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[Malware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/malware/ "Malware") [Malware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/malware/) # PGMiner: New Cryptocurrency Mining Botnet Delivered via PostgreSQL ![Clock Icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-clock.svg) 9 min read Related Products [![Advanced Threat Prevention icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/strata_RGB_logo_Icon_Color.png)Advanced Threat Prevention](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/product-category/advanced-threat-prevention/ "Advanced Threat Prevention")[![Advanced WildFire icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/strata_RGB_logo_Icon_Color.png)Advanced WildFire](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/product-category/advanced-wildfire/ "Advanced WildFire")[![Next-Generation Firewall icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/strata_RGB_logo_Icon_Color.png)Next-Generation 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While the underlying mining protocols and techniques remain fairly standard, malware actors tend to seek out and find smarter ways to hack into a victim's machines. Recently, Unit 42 researchers uncovered a novel Linux-based cryptocurrency mining botnet that exploits a disputed PostgreSQL remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability that compromises database servers for cryptojacking. We named the cryptocurrency mining botnet "PGMiner" after its delivery channel and mining behavior. At its core, PGMiner attempts to connect to the mining pool for Monero mining. Because the mining pool is not active anymore, we could not recover information about the actual profit of this malware family. PostgreSQL, also known as Postgres, is among the most-used open source relational database management systems (RDBMS) for production environments. According to [DB-Engines](https://db-engines.com/en/ranking), PostgreSQL ranks fourth among all database management systems (DBMS) as of November 2020 and has seen a steady increase in popularity since 2013. In particular, PostgreSQL was named database of the year in [2017](https://db-engines.com/en/blog_post/76) and [2018](https://db-engines.com/en/blog_post/79) by DB-Engines. The feature in PostgreSQL under exploitation is "copy from program," which was introduced in version 9.3 on Sept. 9, 2013. In 2018, [CVE-2019-9193](https://www.postgresql.org/about/news/cve-2019-9193-not-a-security-vulnerability-1935/) was linked to this feature, naming it as a "vulnerability." However, the PostgreSQL community challenged this assignment, and the CVE has been labeled as "disputed." We believe PGMiner is the first cryptocurrency mining botnet that is delivered via PostgreSQL. It is notable that malware actors have started to weaponize not only confirmed CVEs, but also disputed ones. Palo Alto Networks [Next-Generation Firewall](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/network-security/next-generation-firewall) customers are protected from PGMiner with the [WildFire](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/wildfire) and [Threat Prevention](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/subscriptions/threat-prevention) security subscriptions. At the time of this writing, none of the vendors on [VirusTotal](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/55698654f0fbcf5a6d52f3f44bc0f2257e06835e76fb7142d449a2d1641d7e4b/detection) detect PGMiner. WildFire, a cloud-based malware analysis platform, detects it by dynamic analysis with the observation of self-deletion and process impersonation. Besides the delivery channel, PGMiner's coin mining codebase reassembles some of the characteristics from the the [SystemdMiner](https://blog.netlab.360.com/systemdminer-when-a-botnet-borrows-another-botnets-infrastructure/) family and its variants [1](https://zhuanlan.kanxue.com/article-10818.htm), [2](https://cloud.tencent.com/developer/article/1587201) and[3](https://s.tencent.com/research/report/900.html), but with the following notable changes: * Delete the PostgreSQL table right after code launch to achieve fileless execution. * Collect system information and send it to the command and control (C2) server for victim identification. * Employ traditional and novel approaches to download curl binary in case the command is not available on the victim's machine. * Impersonate the "tracepath" process to hide its presence. * Attempt to kill competitor programs for better monetization. ## Attack Process Overview A high-level overview of PGMiner's execution flow is depicted in Figure 1. As explained before, the malicious payload is delivered via PostgreSQL, which communicates to the backend C2 servers through SOCKS5 proxies. After that, it downloads the coin mining payloads based on the system architecture. ![The image shows the process by which PGMiner exploits a disputed PostgreSQL RCE vulnerability. After initial compromise, the malicious payload is delivered via PostgreSQL, which communicates to the backend C2 servers through SOCKS5 proxies. After that, it downloads the coin mining payloads based on the system architecture.