different names and different file extensions. Common characteristics include: * All three artifacts have the same name, but different file extensions. * Two of the artifacts are ASCII strings with base64 text. * One of the artifacts is a DLL for BazarLoader. * One of the text-based artifacts uses an .xlsb file extension. The DLL is designed to retrieve a BazarLoader EXE. In our example from April 14, 2021, the BazarLoader EXE was saved to a folder under the C:\\ProgramData directory as shown below in Figure 12. ![A Windows screenshot of program data and properties folders.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/word-image-71.jpeg) Figure 12. Windows EXE file for BazarLoader. ## Follow-Up Activities BazarLoader provides backdoor access to an infected Windows host. In some cases, Cobalt Strike is seen as follow-up malware, leading to other malware like [Anchor](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.anchor). At least two cases have been publicly documented where BazarLoader malware led to Cobalt Strike and then to Anchor malware. [One case](https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/08/bazar-drops-the-anchor/) happened in February 2021, and the[other case](https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/April+2021+Forensic+Quiz+Answers+and+Analysis/27308/) happened in March 2021. However, BazarLoader is not limited to just Cobalt Strike and Anchor as follow-up malware. 2020 saw reports of [BazarLoader leading to ransomware like Ryuk](https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/ryuk-2020-distributing-ransomware-via-trickbot-and-bazarloader). Backdoor access to an infected Windows host could lead to any family of malware. ## Conclusion As early as February 2021, we have seen several reports of the BazarCall method distributing BazarLoader malware using call center personnel. These infections follow noticeable patterns, and they can lead to other malware like Cobalt Strike, Anchor and Ryuk ransomware. Organizations with decent spam filtering, proper system administration and up-to-date Windows hosts have a much lower risk of infection from BazarLoader malware and its post-infection activity.[Palo Alto Networks Next-Generation Firewall](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/network-security/next-generation-firewall) customers are further protected from this threat with a [Threat Prevention security subscription](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/subscriptions/threat-prevention). Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise described in this report, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. For more information on the Cyber Threat Alliance, visit [www.cyberthreatalliance.org](https://www.cyberthreatalliance.org/). ## Indicators of Compromise **Appendix A** Examples of BazarCall emails (March and April 2021): [GitHub repository](https://github.com/pan-unit42/iocs/blob/master/BazarCall/Appendix-A.txt). **Appendix B** Examples of domains hosting the fake websites used for the BazarCall method (March and April 2021): [GitHub repository](https://github.com/pan-unit42/iocs/blob/master/BazarCall/Appendix-B.txt). **Appendix C** 96 examples of Excel spreadsheets from unsubscribe pages from fake websites using the BazarCall method (March and April 2021): [GitHub repository](https://github.com/pan-unit42/iocs/blob/master/BazarCall/Appendix-C.txt). **Appendix D** 11 examples of BazarLoader DLL files dropped by Excel spreadsheet macros (March and April 2021): [GitHub repository](https://github.com/pan-unit42/iocs/blob/master/BazarCall/Appendix-D.txt). **Appendix E** SHA256 hashes for 24 examples of BazarLoader EXE files retrieved by BazarLoader (March and April 2021): [GitHub repository](https://github.com/pan-unit42/iocs/blob/master/BazarCall/Appendix-E.txt). Back to top ### Tags * [BazaCall](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazacall/ "BazaCall") * [BazaLoader](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazaloader/ "BazaLoader") * [Bazar](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazar/ "Bazar") * [BazarCall](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazarcall/ "BazarCall") * [BazarLoader](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bazarloader/ "BazarLoader") [Threat Research Center](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com "Threat Research") [Next: DarkSide Ransomware Gang: An Overview](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/darkside-ransomware/ "DarkSide Ransomware Gang: An Overview") ### Table of Contents * ### Related Articles * [Threat Assessment: Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/ "article - table of contents") * [Flight of the Bumblebee: Email Lures and File Sharing Services Lead to Malware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bumblebee-malware-projector-libra/ "article - table of contents") * [There Is More Than One Way to Sleep: Dive Deep Into the Implementations of API Hammering by Various Malware Families](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/api-hammering-malware-families/ "article - table of contents") ## Related Malware Resources ![Pictorial representation of post-exploitation identity misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE. 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The scene is illuminated with a futuristic blue and red glow.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/04_Malware_Category_1920x900-6-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) September 9, 2026 [#### Untracked Nightmares: The Threats Hiding Behind Commodity Infrastructure](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ppi-network-malware-campaign-analysis/) * [ARKTunnel](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/arktunnel/ "ARKTunnel") * [C2](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/c2/ "C2") * [CL-CRI-1171](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cl-cri-1171/ "CL-CRI-1171") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ppi-network-malware-campaign-analysis/ "Untracked Nightmares: The Threats Hiding Behind Commodity Infrastructure") ![Pictorial representation of attackers using AI tools to target Latin American organizations. A vibrant cityscape with silhouettes of numerous people walking along a bustling street. The scene is illuminated by bright urban lights and digital-like particles, creating a dynamic and futuristic atmosphere.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AdobeStock_768915868-2-1-786x373.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) September 3, 2026 [#### Attackers Expose Ongoing AI Tool Use Targeting Organizations in Latin America](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-tool-use-targeting-latam-orgs/) * [Agentic AI](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/agentic-ai/ "Agentic AI") * [ChatGPT](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/chatgpt/ "ChatGPT") * [CL-CRI-1131](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cl-cri-1131/ "CL-CRI-1131") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-tool-use-targeting-latam-orgs/ "Attackers Expose Ongoing AI Tool Use Targeting Organizations in Latin America") ![Pictorial representation of vishing campaigns in Microsoft Teams. A digital image of a skull formed by blue binary code on a black background, with scattered ones and zeros and digital noise, symbolizes how stealthy prompt injection attacks can exploit AI logic to bypass security controls.