HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost

This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)

Unit 42 recently discovered a new Android malware family we named “HenBox” masquerading as a variety of legitimate Android apps.  We chose the name “HenBox” based on metadata found in most of the malicious apps such as package names and signer detail. HenBox masquerades as apps such as VPN and Android system apps and often installs legitimate versions of these apps along with HenBox to trick users into thinking they downloaded the legitimate app. While some of the legitimate apps HenBox use as decoys can be found on Google Play, HenBox apps themselves have only been found on third-party (non-Google Play) app stores.
HenBox appears to primarily target the Uyghurs – a minority Turkic ethnic group that is primarily Muslim and lives mainly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in North West China. It also targets devices made by Chinese manufacturer Xiaomi and those running MIUI, an operating system based on Google Android made by Xiaomi. Smartphones are the dominant form of internet access in the region and Xinjiang was recently above the national average of internet users in China. The result is a large online population who have been the subject of numerous cyber-attacks in the past.
Once installed, HenBox steals information from the devices from a myriad of sources, including many mainstream chat, communication, and social media apps. The stolen information includes personal and device information. Of note, in addition to tracking the compromised device’s location, HenBox also harvests all outgoing phone numbers with an “86” prefix, which is the country code for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It can also access the phone’s cameras and microphone.
HenBox has ties to infrastructure used in targeted attacks with a focus on politics in South East Asia. These attackers have used additional malware families in previous activity dating to at least 2015 that include PlugX, Zupdax, 9002, and Poison Ivy. This also aligns with HenBox’s timeline, as in total we have identified almost 200 HenBox samples, with the oldest dating to 2015. Most of the samples we found date from the last half of 2017, fewer samples date from 2016, and a handful date back to 2015. In 2018, we have already observed a small but consistent number of samples. We believe this indicates a fairly sustained campaign that has gained momentum over recent months.

HenBox Enters the Uyghur App Store
In May 2016, a HenBox app was downloaded from uyghurapps[.]net. Specifically, the app was an Android Package (APK) file that will be discussed in more detail shortly. The domain name, language of the site and app content hosted suggest this site is a third-party app store for whom the intended users are the Uyghurs. Such app stores are so-called because they are not officially supported by Android, nor are they provided by Google, unlike the Play Store. Third-party app stores are ubiquitous in China for a number of reasons including: evermore powerful Chinese Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), a lack of an official Chinese Google Play app store, and a growing smartphone market.
The HenBox app downloaded in May 2016 was masquerading as the DroidVPN app. At the time of writing, the content served at the given URL on uyghurapps[.]net, is now a legitimate version of the DroidVPN app, and looks as shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 Uyghurapps[.]net app store showing the current DroidVPN app

Virtual Private Network (VPN) tools allow connections to remote private networks, increasing the security and privacy of the user’s communications. According to the DroidVPN app description, it “helps bypass regional internet restrictions, web filtering and firewalls by tunneling traffic over ICMP.” Some features may require devices to be rooted to function and according to some 3rd party app stores, unconditional rooting is required, which has additional security implications for the device.
We have not been able to ascertain how the DroidVPN app on the uyghurapps[.]net app store was replaced with the malicious HenBox app; however, some indicators point to the server running an outdated version of Apache Web Server on a Windows 32-Bit operating system. In light of this, we believe an attack against unpatched vulnerabilities is a reasonable conjecture for how the server was compromised.
The HenBox app downloaded in May 2016, as described in Table 1 below, masquerades as a legitimate version of the DroidVPN app by using the same app name “DroidVPN” and the same iconography used when displaying the app in Android’s launcher view, as highlighted in Figure 2 below Table 1.

APK SHA256 Size (bytes) First Seen App Package name
App name
0589bed1e3b3d6234c30061be3be1cc6685d786ab3a892a8d4dae8e2d7ed92f7 2,740,860 May 2016 com.android.henbox DroidVPN

Table 1 Details of the HenBox DroidVPN app on the uyghurapps[.]net app store


Figure 2 HenBox app installed, purporting to be DroidVPN

Depending on the language setting on the device, and for this particular variant of HenBox, the installed HenBox app may have the name “Backup” but uses the same DroidVPN logo. Other variants use other names and logos, as described later.
Given the DroidVPN look and feel being used by this variant of HenBox, it’s highly likely the uyghurapps[.]net page for DroidVPN remained identical when serving either HenBox or DroidVPN apps, just that the legitimate APK file had been replaced with HenBox for an unknown period of time.
In addition to the look and feel of DroidVPN, this HenBox variant also contained a legitimate DroidVPN app within its APK package as an asset, which could be compared to a resource item within a Windows Portable Executable (PE) file. Once the HenBox app is installed and launched, it launches an install process for the embedded app as a decoy to other malicious behaviors occurring in the background, and to satisfy the victim with the app they were requesting, assuming they requested to download a particular app, such as DroidVPN.
The version of the legitimate DroidVPN embedded inside this HenBox variant is the same version of DroidVPN available for download from uyghurapps[.]net, at the time of writing. It’s worth noting, newer versions of the DroidVPN app are available on Google Play, as well as in some other third-party app stores, which could indicate uyghurapps[.]net is not awfully well maintained or updated to the latest apps available.
At the time of writing, to our knowledge no other third-party app stores, nor the official Google Play store, were or are hosting this malicious HenBox variant masquerading as DroidVPN.