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/word-image-32.png) Figure 1. Structure of PGMiner exploiting a disputed PostgreSQL RCE vulnerability. During our analysis, we found that PGMiner constantly reproduces itself by recursively downloading certain modules. To better illustrate this process, we show the payload relationship in Figure 2. Each box links to a sample identified in the infection chain. The record contains filename, abbreviated SHA256 value and file type information. Note that whenever the architecture information is in the filename, we iterate through all other possible architectures and add the samples in the graph if successfully downloaded. The abbreviated C2 for each stage is marked with dark green. Also, the samples in light blue boxes have been extensively studied in previous research work ([SystemdMiner](https://blog.netlab.360.com/systemdminer-when-a-botnet-borrows-another-botnets-infrastructure/) and its variants [1](https://zhuanlan.kanxue.com/article-10818.htm), [2](https://zhuanlan.kanxue.com/article-10818.htm) and[3](https://zhuanlan.kanxue.com/article-10818.htm)). Here, we'll focus on the samples that appear in light red boxes and provide a summary of the rest. ![This figure shows the PGMiner payload relationship. Each box links to a sample identified in the infection chain. The record contains filename, abbreviated SHA256 value and file type information. Note that whenever the architecture information is in the filename, we iterate through all other possible architectures and add the samples in the graph if successfully downloaded. The abbreviated C2 for each stage is marked with dark green. Also, the samples in light blue boxes have been extensively studied in previous research work (SystemdMiner and its variants 1, 2 and 3). Here, we’ll focus on the samples that appear in light red boxes and provide a summary of the rest.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/image7.png) Figure 2. PGMiner payload relationship. ## Initial Compromise via PostgreSQL Exploit The root sample that triggered our investigation is 55698654f0fbcf5a6d52f3f44bc0f2257e06835e76fb7142d449a2d1641d7e4b, which is an AARCH64 ELF file that is static linked and stripped. At the time of this writing, none of the vendors on [VirusTotal](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/55698654f0fbcf5a6d52f3f44bc0f2257e06835e76fb7142d449a2d1641d7e4b/detection) is able to detect this malware, as shown in Figure 3. ![This shows how, at the time this blog was written, none of the vendors on VirusTotal detect PGMiner.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/word-image-34.png) Figure 3. None of the vendors on VirusTotal detect PGMiner. The sample above works as an exploit tool that attempts to exploit a controversial feature in PostgreSQL that allows RCE on the server's operating system (OS). By reverse engineering the binary as shown in Figure 4, we found the sample has the *libpq* postgresql client library statically linked. This is used for communicating with the target database servers. The attacker scans port 5432 (0x1538), used by PostgreSQLql of the hosts in the private/local network (i.e., 172.16.0.0, 192.168.0.0 and 10.0.0.0 subnets). The malware randomly picks a public network range (e.g., 190.0.0.0, 66.0.0.0) in an attempt to perform RCE on the PostgreSQL server. With the user "postgres", which is the default user of the database, the attacker performs a brute-force attack iterating over a built-in list of popular passwords such as *"* 112233\*"\* and *"* 1q2w3e4r\*"\* to crack the database authentication. ![By reverse engineering the binary as shown here, we found the sample has the libpq postgresql client library statically linked.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/word-image-35.png) Figure 4. PostgreSQL exploit code flow in PGMiner. Once the malware successfully breaks into the database, it uses the PostgreSQL "copy from program" feature to download and launch the coin mining scripts. The "copy from program" feature has been controversial since its debut in PostgreSQL 9.3. The feature allows the local or remote superuser to run shell script directly on the server, which has raised wide security concerns. In 2019, a CVE-2019-9193 was assigned to this feature, naming it as a "vulnerability." However, the PostgreSQL community challenged this assignment, and the CVE has been labeled as "disputed." The main argument against defining the feature as a vulnerability is that the feature itself does not impose a risk as long as the superuser privilege is not granted to remote or untrusted users and the access control and authentication system works well. On the other side, security researchers worry that this feature indeed makes PostgreSQL a stepping stone for remote exploit and code execution directly on the server's OS beyond the PostgreSQL software, if the attacker manages to own the superuser privilege by brute-forcing password or SQL injection. ![This shows the actual exploit content from PGMiner, which can be broken down to the following steps: clear the "abroxu" table if it exists, create the table with a text column, save the malicious payload to table "abroxu", execute the payload on the PostgreSQL server, clear the created table.