Posts tagged with: OilRig

Unit 42’s continued look into OilRig analyzes the group’s operational tempo, including testing, weaponization and attack delivery.

Unit 42’s continued look into the OilRig threat group uncovers the use of spear-phishing emails to deliver an updated version the BONDUPDATER Trojan.

The OilRig group maintains their persistent attacks against government entities in the Middle East region using previously identified tools and tactics. As observed in previous attack campaigns, the tools used are not an exact duplicate of the previous attack and instead is an iterative variant. In this instance a spear phishing email was used containing

The OilRig group continues to adapt their tactics and bolster their toolset with newly developed tools. Get the full report from Unit 42.

Unit 42 details findings on the OilRig group’s attempted delivery of a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE

Unit 42’s continued look into OilRig reveals the use of an Internet Information Services backdoor deployed on government webservers in the Middle East.

Introducing the adversary playbook by Unit 42. First up, OilRig.

Unit 42 continues to its look into OilRig with analysis on recent TwoFace Webshell testing activities.

Unit 42 observed a new version of the Clayslide delivery document used to install a new custom Trojan whose developer calls “ALMA Communicator”.

OilRig group steps up attacks with new delivery documents and new injector trojan.

Striking oil: a closer look at adversary infrastructure.

New research from Unit 42: OilRig uses ISMDoor variant; possibly linked to Greenbug threat group.

Unit 42 researches the techniques used by attackers to avoid antivirus detection and successfully deliver OilRig campaign attacks.

Since our first published analysis of the OilRig campaign in May 2016 , we have continued to monitor this group for new activity. In recent weeks we’ve discovered that the group have been actively updating their Clayslide delivery documents, as well as the Helminth backdoor used against victims. Additionally, the scope of organizations targeted by

In May 2016, Unit 42 observed targeted attacks primarily focused on financial institutions and technology organizations within Saudi Arabia. Artifacts identified within the malware samples related to these attacks also suggest the targeting of the defense industry in Saudi Arabia, which appears to be related to an earlier wave of attacks carried out in the