The Right App at the Right Time
The malicious HenBox and embedded DroidVPN app combination is one instance of the type of legitimate apps the attackers choose to mimic to compromise their victims. These threat actors frequently offer malicious apps purporting to be legitimate apps that are broadly used or important to a targeted population. It’s worth noting however, about one-third of the HenBox apps contained embedded APK objects that did not refer to legitimate apps. Some were only 3 bytes long, containing strings such as “ddd” and “333”, or were otherwise corrupted.
Beyond the previously mentioned DroidVPN example, other viable embedded apps we found include apps currently available on Google Play, as well as many third-party app stores. Table 2 below lists some of these apps with their respective metadata.

# Parent APK SHA256 First Seen Package names
(parent APK)
[embedded APK]
APK App names
(parent APK)
[embedded APK]
1 fa5a76e86abb26e48a
April 2016 (com.android.henbox)
(Uyghurche Kirguzguch)
2 1749df47cf37c09a92
May 2017 (cn.android.setting)
(设置 (Backup))
[Amaq Agency]
3 4d437d1ac29b1762c
June 2017 (cn.android.setting)

Table 2 Example HenBox variants containing embedded apps

Sample 1 marks the first HenBox sample we saw embedding a legitimate app within its assets to be dropped and installed on the victim device as a decoy. The legitimate app in question was a Uyghur language keyboard app targeted at native speakers of the Uyghur language and their smartphones.
Sample 2, has the package name cn.android.setting masquerading as Android’s Settings app, which has a similar package name (com.android.settings). This variant of HenBox also used the common green Android figure as the app logo and was named 设置 (“Backup” in English). This variant’s app name, along with many others, is written in Chinese and describes the app as a backup tool. Please see the IOCs section for all app and package name combinations. Interestingly, the embedded app in sample 2 is not a version of the Android Settings app but instead the “Amaq Agency” app, which reports on ISIS related news. Reports indicate fake versions of the Amaq app exist, likely in order to spy on those that use it.
A month after observing sample 2, we obtained another which used the same package name as sample 2 (cn.android.setting). However, this time the app name for both HenBox and the embedded app were identical: Islamawazi.  Islamawazi is also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party or “TIP”. This organization was formerly known as the East Turkestan Islamic Party and is purported to be an Islamic extremist separatist organization founded by Uyghur jihadists. The embedded app appears to be a media player.
These examples, together with the HenBox app placed on a very specific third-party app store, point clearly to at least some of the intended targets of these malicious apps being Uyghurs, specifically those with interest in or association with terrorist groups. These threat actors appear to be choosing the right apps – those that could be popular with locals in the region, at the right time – while tensions grow in this region of China, to ensure a good victim install-base.

HenBox Roosts
HenBox has evolved over the past three years, and of the almost two hundred HenBox apps in AutoFocus, the vast majority contain several native libraries as well as other components in order to achieve their objective. Most components are obfuscated in some way, whether it be simple XOR with a single-byte key, or through the use of ZIP or Zlib compression wrapped with RC4 encryption. These components are responsible for a myriad of functions including handling decryption, network communications, gaining super-user privileges, monitoring system logs, loading additional Dalvik code files, tracking the device location and more.
The remainder of this section describes at a high-level what HenBox is capable of, and how it operates. The description is based on analysis of the sample described in Table 3 below, which was of interest given its C2 domain mefound[.]com overlaps with PlugX, Zupdax, and Poison Ivy malware families discussed in more detail later.

SHA256 Package Name App Name
com.android.henbox 备份 (Backup)

Table 3 HenBox variant used in description

Once this variant of HenBox is installed on the victim’s device, the app can be executed in two different ways:
One method for executing HenBox is for the victim to launch the malicious app (named “Backup”, in this instance) from the launcher view on their device, as shown in Figure 3 below. This runs code in the onCreate() method of the app’s MainActivity class, which in effect is the program’s entry point. This process is defined in the app’s AndroidManifest.xml config file, as shown in the following snippet.


Figure 3 HenBox app installed and visible on Android's Launcher view

Doing so executes code checking if the device is manufactured by Xiaomi, or if Xiaomi’s fork of Android is running on the device. Under these conditions, the app continues executing and the intent of targeting Xiaomi devices and users could be inferred, however poorly written code results in execution in more environments than perhaps intended; further checks are made to ascertain whether the app is running on an emulator, perhaps to evade researcher analysis environments. Assuming these checks pass, one of the main ELF libraries is loaded that orchestrates other components and provides functionality to the app’s Dalvik code through the Java Native Interface (JNI).
HenBox checks whether this execution is its first by using Android’s shared preferences feature to persist XML key-value pair data. If it is the first execution, and if the app’s path does not contain “/system/app” (i.e. HenBox is not running as a system app), another ELF library is loaded to aid with executing super-user commands.
The second method uses intents, broadcasts, and receivers to execute HenBox code. Providing the app has registered an intent to process particular events from the system, and one of said events occurs, HenBox is effectively brought to life through external stimulus from another app on the system broadcasting a request, or the system itself broadcasting a particular event has occurred. These intents are typically defined statically in the app’s AndroidManifest.xml config file; some HenBox variants register further intents from their code at run-time. Once a matching intent is triggered, the respective Receiver code will be executed, leading to other HenBox behaviors being launched, which are described later. Table 4 below lists the intents that are statically registered in this HenBox variant’s AndroidManifest.xml config file, together with a description of what that intent does, and when it would be used. Depending on the intent triggered, one of two Receivers would be called, in this instance they are called Boot or Time but the name is somewhat immaterial.

