The Machine With Many Faces: Post-Exploitation Identity Misuse in SPIFFE/SPIRE

Posted on by Sheida Azimi

Executive Summary

This research demonstrates post-exploitation techniques that could allow an attacker with root access on a compromised Kubernetes node to misuse an open standard and reference implementation for machine identity known as SPIFFE/SPIRE to impersonate co-located workloads and harvest SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Documents (SVIDs). We show how the trust assumption at the core of every machine-identity system — that the node is trusted — collapses once an attacker obtains root on that node. Unit 42 has not observed this technique exploited in the wild.

The Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE)/the SPIFFE Runtime Environment (SPIRE) is widely deployed in Kubernetes and cloud-native environments to replace long-lived secrets with short-lived, cryptographically verifiable workload identities.

Our research shows how an attacker with root can spoof the Linux control group (cgroup) information the SPIRE agent uses during workload attestation. This tricks the agent into issuing a co-located workload's SVID to an attacker-controlled process.

As part of this research, we developed Spooffe, an open-source tool that defenders can use to test whether an attacker with administrative access could manipulate cgroup metadata to retrieve co-located workload identities and assess the resulting identity area of impact.

When designing threat models for SPIFFE/SPIRE, organizations should assume that root-level access to a node grants access to all cryptographic identities scoped to it. We recommend performing the following activities to reduce exposure:

  • Harden nodes
  • Restrict root access
  • Prohibit privileged containers, host access
  • Minimize reliance on weak selectors

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats described here through the following products and services:

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics Identity, Cloud, Kubernetes

Introduction

SPIFFE is an open standard for machine identity designed to solve the “Secret Zero” problem — the challenge of securely introducing the initial secret required to bootstrap trust — by replacing long-lived secrets with short-lived workload identities. When deployed correctly, SPIFFE enforces strong identity boundaries between workloads.

However, these guarantees rely on a core assumption shared by all identity systems that the underlying node is trusted. If an attacker gains root access to a node, they can interact with identity mechanisms to retrieve all identities authorized to that compromised node.

Our research explores how attackers can exploit root access to harvest workload identities from a compromised node. In this post, we lay the groundwork by explaining machine identity and how SPIFFE establishes and verifies trust in cloud-native environments. We then demonstrate workload impersonation through selector spoofing. Finally, we introduce Spooffe, a tool we built to automate the extraction of these workload identities (SVIDs).

Note to readers: If you’re already familiar with SPIFFE/SPIRE concepts and architecture, you can jump directly to Workload Attestation and How the Agent Attests the Workload sections.

SPIFFE Overview

Consider a scenario where two applications, a frontend and a backend, must communicate securely.

We could generate key pairs and exchange public keys to communicate through Mutual Transport Layer Security (mTLS), but this option raises a few key questions:

  • Who rotates those keys?
  • Who revokes them if the app is compromised?
  • Can we verify who/what is presenting the keys?

SPIFFE addresses these issues by standardizing how machines are named and how short-lived credentials are issued.

The term machines refers to two broad categories:

  • Workloads: Containers, processes and services running application logic
  • Devices: Endpoints such as desktops, mobile devices and internet of things (IoT) or operational technology (OT) systems
    • (Note: Device identity is not part of the core SPIFFE specification)

SPIFFE Identity Components

Each workload is assigned three identity components:

  1. SPIFFE ID: Who you are (your name)
  2. SPIFFE Verifiable Identity (SVID): Proof that you are who you are claiming to be (your credentials)
  3. Trust Bundle: How others verify that a trusted authority issued your credential

Let’s go into a little more detail about each of these.

SPIFFE ID is a canonical name for a workload identity that follows a URI-style format like spiffe://<trust-domain>/<path> (Figure 1).

A diagram illustrating a SPIFFE URI. The structure includes three parts: "URI scheme," "trust domain name," and "name or identity of the specific workload". Arrows point from each label to the corresponding parts of the URI.
Figure 1. SPIFFE ID.