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/word-image-36.png) Figure 5. PGMiner's exploit content to PostgreSQL. While this CVE is still being disputed, malware authors apparently have started to use it to stay under the detection radar by making the attack payload fileless. The actual exploit content from PGMiner is shown in Figure 5, which can be broken down to the following steps: |-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | **Step** | **SQL command** | | Clear the "abroxu" table if it exists. | DROP TABLE IF EXISTS abroxu; | | Create the table with a text column. | CREATE TABLE abroxu(cmd\_output text)*;* | | Save the malicious payload to table "abroxu". | COPY abroxu FROM PROGRAM "*shell command*"; | | Execute the payload on the PostgreSQL server. | SELECT \* FROM cmd\_exec; | | Clear the created table. | DROP TABLE IF EXISTS abroxu; | The malicious script payload saved in the "abroxu" table reassembles some of the characteristics from the known SystemdMiner malware family and its variants. Here we only highlight the major ways that PGMiner evolves from SystemdMiner, as well as overlooked functionalities. We have also added annotation to the script shown in the figures below to make this clear. #### **Downloading Curl** In the case that the curl command is not available on the victim's machine, the malicious script tries multiple approaches (see Figure 6) to download the curl binary and add it to the execution paths: * Direct installation from official package management utilities like apt-get and yum\*.\* * Download static curl binary from GitHub. * Download using /dev/tcp in case the normal ways don't work. ![In case the curl command is not available on the victim's machine, the malicious script tries multiple approaches to download the curl binary and add it to the execution paths, including: direct installation from official package management utilities like apt-get and yum; download the static curl binary from GitHub, dowload using /dev/tcp in case the normal ways don't work.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/word-image-37.png) Figure 6. PGMiner's multiple attempts to download curl binaries. While the first two approaches are well-known, the third one is quite unique. What's more interesting is the target IP address: 94\[.\]237\[.\]85\[.\]89. It is connected to the domain newt\[.\]keetup\[.\]com. While its parent domain, keepup\[.\]com, seems like a legitimate business website, this particular subdomain is redirecting port 80 to 443\*,\* which is used to host a [couchdb](https://couchdb.apache.org/) named newt. Although port 8080 is not open to the public, we believe it has been configured to allow Cross-Origin Resource Sharing ([CORS](https://docs.couchdb.org/en/latest/config/http.html#cors/origins)), as shown in Figure 7. ![Although port 8080 is not open to the public, we believe it has been configured to allow Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS).](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/word-image-38.png) Figure 7. newt\[.\]keetup\[.\]com is hosting a couchdb for curl binary downloading. #### **Resolving SOCKS5/TOR Relay Server Name** The C2 host name has been updated to nssnkct6udyyx6zlv4l6jhqr5jdf643shyerk246fs27ksrdehl2z3qd\[.\]onion. PGMiner also utilizes the SOCKS5 proxy technique to communicate with the C2, as described in this [SystemdMiner variant](https://zhuanlan.kanxue.com/article-10818.htm). However, as shown in Figure 8, the DNS server list has been expanded. ![The code from PGMiner shown here illustrates how the C2 host name has been updated and the DNS server list expanded.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/word-image-39.png) Figure 8. Updated C2 and expanded DNS server list observed in PGMiner. #### **Fetch Payloads From C2 and Launch PGMiner** After resolving the SOCKS5 proxy server IP address, PGMiner rotates through a list of folders to find the first one that allows permission to create a new file and update its attributes. This ensures the downloaded malicious payload can successfully execute on the victim's machine. This function has been observed in the previous research on the [SystemdMiner variant](https://zhuanlan.kanxue.com/article-10818.htm), but the author of the research did not provide an explanation of its purpose. The malware family also evolves with client tracking functionality. It concatenates the IP address, username, architecture, hostname and md5 of all inet IP ranges, as well as the base64 encoding of the crontab content, to formulate the client's unique identifier, which it reports to the C2 server. The code snippet is highlighted in Figure 9. ![The code snippet highlighted here shows how the malware family evolves with client tracking functionality. It concatenates the IP address, username, architecture, hostname and md5 of all inet IP ranges, as well as the base64 encoding of the crontab content, to formulate the client’s unique identifier, which it reports to the C2 server.