Receiver Intent Name Description
BootReceiver android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED System notification that the device has finished booting.
android.intent.action.restart A legacy intent used to indicate a system restart.
android.intent.action.SIM_STATE_CHANGED System notification that the SIM card has changed or been removed.
android.intent.action.PACKAGE_INSTALL System notification that the download and eventual installation of an app package is happening (this is deprecated)
android.intent.action.PACKAGE_ADDED System notification that a new app package has been installed on the device, including the name of said package.
com.xiaomi.smarthome.receive_alarm Received notifications from Xiaomi’s smart home IoT devices.
TimeReceiver android.intent.action.ACTION_TIME_CHANGED System notification that the time was set.
android.intent.action.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE System notification that a change in network connectivity has occurred, either lost or established. Since Android version 7 (Nougat) this information is gathered using other means, perhaps inferring the devices used by potential victim run older versions of Android.

Table 4 HenBox variant's Intents and Receivers

Most of the intents registered in the AndroidManifest.xml file, or loaded during run-time, are commonly found in malicious Android apps. What’s more interesting, and much less common, is the inclusion of the com.xiaomi.smarthome.receive_alarm intent filter. Xiaomi, a privately owned Chinese electronics and software company, is the 5th largest smart phone manufacturer in the world and also manufactures IoT devices for the home. Most devices can be controlled by Xiaomi’s “MiHome” Android app, which is available on Google Play with between 1,000,000 and 5,000,000 downloads.
Given the nature of connected devices in smart homes, it’s highly likely many of these devices, and indeed the controller app itself, communicate with one another sending status notifications, alerts and so on. Such notifications would be received by the MiHome app or any other, such as HenBox, so long as they register their intent to do so. This could essentially allow for external devices to act as a trigger to execute the malicious HenBox code, or perhaps afford additional data HenBox can collect and exfiltrate.
Either method to load HenBox ultimately results in an instance of a service being launched. This service hides the app from plain sight and loads another ELF library to gather environmental information about the device, such as running processes and apps, and details about device hardware, primarily through parsing system logs and querying running processes. The service continues by loading an ELF, created by Baidu, which is capable of tracking the device location before setting up a monitor to harvest phone numbers associated with outgoing calls for those numbers with a country code “+86” prefix, which relates to the People’s Republic of China.
Further assets are decrypted and deployed, including another Dalvik DEX code file, which has various capabilities including registering itself as the incoming SMS handler for the device to intercept SMS messages, loading another ELF library that includes a version of BusyBox - a package containing various stripped-down Unix tools useful for administering such systems – and, interestingly, is capable of turning off the sound played when the device’s cameras take pictures.
The Android permissions requested by HenBox, as defined in the apps’ AndroidManifest.xml files, range from accessing location and network settings to messages, call, and contact data. HenBox can also access sensors such as the device camera(s) and the microphone.
Beyond the Android app itself, other components such as the aforementioned ELF libraries have additional data-stealing capabilities. One ELF library, libloc4d.so, handles amongst other things the loading of the app-decoded ELF library file “sux”, as well as handling connectivity to the C2.
The sux library appears to be a customized super user (su) tool that includes code from the com.koushikdutta.superuser app and carries the equivalent of a super user (su) binary in order to run privileged commands on the system. The primary goal of sux appears to be steal messages and other data from popular messaging and social media apps specified within the HenBox sample. A similar tool, with the same filename, has been discussed in previous research but the SpyDealer malware appears unrelated to HenBox. More likely, this is a case of common attack tools being re-used between different threat actor groups.
This particular HenBox variant, as listed in Table 3 above, harvests data from two popular messaging and social media apps: Voxer Walkie Talkie Messenger (com.rebelvox.voxer) and Tencent’s WeChat (com.tencent.mm). These types of apps tend to store their data in databases and, as an example, HenBox accesses Voxer’s database from the file “/data/data/com.rebelvox.voxer/databases/rv.db”. Once opened, HenBox runs the following query to gather message information.

Not long after this variant was public, newer variants of HenBox were seen, and some had significant increases in the number of targeted apps. Table 5 describes the latest variant seen in AutoFocus.

SHA256 Package Name App Name First Seen
com.android.henbox 备份 (Backup) January 3rd 2018

Table 5 Recent HenBox variant with updated functionality

Table 6 contains an updated list of targeted apps from which this newer variant of HenBox is capable of harvesting data. Interestingly, the two communication apps described above as being targeted by the HenBox variant listed in Table 3 do not appear in this updated list.

Package Name App Name
com.whatsapp WhatsApp Messenger
com.pugna.magiccall n/a
org.telegram.messenger Telegram
com.facebook.katana Facebook
com.twitter.android Twitter
jp.naver.line.android LINE: Free Calls & Messages
com.instanza.cocovoice Coco
com.beetalk BeeTalk
com.gtomato.talkbox TalkBox Voice Messenger - PTT
com.viber.voip Viber Messenger
com.immomo.momo MOMO陌陌
com.facebook.orca Messenger – Text and Video Chat for Free
com.skype.rover Skype; 3rd party stores only

Table 6 Targeted apps from a newer HenBox variant

Most of these apps are well established and available on Google Play, however, com.skype.rover appears to be available only on third-party app stores. The same is likely to be the case for com.pugna.magiccall but this is unknown currently.
It’s clear to see that the capabilities of HenBox are very comprehensive, both in terms of an Android app with its native libraries and given the amount of data it can glean from a victim. Such data includes contact and location information, phone and message activity, the ability to record from the microphone, camera, and other sensors as well as the capability to access data from many popular messaging and social media apps.