The middle part (example[.]com) in Figure 1 is the trust domain, the issuer of identity that acts as a security boundary.

In this way, workloads can have an identity and know who to communicate with.

However, identity alone does not guarantee trust or security, so we add the SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document (SVID). This is a short-lived credential that a workload presents to prove its identity. It is cryptographically signed by the certificate authority (CA) server and always includes the workload's SPIFFE ID.

SVIDs support two primary formats:

  • X.509 SVID: A certificate with an embedded public key, typically used for mTLS
  • JSON Web Token (JWT) SVID: A signed JWT token used as a bearer token for application-level authorization

Finally, we have the trust bundle, which is a set of trust anchors — root CA certificates or JSON Web Key Sets (JWKS). These are used to verify that a trusted authority issued an SVID within a trust domain.

To understand how these identity components are issued and verified in practice, we first need to look at the SPIRE architecture and its core runtime components.

SPIRE Architecture

SPIRE is a production-ready implementation of the SPIFFE specification. While several implementations exist, we chose SPIRE for this research because it is widely deployed in Kubernetes environments and fully implements the SPIFFE standard. Furthermore, because SPIRE is open source, we can inspect its internals to understand how the specification works in practice.

SPIRE is composed of a few simple pieces (as shown in Figure 2 below):

 

A diagram illustrating SPIFFE/SPIRE architecture. At the top, "CLI Tool" and "API Calls" lead to a "registration API" and "Trust bundle" within a server. Below the server, "Node API" connects to two agents, each with a "WL API." A highlighted entry shows components and related terms.
Figure 2. SPIFFE/SPIRE architecture.
  • Workload: A single piece of software deployed to do a specific job (e.g., a process, container, pod)
  • SPIRE Server (control plane): This is the CA that stores registration entries. It also issues and cryptographically signs SVIDs. Additionally, it publishes the trust bundle for the trust domain.
  • SPIRE Agent: This runs on every compute node (e.g., a Kubernetes node, VM or bare-metal host). It performs the following activities:
    • Accepts requests from workloads locally over the Workload API (UNIX socket)
    • Communicates with the server via the Node API
    • Performs attestation
    • Caches SVIDs
    • Handles rotation
  • Registration entries and selectors: These are server-side policy objects that define which workloads are allowed to receive which SPIFFE IDs. When a workload requests an identity, the SPIRE agent collects runtime attributes (selectors) about the workload and the server compares them against registration entries to determine which identity, if any, should be issued.

With the SPIRE architecture in mind, we can now walk through how workload-to-workload identity verification works end to end.

Workload-to-Workload Identity Verification Flow

When workload A needs to communicate with workload B over mTLS, it requests a short-lived credential from the local SPIRE agent. The agent attests the workload and forwards the attestation data to the SPIFFE server. Based on predefined registration policies, the server selects the appropriate SPIFFE ID for the workload and issues a short-lived X.509 SVID.

The server also publishes the corresponding public keys as part of the trust bundle.

When workload A initiates a connection, it presents its SVID during the mTLS handshake. Workload B verifies the SVID by validating the signature against the trust bundle, checking the certificate’s expiration, and confirming that the SPIFFE ID matches an expected identity.

If these checks succeed, workload B can cryptographically authenticate workload A and establish a secure connection. This enables workload-to-workload communication based on identity rather than long-lived secrets (Figure 3).

A diagram depicting a process flow between two workloads, A and B, using secure communication. Workload A signs data with a server's private key, creating an SVID (X.509) that includes a public key. This information is verified by Workload B using a trust bundle. The process includes verification and the exchange of digital certificates via an endpoint. The visual features robots and padlock icons to represent processes and security.
Figure 3. Workload communication.

The identity flow described above depends on attestation, the process by which SPIRE determines whether a workload is allowed to receive an identity. SPIRE performs attestation at two levels:

  1. Node attestation establishes trust in the agent running on a node
  2. Workload attestation determines the identity of individual workloads

In this post, we focus on workload attestation, as it is the mechanism directly involved in selector evaluation and the attacks discussed later.