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/word-image-40.png) Figure 9. PGMiner featches payloads from C2 and executes them. ## Multi-Architecture Payloads With different architectures supplied to the C2 server mentioned above, we were able to recover the following list of payloads. The downloads for other architectures failed. * a935d364622ebefbee659caaa9d0af5828952ab9501591c935cf1f919e2a38ff pg.aarch64: Shell Script * a935d364622ebefbee659caaa9d0af5828952ab9501591c935cf1f919e2a38ff pg.armv7l: Shell Script * 6d296648fdbc693e604f6375eaf7e28b87a73b8405dc8cd3147663b5e8b96ff0 pg.x86\_64: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, no section header Interestingly, the payload for x86\_64 is an ELF executable, while for aarch64 and armv7l, the payload is an identical shell script. #### **x86\_64 ELF Payload** The x86\_64 ELF payload shares the majority of behaviors seen in the previous [SystemdMiner variant](https://zhuanlan.kanxue.com/article-10818.htm), yet evolves with additional capabilities: * Environment Preparation: * Download and install curl binary as explained above. * Install crontab. * Remove cloud security monitor tools such as Aegis, and Qcloud monitor utilities such as Yunjing. * Virtual Machine Checking: PGMiner checks the existence of VBoxGuestAdditions to infer whether it is being analyzed in a virtual environment. * Competitors Removal: * Remove other known miner scripts, processes and crontab records. * Kill miner cleanup processes. * Kill all other CPU intensive processes such as ddg, system updates and so on. * Kill processes connected to known mining IP addresses. ## armv7l/aarch64 Shell Script Payload From the x86\_64 ELF payload, we were able to recover the CPU file from C2 jk5zra7b3yq32timb27n4qj5udk4w2l5kqn5ulhnugdscelttfhtoyd\[.\]onion, which is the coin mining module for PGMiner. However, the other cmd and bot modules are unavailable from the C2. Here, the armv7l/aarch64 shell script connects to a different C2, reambusweduybcp\[.\]onion. It also attempts to download the cmd file. This time, it succeeds. This indicates that the C2 server for this malware family is constantly updating. Different modules are distributed across different C2s. The cmd module first attempts to kill the tracepath process. Then, it downloads additional payload from the same C2 address. The downloaded malware impersonates the tracepath process to hide its presence. After analyzing the aarch64 payload, we recovered the same shell script initially used to run on PostgreSQL servers, which completes the analysis. ## Mitigations and Recommendations Palo Alto Networks Next-Generation Firewall customers are protected against PGMiner via the WildFire and Threat Prevention security subscriptions. At the same time, we urge PostgreSQL users to remove the "pg\_execute\_server\_program" privilege from untrusted users, which makes the exploit impossible. Moreover, we continue to recommend that users download software from trusted sources, manage strong and secure passwords and apply patches in a timely manner. To remove the impact of PGMiner on the PostgreSQL server, the user can search and kill the "tracepath" process, which this malware impersonates, and kill the processes whose process IDs (PIDs) have been tracked by the malware in "/tmp/.X11-unix/". ## Conclusion In this research, we unveiled PGMiner, a new cryptocurrency mining botnet delivered via a disputed PostgreSQL RCE vulnerability. The fact that PGMiner is exploiting a disputed vulnerability helped it remain unnoticed until we recently uncovered it at Palo Alto Networks. PGMiner can potentially be disruptive, as PostgreSQL is widely adopted in PDMS. With additional effort, the malware could target all major operating systems. For example, PostgreSQL is available for all major platforms, including macOS, Windows and Linux. Theoretically, the malware actors could implement another version of PGMiner by targeting a new platform, such as Windows, and deliver it using PostgreSQL. During our analysis, we observed new techniques, such as embedding victim identification in the request, impersonating a trusted process name, downloading curl binary via multiple approaches and more and aggressively killing all competitor programs. We also analyzed how the malware seeks to better track victims, execute, hide itself and monetize. Other traits, such as