While investigating HenBox we discovered infrastructure ties to other malware families associated with targeted attacks against Windows users – notable overlaps included PlugX, Zupdax, 9002, and Poison Ivy. The overall image of these ties is below in Figure 5 and paints a picture of an adversary with at least 5 malware families in their toolbox dating back to at least 2015.

Figure 5. HenBox and related malware and C2s

The overlap between the HenBox and 9002 malware families Unit 42 has seen involves three shared C2s between several samples; the first IP below is used for more than half of the HenBox samples we have seen to date:

  • 47.90.81[.]23
  • 222.139.212[.]16
  • lala513.gicp[.]net

The overlaps between the Henbox, PlugX, Zupdax, and Poison Ivy malware families involves a web of shared C2s and IP resolutions centered around the below:

  • 59.188.196[.]172
  • cdncool[.]com (and third-levels of this domain)
  • www3.mefound[.]com
  • www5.zyns[.]com
  • w3.changeip[.]org

Ties to previous activity
The registrant of cdncool[.]com also registered six other domains. To date, Unit 42 has seen four of the seven (the first three in the list below, along with cdncool[.]com) used in malicious activity and it is reasonable to assume the remaining three are or were intended to serve the same purpose.

  • tcpdo[.]net
  • adminsysteminfo[.]com
  • md5c[.]net
  • linkdatax[.]com
  • csip6[.]biz
  • adminloader[.]com

Unit 42 published a blog in July 2016 about 9002 malware being delivered using a combination of shortened links and a file hosted on Google Drive. The spear phishing emails had Myanmar political-themed lures and, if the 9002 C2 server responded, the Trojan sent system specific information along with the string “jackhex”. “jackhex” has also been part of a C2 for what is likely related Poison Ivy activity detailed below, along with additional infrastructure ties.
The C2 for the aforementioned 9002 sample was logitechwkgame[.]com, which resolved to the IP address 222.239.91[.]30. At the same time, the domain admin.nslookupdns[.]com also resolved to the same IP address, suggesting that these two domains are associated with the same threat actors. In addition, admin.nslookupdns[.]com was a C2 for Poison Ivy samples associated with attacks on Myanmar and other Asian countries discussed in a blog published by Arbor Networks in April 2016. Another tie between the activity is the C2 jackhex.md5c[.]net, which was also used as a Poison Ivy C2 in the Arbor Networks blog. “jackhex” is not a common word or phrase and, as noted above, was also seen in the beacon activity with the previously discussed 9002 sample. Finally, since publishing the 9002 blog, Unit 42 has also seen the aforementioned 9002 C2 used as a Poison Ivy C2 with a Myanmar political-themed lure.
In our 9002 blog we noted some additional infrastructure used either as C2s for related Poison Ivy samples, or domain registrant overlap with those C2 domains. When we published that blog Unit 42 hadn’t seen any of the three registrants overlap domains used in malicious activity. Since then, we have seen Poison Ivy samples using third-levels of querlyurl[.]com, lending further credence the remaining two domains, gooledriveservice[.]com and appupdatemoremagic[.]com are or were intended for malicious use.  While we do not have complete targeting, information associated with these Poison Ivy samples, several of the decoy files were in Chinese and appear to be part of a 2016 campaign targeting organizations in Taiwan with political-themed lures.

Typically masquerading as legitimate Android system apps, and sometimes embedding legitimate apps within them, the primary goal of the malicious HenBox appears to be to spy on those who install them. Using similar traits, such as copycat iconography and app or package names, victims are likely socially engineered into installing the malicious apps, especially when available on so-called third-party (i.e. non-Google Play) app stores which often have fewer security and vetting procedures for the apps they host. It’s possible, as with other Android malware, that some apps may also be available on forums, file-sharing sites or even sent to victims as email attachments, and we were only able to determine the delivery mechanism for a handful of the apps we have been able to find.
The hosting locations seen for some HenBox samples, together with the nature of some embedded apps including: those targeted at extremist groups, those who use VPN or other privacy-enabling apps, and those who speak the Uyghur language, highlights the victim profile the threat actors were seeking to attack. The targets and capabilities of HenBox, in addition to the ties to previous activity using four different Windows malware families with political-themed lures against several different South East Asian countries, indicates this activity likely represents an at least three-year-old espionage campaign.

Palo Alto Networks customers are protected by:
AutoFocus customers can investigate this activity using the following tag. To date we believe HenBox is not a shared tool, however, the remainder of malware used by these attackers is shared amongst multiple groups:

Android Hygiene
Update: Keep installed apps updated. Much like patching Operating System and application files on PCs, Android and apps developed for the platform also receive security updates from Google and app developers to remove vulnerabilities and improve features, including security.
Review: App permissions to see what the app is potentially capable of. This can be quite technical, but many permissions are named intuitively describing if they intend to access contacts, messages, or sensors, such as the device microphone or camera. If you the permission seem over the top compared to the described functionality, then don’t install. Also read the app and developer reviews to evaluate their trustworthiness.
Avoid: Third-party app stores that may host pirated versions of paid apps from the Google Play app store, often such apps include unwanted extra features that can access your sensitive data or perform malicious behaviors. Also avoid rooting devices, if possible, as apps could misuse this power.