Workload Attestation

Before the agent attests the workloads, the SPIRE server’s administrator must register the workload selectors in the SPIRE server so it can later compare them to the selectors in the agent.

In this Kubernetes example, the registration entry authorizes any pod running in the default namespace and using the default service account to receive the specified SPIFFE identity (spiffeID).

The resulting record is stored on the SPIRE server as follows:

The SPIRE agent periodically synchronizes and caches these registration entries from the server, using them locally during workload attestation to determine which identity applies. The agent generates key pairs for each registration entry, sends certificate signing requests (CSRs) to the server and caches the resulting SVIDs.

When a workload wants to authenticate, it requests an identity from the agent over the Workload API (Figure 4, step 1). The agent performs workload attestation (Figure 4, step 2) by gathering selectors from the workload process and matching them against cached registration entries.

Upon a successful match (Figure 4, step 3), the agent returns:

  • X.509 SVID
  • Private key
  • Trust bundle

Note: This example is based on an X.509 SVID request. For JWT SVID requests, the agent returns only a signed JWT token.

A diagram titled "Workload Attestation" illustrating the process flow. "Workload A" connects to "kubelet" and "Linux" components, then to "k8s" and "UNIX," leading to the "Agent." The "Agent" includes "Workload Attestor" and connects to the "Workload API." Cached entries and SVIDs are shown. The process is numbered 1 to 3, showing the flow of requests and responses.
Figure 4. Workload attestation.

With the high-level flow in mind, we can now examine how attestation works in practice.

How the Agent Attests the Workload

When a workload requests an SVID (via FetchJWTSVID or FetchX509SVID), it connects to the agent Workload API, typically via a Unix domain socket (such as /run/spire/sockets/agent.sock). The agent then extracts the PID for the calling process.

Once the agent receives the PID, it passes it to the configured workload attestor plugins, which collect selectors based on process and container metadata. SPIRE agents support several workload-attestor plugins. Common plugins include docker, k8s, systemd, Unix and Windows. In our cluster, the agent uses the k8s and Unix plugins.

Kubernetes Plugin (k8s)

The k8s plugin uses the workload PID to access /proc/<pid>/mountinfo or /proc/<pid>/cgroups. It calls GetPodUIDAndContainerID to extract the pod UID and the container ID. In our environment, this process looks like the following:

After extracting the container ID and pod UID, the k8s plugin queries the kubelet to retrieve pod metadata. To do this, it uses the SPIRE agent’s service account token, stored at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.

The agent's service account has the following permissions, which allow it to list pods and access node information:

Using this token, the plugin calls getPodList to retrieve all pods on the node. It then identifies the pod whose UID and container ID match the values extracted from the /proc directory. Once matched, it collects selectors from the pod's metadata:

Unix Plugin

The Unix plugin gathers information from /proc to produce selectors such as user identifier (UID) and group identifier (GID). These selectors are used during workload attestation to bind a workload’s identity to operating system level properties of the calling process, helping SPIRE distinguish between different workloads running on the same node.

Here is an example of the selectors it collects:

The agent combines these selectors from both the k8s and Unix plugins. It then matches this selector set against the locally cached registration entries. If an entry's selectors are a subset of the workload's selectors, the agent returns the corresponding cached SVID to the workload.

Workload Impersonation: Selector Spoofing via Cgroup

This attack requires root-level access to the node. Our analysis revealed that workload attestation relies heavily on the workload’s cgroup path. An attacker with root access on the node can manipulate this cgroup path, potentially tricking the agent into believing the attestation claims belong to a different workload and obtain that workload’s identity. This could allow the attacker to impersonate the victim workload and access any services or resources trusted under that identity.