the malware recursively downloading itself and frequently changing C2 addresses, also indicate PGMiner is still rapidly evolving. ## Additional Information on Cryptojacking * [Highlights from the Unit 42 Cloud Threat Report, 2H 2020](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/highlight-cloud-threat-report-iam/) * [Black-T: New Cryptojacking Variant from TeamTnT](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/black-t-cryptojacking-variant/) * Cetus: Cryptojacking Worm Targeting Docker Daemons ## Indicator of Compromise (IOCs) Sample and payload identification as a tuple of filename, SHA256 and file type: * root.bin, 55698654f0fbcf5a6d52f3f44bc0f2257e06835e76fb7142d449a2d1641d7e4b, ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped * pg.x86\_64, 6d296648fdbc693e604f6375eaf7e28b87a73b8405dc8cd3147663b5e8b96ff0, ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, no section header * int.x86\_64, 6984a04d7e435499ff267cfaf913d51e8644f6c08db8069c56f9247f1e18ba71, ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, no section header * cpu, fef1a83ba6aba160116a8251462dd842f68464a5f767b2e3194820d62fef23b1, ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, no section header * pg.aarch64 / pg.armv7l, a935d364622ebefbee659caaa9d0af5828952ab9501591c935cf1f919e2a38ff, Shell Script * cmd, 864ece624b7069b929385f9cf741355a371e844aa3726d340f91549562e2c604, Shell Script * dream.aarch64, d8c46be19ff3ea5b2c12f050f226a199aaa5f76cc1731c868e29eea6c68b6801, ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, no section header * dream.armv7l, 8d44fbbefa0c59a65e21b0d1598ff7c51487ea1cede544d1c3f56d5db0ea7807, ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI5 version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, no section header * dream.mips, 41ef5c6b0cdd068f117902e59233991082a4ecb4877a1fb16016e756412f06ea, ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, no section header Additional samples related to the 55698654f0fbcf5a6d52f3f44bc0f2257e06835e76fb7142d449a2d1641d7e4b: * 1b1d6d5f01b26e4ccf6fff8f2626f9318084dc1123ac67ed7d02f955b72a1432 * 0fc1332d2b20ea43d3c3fea50a48bb1991522bc6c79d518ba9b68a763ef2ad58 * 8a13c3fe815f15a5600fda30d132dfbd4bb54d9c766da164060dd1d66b12e9e4 * 6d95b593f0b5e3cc1985635ad2b943acb083833fea8123e7ac3f88f68e04edd6 * 101ccbad7732fb185d51b91d31a67ff058cac3bc31ec36cec05094065a97d6fd * d4cf8cfb4dc9cc3101b8c850369a71af70f11e67df7e41e9af98624ebe54ff4a * 47d56fcbf5d90b9c513d8d38a2c00e4bad6ea4e1d17b05dd37feb4d63b2856e1 * e3c5abe56964ddb3b4f0b3c434a9af145efca558307c65d30e8acc5aed45bedc * 524cce2cf615809bc08ca80facf95f2be7c5071c4cb3eac38c20a1f0ed39ce1f C2: * nssnkct6udyyx6zlv4l6jhqr5jdf643shyerk246fs27ksrdehl2z3qd\[.\]onion * ojk5zra7b3yq32timb27n4qj5udk4w2l5kqn5ulhnugdscelttfhtoyd\[.\]onion * dreambusweduybcp\[.\]onion Back to top ### Tags * [Cryptocurrency mining](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cryptocurrency-mining/ "Cryptocurrency mining") * [Cryptojacking](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cryptojacking/ "cryptojacking") * [Exploit](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/exploit/ "exploit") * [PostgreSQL](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/postgresql/ "PostgreSQL") [Threat Research Center](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com "Threat Research") [Next: Threat Brief: VMware Command Injection Vulnerability (CVE-2020-4006)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2020-4006/ "Threat Brief: VMware Command Injection Vulnerability (CVE-2020-4006)") ### Table of Contents * ### Related Articles * [Diving Into Glupteba's UEFI Bootkit](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/glupteba-malware-uefi-bootkit/ "article - table of contents") * [In-Depth Analysis of July 2023 Exploit Chain Featuring CVE-2023-36884 and CVE-2023-36584](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-cve-2023-36584-discovered-in-attack-chain-used-by-russian-apt/ "article - table of contents") * [CloudKeys in the Air: Tracking Malicious Operations of Exposed IAM Keys](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/malicious-operations-of-exposed-iam-keys-cryptojacking/ "article - table of contents") ## Related Resources ![Pictorial representation of attackers using AI tools to target Latin American organizations. A vibrant cityscape with silhouettes of numerous people walking along a bustling street. The scene is illuminated by bright urban lights and digital-like particles, creating a dynamic and futuristic atmosphere.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AdobeStock_768915868-2-1-786x373.