Most recent samples first:

sha256 apk_package_name apk_app_name apk_app_name_en
446734590904c5c44978e4646bbbc629d98236c16e29940b32100c1400aebc88 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
ea0786bfe145d8c763684a2fdf2eb878da29c1b6ae5aacd1a428c9ffead4bad8 com.android.vivibox 备份服务 Backup service
16bb6ff97999b838a40b66146ff4c39b9c95906f062c6fe1e3077e6e30171a4d com.android.vivibox 备份 Backup
0fa384198ae9550e008e97fa38e8a56c4398fc91e12eddba713966bfed107130 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
e835e4907c9ff07a3a8281530552eaed97d9dea5b182d24a8db56335bad5213d com.android.cicibox 备份服务 Backup service
9192602e5a3488c322025991ca7abcbdc8f916e08f279004a94cec8eb9f220b4 com.android.vivibox 备份 Backup
9b57ab06650a137a5962b85ca9ae719e9c3956d68938a6a2425dffe8d152941a com.android.webbox 备份服务 Backup service
7bf0e70fb4ffca19880fecdeb7e7e5d0fb4681064a98c71056cbb29c80ed6119 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
51cfc1a658e63624706a6bb2ed2baa63c588e7ce499bd116a3d5752743fefb54 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
3417899195780c8186356d49bc53b600b3b0e49aae83d9aeb27e518b6964be04 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
f0fd8c5f4487df7592e5b7fa02f19f23d3ad43f5aaab84257cc560bf5ea76f1e com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a6c1da9559d72563848802ed14a7421515009c2a0ffb85aab74c6e42584c222d com.android.cicibox 备份服务 Backup service
bf0ab0362ee39191587921b75ab92bf6da12e377dbfdf4f7a053c1217841bdfc com.android.vivibox 备份服务 Backup service
f5abd5e7e325f16df3e96ff55a19ebf524f40f9ade76003355eb1d68bc084006 com.android.vivibox 备份 Backup
201eca94a9e8023d021a2b4a1517c4e46cd01e3be323bc46660c1c6f42aa6abf com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
7b7887d4ad7cab0c53d6f8557bbdf616985f3434ba536a5683f6fba604151d04 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
4eb768b52b687de49c7da8845bbd7671e2e076fe64bf23596a409108ef3fbbbc com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a7cfae9b12542b293d8265770a10946d422736d6f716af17f7b963603e422c51 com.jrzheng.supervpn.view SuperVPN SuperVPN
3c2109adf469bfc6c320ac824355f97a2b0f5ff01891d1affcd1a5b017c97195 com.android.webbox 备份服务 Backup service
2a7e456d2700ba13af48efdcf1f699bf51b6901a3ba5c80c009aaaca86235e5d com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
3d525435cbd88b4f1f97e32e2c6accf7855f4cc576ecbd87ad05a05ddd2d2f79 com.android.vivibox 备份服务 Backup service
5a999904b2f03263a11bcc077ad179333b431fb9e6e8090f371d975ba188e55e com.android.cicibox 备份服务 Backup service
4d1e37e5840e8a4d5ae0f60cf33c593f595af200fbf998c3af809fd0c225c475 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
3cce965887d4677069cb9160d7c7c122087a5f434e095a9f0848c3e838bca9f5 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
8095cf4f6aec1983bd9f81ca85c1b27415e200b315f757613afb4f0334c99f0b com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
b098be6fd1859ee70ef123c59d5e2a1db435f990c9378b41af0c005f76ba24f2 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
56c1e23b12e83573440019084b9ce39f8f5ddd9d6de51edaf1f83e020fc648a0 com.android.cicibox 备份服务 Backup service
75fef2a0f05ae2ad971b01041fd3ed5ceacce306d78930bc2eba190c39799bc7 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a3deca8203792d4b34242e8f5d0f7e2e3d054f08d74885ab7ff6f3a6f4b2578a com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
77b6e8cd1e6de9ee22bf0e9d735089ae24134ab955f0975d4febc9ed6b60af38 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
9f8909b1615aaa0fed38ad27162ccf3437e2eaa59cb0c990261c866f075c4113 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
7ffc1afd5749e7731f4161a6348205555e5892f1bd3446b6d0c5e7bbaa5917e3 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a1644194faac76a1d49fd96b875a3f9026993e9f21f6dbc50dc59aeb5e7dac4b com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
2e4aa7777ba449071b90c0c13b803ddf6c6f10576eb9806acde6c3d1391db463 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
af2d44e36cc28727e29b0d9aecb4b17534a195faacbf4192ce1483a9bde65edc com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
5010236b481d8d2ebc45ee95154f10ffbb317eced86401486f63276520049896 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
8de4e886b69046c2942e26d8b2f436695ca27060f6a74c797c620502f87887c9 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
fed084773542120fe77b880fc136bd20979cddc286b75b651d01aa6e32234b2d com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
43ce0c3e63de64f032ea7d4ca77c4b40b86d57e1d237f771b21c1f9c8f41eafb com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