As a first step, we created a registration entry for a pod named workload-a in the server and we verified that we could fetch its identity from the pod:

We verified that we could not retrieve this identity from the host by requesting a JWT SVID:

To spoof the workload-a cgroup, we first retrieve its PID:

We checked its cgroup path based on the above PID:

We copied this path to a mock cgroup path and wrote our shell’s current PID($$) into the mock cgroup’s cgroup.procs file:

Notably, writing the PID directly into the original cgroup path would have also worked. We used a separate cgroup only to avoid modifying the original workload’s runtime state.

Running the fetch command again successfully retrieved the identity associated with PID 9072:

We can also see the workload-a SPIFFE ID inside the JWT token:

The manual spoofing demonstration highlights that the security model relies entirely on a single, vulnerable assumption of node integrity. When we have root access, we can get the identity of any workload on the node.

This manual spoofing demonstration highlights a critical trust assumption in workload attestation. When an attacker has root-level access to a node, they can manipulate cgroup information to cause the SPIRE agent to misattribute workload identities. Under these conditions, the attacker can impersonate other workloads running on the same node and obtain their identities.

Spooffe

These findings motivated us to develop Spooffe, a tool that allows defenders to automate selector spoofing to retrieve all the workload identities from the node.

Spooffe scans the node for running workloads, discovers their cgroup paths, and replicates them as a mock cgroup for its own process. It then queries the local SPIRE agent for the resulting identities (SVIDs), allowing us to collect all workload identities present on the host (Figure 5).

A screenshot of a terminal displaying a command line output related to Kubernetes. The text includes creation and verification of a fake group, fetched JWTs, and viewing various certificates. It features commands like `spoofre` and directories related to Kubernetes pods.
Figure 5: Dumping all workloads' identities (SVIDs).

Besides selector spoofing, Spooffe includes additional capabilities. However, in this post we focus only on the features relevant to this research.

One such capability is agent impersonation, which examines whether an attacker can impersonate the SPIRE agent and communicate directly with the server to extract workload identities.

Conclusion

In this article, we demonstrated how an attacker with root access on a compromised node can misuse SPIFFE/SPIRE workload attestation to impersonate co-located workloads and retrieve their identities. By manipulating cgroup metadata, we showed how attackers could mislead the SPIRE agent into issuing valid SVIDs to an attacker-controlled process. We also introduced Spooffe, a tool that automates this technique to enumerate and extract workload identities from a node.

These findings highlight a fundamental assumption in workload identity systems: trust in the underlying node. While SPIFFE/SPIRE enforces strong cryptographic identity guarantees between workloads, those guarantees rely on the integrity of the environment where attestation occurs. Once that trust boundary is broken, identity isolation between workloads collapses, allowing attackers to move laterally using legitimate credentials rather than stolen secrets.

Organizations adopting workload identity should treat node-level compromise as equivalent to compromise of all identities scoped to that node. To reduce risk, restrict privileged containers, limit direct host access and minimize reliance on weak or easily spoofable selectors.

Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Palo Alto Networks Product Protections

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products:

  • Cortex XDR and XSIAM can help protect against post-exploitation activities using the multi-layer protection approach. This approach combines several layers of protection, including Advanced WildFire, Behavioral Threat Protection, and Endpoint Protection Modules (EPM).
  • Cortex Cloud Identity Threat Detection can help deliver end-to-end visibility across cloud providers and IdPs by baselining real-time access patterns. By continuously monitoring these behaviors, ITDR detects identity abuse and compromised credentials targeting critical cloud resources and Kubernetes workloads, automatically triggering containment actions to keep attackers out.

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Additional Resources

Untracked Nightmares: The Threats Hiding Behind Commodity Infrastructure

Posted on by Sheida Azimi

Executive Summary

A recent Unit 42 investigation into seemingly low-priority enterprise infections demonstrates how the most effective camouflage in cybercrime is not necessarily in the use of sophisticated techniques, but in how unremarkable the threat appears. The activities that we investigated would typically not require escalation or further inquiry. But upon closer inspection, we discovered a massive cybercrime campaign largely targeting young gamers. Tracked as CL-CRI-1171, in accordance with Unit 42’s attribution framework, the group behind this cluster has operated under the radar for at least two years, distributing an indeterminate number of payloads.