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) September 3, 2026 [#### Attackers Expose Ongoing AI Tool Use Targeting Organizations in Latin America](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-tool-use-targeting-latam-orgs/) * [Agentic AI](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/agentic-ai/ "Agentic AI") * [ChatGPT](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/chatgpt/ "ChatGPT") * [CL-CRI-1131](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cl-cri-1131/ "CL-CRI-1131") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-tool-use-targeting-latam-orgs/ "Attackers Expose Ongoing AI Tool Use Targeting Organizations in Latin America") ![Pictorial representation of vishing campaigns in Microsoft Teams. A digital image of a skull formed by blue binary code on a black background, with scattered ones and zeros and digital noise, symbolizes how stealthy prompt injection attacks can exploit AI logic to bypass security controls.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/01_Malware_Category_1920x900-5-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 31, 2026 [#### Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/) * [Cloaked Ursa](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cloaked-ursa/ "Cloaked Ursa") * [Entra ID](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/entra-id/ "Entra ID") * [Microsoft Teams](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/microsoft-teams/ "Microsoft Teams") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/ "Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams") ![Pictorial representation of AI-enabled malware. A vibrant digital interface displaying various icons and graphs, resembling a futuristic network or data analysis dashboard. The scene is illuminated with glowing lights and patterns.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/AdobeStock_1270203474-2-1-786x368.png) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 25, 2026 [#### The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-enabled-malware-analysis/) * [Backdoor](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/backdoor/ "backdoor") * [Bitcoin](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/bitcoin/ "Bitcoin") * [DLL hijacking](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/dll-hijacking/ "DLL hijacking") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-enabled-malware-analysis/ "The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution") ![Pictorial representation of identity abuse through trusted communication channels. Close-up view of a digital screen displaying a glitched and pixelated image of a skull-like shape.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02_Malware_Category_1920x900-2-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 20, 2026 [#### Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/communication-channel-identity-risks/) * [Authentication](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/authentication/ "authentication") * [Identity theft](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/identity-theft/ "identity theft") * [Malware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/malware/ "malware") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/communication-channel-identity-risks/ "Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels") ![Pictorial representation of Kimwolf botnet malware family. Digital screen with a warning sign reading "Malware." The background features lines of computer code and graphics, creating a sense of cybersecurity threat.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/07_Malware_Category_1920x900-3-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 11, 2026 [#### Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Botnet](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/kimwolf-v7-botnet-malware/) * [Android APK](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/android-apk/ "Android APK") * [Ethereum](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ethereum/ "Ethereum") * [HTTP](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/http/ "HTTP") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/kimwolf-v7-botnet-malware/ "Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Botnet") ![Pictorial representatiom pf Aeternum's blockchain C2. A close-up of a computer circuit board with a central microchip is depicted. Red digital data streams in the form of glowing binary numbers and arrows appear to flow in and out of the chip. The scene is illuminated with a futuristic blue and red glow.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/04_Malware_Category_1920x900-4-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 10, 2026 [#### The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum's Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and Communications](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/aeternum-blockchain-c2-analysis/) * [Aeternum](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/aeternum/ "Aeternum") * [Infection chain](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/infection-chain/ "infection chain") * [JSON](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/json/ "JSON") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/aeternum-blockchain-c2-analysis/ "The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum’s Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and Communications") ![Pictorial representation of ChainDrop, a self-propagating npm worm. An artistic depiction of a digital workspace featuring an open laptop with a red virus on the screen.