6e1812f7bf313552bc60b6be5b46bdfd44582775e3cb19cf6a231a903aec508b com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
7774432c67f3d3688a1a1b21edc0a73d9d47990cc1f132663b0010ff4bbd6e87 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
59ca2754279d9cba40334c35907e2e1fc6fd2888b2c180e5b0b8d73accbb40f2 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
2c5934db000a2838d42cf705453e29d16f4d4bb462fa65e134ce78b4266cefee com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
e326501a0fb15bf19ac135f501b84caa2587d1fb2cad9e034f1756898686dab4 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
14f715228acff7d8bad057e4bf996635d76ab41ae25ca8a3f90196caeb241446 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
2be931f008a9ea62aa35091eb9a5629824e81499ce7a5219101ccd39a02ecdec com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
51db059a833377666f92f64ae1e926b83da8821876c66949e320b55c1a929ff8 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
dee79253deaaa57af0fddb2c8ec5d4cc0546dfe3c1d05c2916a44a37eef3d9f8 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
ec2e060ac633978b9b700aa95784255b9796f4fb51c188b1c79d5947df07bf98 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a6c7351b09a733a1b3ff8a0901c5bdefdc3b566bfcedcdf5a338c3a97c9f249b com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
ae5598ccb3f2f31d2ec967808988a47d6ce4d1cd5e6808d1194ee93c6400039c com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
6f5e7f6ca2f25667d5fe55d7e8ec1b816d6db8b31cb28dff43b4f2f73d70ecdb com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
4cbb5a0d9b6f64dc9d8dd9aaac5651649e24b2cd7248eb9db32191102559ab9c com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
c375aad52c292b4d5c4efb02a33e2325a27f27158bb13c048f533a2a9d0837fb com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
779b09c61951818e5afb47c369fe9b5fa7b7f6139f589f14b3042b2ac96809d8 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
7ba216b88f84c9a0ce90ca5500ddc2e80100b23ef3784d133b69870768f1e3bc com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
077239b3bedaa850b82204fdd42e5e45fedc3dfc2f6da5aab04d768370e990fa com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
be548c26d0863b812948a16f982e96557319346fad897f67dc7873108203fdce com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
54366ee485b43cea10624d62247a48b12c1ce35c49295491f7fbb6323c68da7b com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
51714b8f34db94cbd8916374af4d8e63b56ef41fa819d2d697f1a3975a32960e com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
48f38b671847bfba3810b74d1d815c2bb4cc94392b98e1f59f95e748eb410465 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
d0e58c3e9d881f875532d1bb8bee63e4ac8728458708361f754db97fba6be22e com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
8b78f469f3eda0cb02cfbf5598f0a7449cb63b7181d7fd5037ebb9cb8aff30a4 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
49556e972a35c9d592bf64ab37056f6da356b2061c1ce269d9c3af73978756d9 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
1d4dadae0c696fde2fef99eb99188509dc0d5fbac7ee07d4f0d5a92dcc922ad7 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
3c62d00a9740c49cf01fb7635260ff71e0ac44cf80da749ca4101869120f2233 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
993692d5540c40614f4da430cf4cea64a7e0e7f950452abae19bf608afdf20a6 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
3e026154767b6a101d3a852946e9eb3ed1c96662490afe9b601469a8459e325b com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
6a518d29232d3f68aa5c78df4a8d212f924e03379dc2be0a388b3118779fe583 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
70512a566f33c636ad071d18e82db89f9531a6133be89b7d3f18fc9f7730b078 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
53238af90efd8531686432245c516db04cd163584a811d6e5835a42fe738fbab com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
2f2277898f34a91a365f1a090d72678768c5e420c8350f340cc4b4602cd8a710 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
b48edd2270b1aeb014291eb3ac2aaa1d4b7ee4694965d0de2c0978b2feae946d com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
45e7dc9c0e33d4754384365a60604c66d72356a994cbed8e8eab8796cf1579e2 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a1e465d905434d5dae3bb7acb7c148ef8ed0d341a6d9121d09adbc126cc3a907 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
4d437d1ac29b1762cc47f8094a05ab73141d03f9ce0256d200fc691c41d1b6e7 cn.android.setting islamawazi islamawazi
d29646f2c665ef91c360e24242c634ee9051d4ab01cb8f87265088e47f41d690 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
2345a56d61e052af3265ee0fae47b22f1551ede4eee45bca30ad5fb9fac7a922 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