The group behind CL-CRI-1171 provides an infection service for other threat actors who want to spread their malware indiscriminately. This pay-per-install (PPI) marketplace drove hundreds of infections through YouTube channels and a parallel search engine optimization (SEO)-poisoning funnel, all using the same custom loader.

We observed at least eleven YouTube channels that had hundreds of thousands of followers. We notified YouTube of these channels, which it promptly terminated.

These channels were actively interacting with viewers to promote gaming content laced with links to download malware. Content in the channels included advice on improving frame rates, fixing game crashes and adjusting settings on game platforms. Although the videos provided real content for gamers, they also served as the delivery vehicle for infection, prompting viewers to download malicious tools.

The SEO funnel targeted a more professional audience, promoting trojanized software that resulted in malware deployment on corporate endpoints, including critical infrastructure and even government entities. We identified three independent payloads delivered by the same loader between July 2025 and April 2026: two never publicly reported, Docro Hijacker and ARKTunnel, and a new variant of a previously unnamed backdoor, which we dubbed Insomnia remote access Trojan (RAT).

These infections represent only a small sample of a much larger deployment campaign. We have identified more than 10,000 distinct loader samples, each capable of delivering unique payload combinations.

We provide an overview of the cybercrime cluster and its loader infrastructure, and a technical analysis of three recently delivered malware strains.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed in this article through the following:

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics SEO Poisoning, Browser Hijacking, RATs

Overview of CL-CRI-1171 Activity

Our discovery of two separate infections delivering three entirely distinct malware families revealed one common denominator: a shared loader. By tracing this infrastructure, we mapped the broader activity of CL-CRI-1171, ultimately tying the cluster to a PPI marketplace responsible for delivering countless payloads over the last two years.

This operation uses at least two funneling mechanisms to route traffic to the malware landing pages: a network of YouTube channels and SEO poisoning. The shared infrastructure between the YouTube and SEO funnels, consistent use of the same loader and a rotational domain pattern observed over an eight-month window all pointed to a single sustained operation, which we track as CL-CRI-1171.

The PPI Ecosystem: An Infection Marketplace

PPI networks operate as underground marketplaces. An operator compromises machines and auctions access to multiple buyers, each buyer deploying their own independent payloads through the same dropper. The result is a single infection that conceals multiple payloads from unrelated threat actors on the same endpoint, each with its own C2 infrastructure and objectives. Because the loader is designed to be disposable and generic, it rarely attracts the scrutiny needed to uncover its subsequent payloads.

Tracking CL-CRI-1171: The PPI Operation Behind the Payloads

The investigation began with two identical and seemingly routine infections at separate organizations. Both events involved trojanized software downloads — one a Bluetooth driver, the other WinDirStat — and both affected machines executed an identical post-exploitation chain. The loader was unnamed, untracked and generic enough to be dismissed as commodity adware.

But our discovery of a shared payload chain raised a question. How were two unrelated organizations infected by the same unnamed loader delivering the same set of payloads, just one week apart?

Pivoting on the loader's C2 infrastructure revealed a sprawling network of rotational domains — over 200 unique hostnames following a distinctive two-word compound naming pattern (including bubbleslip, churchpail, dinosaursjam), rotating across .xyz, .cfd, .space and .info top-level domains (TLDs).

Unpacking the Delivery Infrastructure

The payloads delivered through CL-CRI-1171's infrastructure are not fixed, enabling the simultaneous delivery of unrelated malware families. In April 2026, two incidents initiated this investigation. They shared a single loader that delivered three separate malware families: Insomnia RAT, ARKTunnel and Docro Hijacker. A subsequent infection, observed in June 2026, delivered two entirely different payloads: GCleaner and Socks5Systemz.

Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the operational architecture and the observed rotational malware bundles.

A diagram illustrating CL-CRI-1171 infrastructure with connections from YouTube and SEO funnels, listing several attack vectors.
Figure 1. Illustration of CL-CRI-1171 infrastructure.

Our in-depth analysis explores three operations that were spotted in two intrusion sets during April 2026. By examining the campaign’s trackers, we found that these operation payloads were in rotation from July 2025 to April 2026. This discovery provides a valuable snapshot of the group’s deployment capabilities and the variety of payloads they have been entrusted to deliver.

Although the observed rotation appears to be highly structured, the discovery of over 10,000 unique OfferLoader samples points to a much larger distribution pipeline. It is very likely that the loader has delivered numerous other malware families.

The SEO poisoning path was the first delivery channel we identified. Unsuspecting users searching for legitimate software landed on file-hosting lure pages that displayed a fake virus-scan animation before delivering the trojanized archive via a chain of redirectors into the PPI gate.

A reconstructed example download page from the SEO poisoning funnel is shown in Figure 2.

A screenshot of a webpage displaying a file download section. There’s a large green button labeled "Download File" and an option to "Check viruses." The footer includes links to hosting details and mentions of partner sites.
Figure 2. Reconstruction of the trojanized WinDirStat download page.

Analysis of the gate's tracker URLs revealed a critical detail. Each URL contained a click_id parameter: a Base64-encoded fingerprint containing the victim's operating system (OS), browser, the referring domain, the exact search keyword that led them to the lure and their public IP address, as Table 1 shows.

Operating System Browser Referring SEO Domain Search Keyword Victim IP
Windows_10 Chrome atthelake[.]info hwidspoofer 5.xxx.xx.xxx
Windows_10 Chrome atthelake[.]info combatwarriorsGit 2.xx.xxx.xx

Table 1. Example of a deobfuscated click_id.

The gate uses this fingerprint to decide who receives the payload: a valid, fresh click_id forwards the visitor to the malware/loader download. This is an evasion tactic used to ensure that only real targets are infected, and to protect the actor’s infrastructure: scanners, crawlers or analysts receive a decoy clone of the legitimate WinRAR download page or broken links. This is why the campaign has almost no public footprint despite being highly active: automated URL scanners rarely pass the gate.

Decoding hundreds of these fingerprints, with the assistance of AI, exposed the full names of YouTube video titles and their associated channels. Alongside search keywords for cracked software and game cheats, the q= field – which tracks which search query led to the infection – contained strings like "CS2 Potato Graphics Settings - Maximum FPS Boost for Low-End PC (2026 Guide) - Velvox."

The YouTube Funnel

Searching for titles derived from the fingerprints led us to uncover a chain of gaming optimization YouTube channels. Their content included tips on boosting frames per second (FPS), fixing game crashes and tweaking settings on popular game platforms. While the videos provided authentic, engaging content for young gamers, they ultimately served as an infection delivery vehicle, prompting viewers to download a malicious “tool” or “optimization pack” via links in the description, as Figure 3 shows.

A screenshot of a YouTube video titled by ADEX with 18.7K subscribers. The video has 168 views as of June 22, 2026. Hashtags include #CPUBottleneck and #LowGPUUsage. Two links are provided: one short link and a GearUp Booster product link.
Figure 3. A YouTube video from the ADEX channel directing viewers to a download link.

Those links pass through intermediary sites, such as Blogspot, which contain social-engineering instructions that lead the victim to the same PPI gate infrastructure serving the SEO path. An example blog page is shown in Figure 4.

A screenshot of a website page showing two featured articles. The first article discusses fixing high ping and packet loss for improved downloads. The second article is about optimizing SSD performance. Both articles include bold headlines and colorful images.
Figure 4. The download link leads to a Blogspot page.

We identified 11 channels connected to CL-CRI-1171, which collectively had hundreds of thousands of subscribers and millions of views.