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/03_Malware_Category_1920x900-7-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/top-threats.svg)High Profile Threats](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/top-cyberthreats/) August 6, 2026 [#### ChainDrop: Inside a Self-Propagating npm Worm](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chaindrop-npm-worm-analysis/) * [Blockchain](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/blockchain/ "blockchain") * [ChainDrop](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/chaindrop/ "ChainDrop") * [Claude code](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/claude-code/ "Claude code") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chaindrop-npm-worm-analysis/ "ChainDrop: Inside a Self-Propagating npm Worm") ![Pictorial representation of Token-jacking. A person types on a laptop with multiple digital interface elements projected, including an "AI" icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/AdobeStock_1246251272-2-786x369.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 6, 2026 [#### Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Could Be Stealing Your AI Resources](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-token-jacking/) * [AI API](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ai-api/ "AI API") * [AI gateway](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ai-gateway/ "AI gateway") * [API keys](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/api-keys/ "API keys") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-token-jacking/ "Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Could Be Stealing Your AI Resources") ![Pictorial representation of a group of people interacting with a dynamic 3D holographic display of colorful, undulating data waves on a table.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/11_Myth-Busting_Overview_1920x900-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Insights-icon-white.svg)Insights](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/insights/) August 4, 2026 [#### The Frontier AI Vulnerability Burst: Industrializing Autonomous Zero-Day Discovery in Open-Source Software](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/frontier-ai-vulnerability-burst/) * [AI](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/ai/ "AI") * [Frontier AI](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/frontier-ai/ "Frontier AI") * [Vulnerability Exploitation](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/vulnerability-exploitation/ "Vulnerability Exploitation") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/frontier-ai-vulnerability-burst/ "The Frontier AI Vulnerability Burst: Industrializing Autonomous Zero-Day Discovery in Open-Source Software") ![Pictorial representation of malware bypassing DNS and communicating directly to IP addresses. Futuristic digital cityscape with glowing blue and orange geometric structures, resembling skyscrapers.](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/07_DNS_Overview_1920x900-786x368.jpg) [![category icon](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/icon-threat-research.svg)Threat Research](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/threat-research/) August 4, 2026 [#### Almost Half of Malware Samples Communicate Direct to IP](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/malware-bypass-dns-direct-to-ip/) * [Command and Control](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/command-and-control/ "Command and Control") * [D2IP](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/d2ip/ "D2IP") * [Exfiltration](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/exfiltration/ "exfiltration") [Read now ![Right arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/icon-right-arrow-withtail.svg)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/malware-bypass-dns-direct-to-ip/ "Almost Half of Malware Samples Communicate Direct to IP") * ![Slider arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/slider-arrow-left.svg) * ![Slider arrow](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/slider-arrow-left.svg) ![Close button](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/icons/close-modal.svg) ![Enlarged Image]() ![Newsletter](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/unit42-footer-subscribe-desktop.png) ![UNIT 42 Small Logo](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/themes/unit42-v6/dist/images/palo-alto-logo-small.svg) Get updates from Unit 42 ## Peace of mind comes from staying ahead of threats. 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