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/01_Malware_Category_1920x900-5-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 31, 2026 [#### Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/) * [Cloaked Ursa](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cloaked-ursa/ "Cloaked Ursa") * [Entra ID](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/entra-id/ "Entra ID") * [Microsoft Teams](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/microsoft-teams/ "Microsoft Teams") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/ "Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams") ![Pictorial representation of AI-enabled malware. A vibrant digital interface displaying various icons and graphs, resembling a futuristic network or data analysis dashboard. The scene is illuminated with glowing lights and patterns.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/AdobeStock_1270203474-2-1-786x368.png) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 25, 2026 [#### The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-enabled-malware-analysis/) * [Backdoor](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/backdoor/ "backdoor") * [Bitcoin](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bitcoin/ "Bitcoin") * [DLL hijacking](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/dll-hijacking/ "DLL hijacking") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-enabled-malware-analysis/ "The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution") ![Pictorial representation of identity abuse through trusted communication channels. Close-up view of a digital screen displaying a glitched and pixelated image of a skull-like shape.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02_Malware_Category_1920x900-2-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 20, 2026 [#### Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/communication-channel-identity-risks/) * [Authentication](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/authentication/ "authentication") * [Identity theft](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/identity-theft/ "identity theft") * [Malware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/malware/ "malware") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/communication-channel-identity-risks/ "Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels") ![Pictorial representation of Kimwolf botnet malware family. Digital screen with a warning sign reading "Malware." The background features lines of computer code and graphics, creating a sense of cybersecurity threat.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/07_Malware_Category_1920x900-3-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 11, 2026 [#### Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Botnet](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/kimwolf-v7-botnet-malware/) * [Android APK](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/android-apk/ "Android APK") * [Ethereum](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ethereum/ "Ethereum") * [HTTP](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/http/ "HTTP") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/kimwolf-v7-botnet-malware/ "Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Botnet") ![Pictorial representatiom pf Aeternum's blockchain C2. A close-up of a computer circuit board with a central microchip is depicted. Red digital data streams in the form of glowing binary numbers and arrows appear to flow in and out of the chip. The scene is illuminated with a futuristic blue and red glow.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/04_Malware_Category_1920x900-4-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 10, 2026 [#### The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum's Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and Communications](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/aeternum-blockchain-c2-analysis/) * [Aeternum](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/aeternum/ "Aeternum") * [Infection chain](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/infection-chain/ "infection chain") * [JSON](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/json/ "JSON") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/aeternum-blockchain-c2-analysis/ "The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum’s Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and Communications") ![Pictorial representation of ChainDrop, a self-propagating npm worm. An artistic depiction of a digital workspace featuring an open laptop with a red virus on the screen.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/03_Malware_Category_1920x900-7-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/top-threats.svg)High Profile Threats](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/top-cyberthreats/) August 6, 2026 [#### ChainDrop: Inside a Self-Propagating npm Worm](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chaindrop-npm-worm-analysis/) * [Blockchain](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/blockchain/ "blockchain") * [ChainDrop](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/chaindrop/ "ChainDrop") * [Claude code](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/claude-code/ "Claude code") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chaindrop-npm-worm-analysis/ "ChainDrop: Inside a Self-Propagating npm Worm") ![Pictorial representation of Token-jacking. A person types on a laptop with multiple digital interface elements projected, including an "AI" icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/AdobeStock_1246251272-2-786x369.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 6, 2026 [#### Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Could Be Stealing Your AI Resources](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-token-jacking/) * [AI API](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ai-api/ "AI API") * [AI gateway](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ai-gateway/ "AI gateway") * [API keys](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/api-keys/ "API keys") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-token-jacking/ "Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Could Be Stealing Your AI Resources") * ![Slider arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/slider-arrow-left.svg) * ![Slider arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/slider-arrow-left.svg) ![Close button](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/close-modal.svg) ![Enlarged Image]() ![Newsletter](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/unit42-footer-subscribe-desktop.png) ![UNIT 42 Small Logo](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/palo-alto-logo-small.svg) Get updates from Unit 42 ## Peace of mind comes from staying ahead of threats. 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