44388ec38ee36177d6804d778ee554b2d063db3b88d7480eca6587ff68a15982 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
286bd20f3ea944703c8c87e66708d6b32046a640863afba7f3c4c72dc28d37d1 cn.android.seting 设置 Setup
7f28caeaa484496f85c80580cd88671961149aae2295c8777becb2970455504c com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
89ef65813bccb8197da4af68ba8f9e8e123f3aad4ed41736f8039ad2c6817a25 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
1749df47cf37c09a92b6a56b64b136f15ec59c4f55ec835b1e569c88e1c6e684 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
5f16c23f92a10de59efc9a081e0c79458faa3fabb24a1356dbfff7cea8611a3e com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
66eec9ffa2906e56656e649d5b632526e829d7142a75cd27a006bf82775e8c45 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a728c653b9c7be4b058eff329afb826db755fdddc4e10ba67191816db7dbeac0 cn.android.setting 爱奇艺 IQIYI
c4ee98d58d38f6109d843955277f1a37bfb138a14113c6cb38bcb6eb857d4977 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
577ed81e07b62d9c363c505271d1f2a81592a69e1a60a82fbe8fff16e7d3419d cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
b8f785a6581bf438b1947e498b8f2255607440347d8f8b5cb31f3b98427330e6 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
5a3c44a6e8c8e02e69caa430f41ec80b94740d099bbcfbf39cf08280fc6e16bb com.android.henbox WJ VPN WJ VPN
184e5cbebef4ee591351cfaa1130d57419f70eb95c6387cb8ec837bd2beb14d6 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
efa3cd45e576ef8ab22d40fc9814456d06a6eeeaeada829c16122a39cb101dbf com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
9d85be32b54398a14abe988d98386a38ce2d35fff91caf1be367f7e4b510b054 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a8ea1140a739b2aeeb838d7fe2c073cb834bce46db22071022bd181a59422af1 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
80a35bcbce326d05dd74ed05560db41a0f9471c4922fc9fe88d0b1a94c3cb1ae cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
0e31575bf0001d818d87aa134e728f62e7f2d27ff9437897303eb8ae1962a865 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
d3dd162e7dee6022826e7fef23cb84f17a948d2761013a09943f165f378197e0 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
3b345ffe7fac9aef0c9e0be3f01e8f9e1f3e0442849cc0e3f979b9866465b6bc cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
0a4f38a83abbbab3a039be95862df7848f28513baa1da52a74a9e6a31f63c9b7 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a267176bdc1779b19fde2e38f5f062478e8cf173582e38a26538512d64d85ecd cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
7603126f04e9e7cff828aabc060349d6dfbd76e795df7b0e798b3b0914ad13a0 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
1da0e30b4b2ad2626a3f069f0f50f81d29b789d41385db26d7c84da3af02cd1c com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
ddea532ef46abb9bfa77acdbd38155d9a92381f777fe4c797967203578aa0966 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a89bdb4fd54b9488fd6f2685a4dcfa1c106d4ac9f9fb8f8992e557e306184f1a com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
b0bbcee232f27a1b366f8a7ed1d2c3056f9a67fa70e42c1fa7cfb7c778df8cb5 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
bf16b9f012e1a0724f95a0e61a8748be3c9fc3fe3bb5a82bf3efd9b8211591fb cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
ad5a6b9ca0389c458dde73a456404634eec473cf5833914c7466af41e23b6ea9 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
a5d9efae12c9e5913156b5415581678748bdeed25a5767438afadc869d25e0d4 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
b5598c4a26f3b4a143a413c46935f0506afd7e400ecf4c6ca05595e83d8dc2c7 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
4f6173659e2c23835228f2e05daacecb618c099878d0028dd9a52b9682de2ac4 cn.android.setting 无秘 No secret
7d8a47cda9367ee31ebf58dd226afc583b34a73476ed5ff1b2b3f2460cd4c339 cn.android.setting uyhl uyhl
b34b09d7b4bee3125ea9b27c128c4239c78d3be95d9d5dff73c68e479353db5b cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
b3413e09ceecc305187d08007ea86f654a451952807e37b8f2dcd14a8127042a cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
718bab91ba29791a494c31783b64ce1fe3d78bcdd6a6f909588e198fbea3b3cf cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
de9d1c68ef9df6dd72455f50d1cdffd76e24a501bbbaa3cacc4aedb74b2f743d cn.android.setting 探探 Explore
55e65d1fba82a21b0ee52435be890279cf7ae747abba7f448a6547ba2ed9666e cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
801d54f829668487c2ed28dc56beb6f156a6100a3be12805e1104fb9f68f6a00 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
3ffa8ef36934420b08e4139385400da774f61cabe000557ff025af650f2964bb cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
8b4e60160089b6af71e3c555c4bdaa9344b76a5f0dfd1ecc3a6e8c23f0940b2a cn.android.setting 0
b779a7a05c226a14c2f4bad1f22c493a2a9de8b988b01602fbe60d1f6dc2ba8c cn.android.setting 0
4a8c5194183f2a5b593654a29213c6f705f083ddbbff10a0bb1e7695c66a0f89 cn.android.setting 0
775c2dbf6dd7423bd098b216bd6dcf11104e885e451fa95ae64dc18fb54a34c7 cn.android.setting 0
228d1c80a92641c6ba9c9d1e68146e9bb66f02605135c2603db3ace692cc05f2 cn.android.setting 0
4ecf03a1eaa0255340a41e48728be1d50dab724b72f9096a1f537fa578e76d17 cn.android.setting 0
8a28fed36cf0d8640c7086770614e33d3788200bc7b0b408873873cd17e31653 com.android.henbox 0
35b1f11a97dd5c05c87328e2ed4ae5776b84d3ce6cf4cdbc2faa1865dab2e09b cn.android.setting 0
bb91d7bbea783bacd57a92691ebcbb449d9606f2f3bbb77538ec751a8b01d8a9 com.android.henbox 0
011509bb9cde31c0b45c49747ff150abcfa66d283ff986f167bf564bacfded4d com.android.henbox 0
da6d75e996b0bafad782d87c809269ef5ccfa62c938039790333f0f2b4ecafe3 cn.android.setting 0
eb31fc24f727bc6f25b7a90dc86c127099384398b7182ae52d3fe23950e9ed8c com.android.henbox 0
6d441e6b75fa0ea1880937d7c94dbd1caaa210915d386dfb5a01ca22fd813d28 com.android.henbox 0
c153ed3b2ae96cb2ec55294f89180302f89e9dbca6a192eec7bd4f3591b8252e cn.android.seting 0
2510aa8736c5462e8784f1cf494716bb923f97645899c73c56ead1ff58b35499 cn.android.setting 0
0bfbbca56718b5bae7e21613a9884ea80db53aa1eca9cacf5a793e52f6a724e7 com.android.henbox 0
e9da842ccf4a681226577c26e2becea079080a4b6838171c06bb358db132bc5e cn.android.setting 0
20fcff9826373d50abe813d3cb0272bf7b65617196cd4ac8d4646b8fd3256bea cn.android.setting 0
0387baebb2b0c678e46e7291325e91118c53a3206d73c1145c082b10cf6a65f1 cn.android.setting 0
0efaf91842a7e45562e97bda369efa6e14f98bf9d63782ec9c323fa246da549a cn.android.setting 0
cdbd4b98625c4766cbf72f69ce951faf49a13394ea85e7a23188e70a209609be cn.android.seting 0
d4ef4bdea69a248f9792211c4d52882ad6262f7223fc1aa9f328abe50412669f cn.android.setting 0
3db36dc3b21dbd0a9037cda21606d37c1a1dd493346e00e36231a252a14446d6 cn.android.setting 0
92c5fdf61b378e5252b0eb70a5cfd7af2d27c915aece48e32b9c2ba04a5fa5b3 cn.android.setting 0
740a54e1f89cb321d13396987fd26d52c6c66c49894283c6d9889156e063ecb3 com.android.henbox 0
7f76f102ab233528ce3cb111ae3b026cf16b3233c6bf3002de8a0daea3ebc0d7 com.android.henbox 0
153794e424eceaba48e28e7f3333ab0c9c7addeda1c5de7835b191f5f25e4e34 com.android.henbox 备份 Backup
a1bf2f3fcac9d1aae94eb7a6dc37be00185e102e504032f4ffa391ddbd4bd353 com.android.henbox 0
444e73bd1020d08dc2901a041d675db1060815914024855daeddbc201e3ad4ee com.android.henbox 0
f88c84156d8e9fdec6f5c400135277ecd03e4b1d95e7d3b6f5b8c8a77eeb055f cn.android.setting 0
2782265ddd3a0d94d4f2622366b3401002dcfe1a9b99b7cbf6d5e824ff14d728 com.android.henbox 0
efff4243b6143c937509f52dbe7c4e40ceb2eb226f7cc1c96d8cf9f287668e37 cn.android.setting 设置 Setup
000473f7168ebda3de054a126352af81b61dd0be462ae9b3c7ccc0bc5cea7986 cn.android.setting 0
6f0de72ee2df4206102c1ff93955fef07cee84a1ba280ef3eda3db9a7eafb22e cn.android.setting 0
2f7aa05b16d870d34feb1faa62bbfb9c5cffd4a52ea094c66657887b7c7046d4 cn.android.setting 0
198ff17259ad377fae62ca49daaed0d9313831d5a12b16a79dd54045eb6909b8 cn.android.setting 0
88c08e7084d4e0db14fc5fec6c906ff89e68b54df09096d49573b1906dd1ecd2 cn.android.setting 0
5fff623781636b2af95327293f246e0d83b90012f067a8c9e6c2b5869e606465 cn.android.setting 0
a26802ebe8ad4dc076becbc18b32a825cf057ff2059a0742ece86afe6fcb496c com.android.henbox 0
e0427ca401d68c347ef14f65a94735f76238f59710d99c4097e51da23cbb2a6d cn.android.setting 0
cf36fb6f2d4029876f50d6a1eb9eafb13eb0bc6a57e179172ffe67a305f33c41 cn.android.setting 0
d68070f75341ce070b11a4ecda28d80a85303fa102fb4cb84c3dcbf97863bcc5 cn.android.setting 0
60adc526a1bfa8df150c25016d220544671a62820493b66a8467436181b8d224 cn.android.setting 0
0589bed1e3b3d6234c30061be3be1cc6685d786ab3a892a8d4dae8e2d7ed92f7 com.android.henbox DroidVPN DroidVPN
f28761f897e3a0e1dcdb0a993076a1cc48a1b17361d3f401aa917406332a79f1 0
fa5a76e86abb26e48af0b312f056d24000bc969835c40b3f98e5ca7e301b5bee com.android.henbox Uyghurche Kirguzguch Uyghurche Kirguzguch
5808df07cedf15451ab0984e9c60b077602de258319d48cf88b0cc4ca7bb57a0 0
b0e0d35649d6e5405d051580d0c2a7ca5d3eb58f38bd51d0b8b7b98813256ea1 0
2db13b0cdede04b1b050744114e6c849e5e527b37bcd22984b265dff874dd411 0
c6117397a54a1c2fda6efe40b1a209c14834f9ecb82136e06174c16644a59657 0
ed35dab84aa4de72e782aef8cead90688d5c664de878207488828ed16902e828 0
2a7ab147d9e7c7f5349f5f929a2f955fb03b376d29d02d5a41d5e6da31d7cdcf 0
f3d04a7f77498acec86efc8d372c4d6eac591d8030f0a867ab856074e4da1fe6 0

Poison Ivy




Domains and IPs