Technical Analysis

Our investigation revealed three malware strains delivered by the group behind CL-CRI-1171 between June 2025 and April 2026. The following sections explain the technical aspects of the loader used by this cybercrime group and the deployed malware payloads:

  • OfferLoader – The delivery mechanism behind all recorded intrusions, an Inno Setup trojanized installer that sets up the other payloads.
  • Operation A: Insomnia RAT – A dual-payload, cross-platform backdoor that brings its own environment to ensure survival. Targeting both Windows and macOS using Node.js, paired with a twin Python agent.
  • Operation B: ARKTunnel – A previously unreported WebSocket tunneling RAT unpacks itself from a bitmap image using steganography. We found 50 samples spanning over a year of development, operating across four fictitious corporate-identity rotations.
  • Operation C: Docro Hijacker – A Chrome backdoor that revives a browser-hijacking technique first seen in 2015, re-engineered to bypass modern integrity protections. This campaign represents the first observation of this modern variant in the wild.

Initial Access Vector in Intrusions

We discovered two intrusion sets that began in the same way: a user searched for a legitimate utility, clicked a top search result that led to a malicious domain, and downloaded what appeared to be a legitimate application. Both infections delivered the same three payloads.

  • First intrusion set: Downloaded Bluetooth Driver for Windows 10.exe from a file-sharing archive. The installer was a trojanized Inno Setup package carrying the PPI loader with affiliate ID CID=2855.
  • Second intrusion set: Browsed to noiseship[.]cfd, a domain registered just 39 days earlier, and downloaded a trojanized windirstat.exe installer. This package carried the PPI loader with affiliate ID CID=3075.

The OfferLoader Execution Chain

The operator's code and C2 communication designate each payload slot as an "offer," tracking variables as offer_execution, offer_execution_fail and offer_exists. Based on the naming convention, we track this loader as OfferLoader. OfferLoader uses chained Inno Setup (a legitimate installation packager) packages to deliver multiple payloads. Figure 5 shows the infection chain.

A Cortex XSIAM infecton chain diagram illustrating the process of payload prevention by Advanced WildFire. It shows a main circle labeled "Installer" leading to another node. Three red X-marked paths branch indicate prevention. Advanced WildFire logo is present at the top.
Figure 5. Cortex XSIAM view of the infection chain. In this case, Advanced WildFire blocked the payloads.

OfferLoader is delivered in a ZIP file, with the source download site providing the social engineering instructions required to guide users through downloading and executing an extraction tool. Based on our analysis of the collected samples, we observed the loader being delivered alongside a legitimate version of WinRAR, renamed to .store. The installer contains no embedded application files; all malicious logic is contained in the compiled Pascal [Code] section, which triggers when the installation page is displayed.

In two separate intrusion sets we discovered that the ZIP file contained OfferLoader masquerading as a windirstat.exe installer that initiates the compromise by unpacking windirstat.tmp. This temporary file transmits an initial tracking beacon to voyagemist[.]space. This is another gating mechanism: depending on the structure of the beacon, one of two text files will be retrieved. They either contain “no” to signal that the loader should not unpack further stages, or “ok” to signal all offers will be deployed. Following this check-in, the process spawns three child processes: eld0.exe, eld1.exe and eld2.exe. Each child process corresponds to a different malware campaign. The loader passes specific affiliate-tracking parameters to each process via a command line.

Figure 6 illustrates the entire OfferLoader infection chain at the time of the intrusion.

A diagram showing an OffLoader attack chain process. The "Victim" is redirected to a domain, followed by the download of a file. This is unpacked into another file, which gates into a different domain. Three operations branch out: Operation A involves Insomnia RAT, Operation B involves ARKTunnel, and Operation C involves Docro Hijacker.
Figure 6. Example of an OfferLoader infection chain.

OfferLoader's role ends once the three offers are spawned. From this point forward, each child process operates as an independent malware campaign with its own infrastructure, C2 protocol and objectives. The following sections analyze what each offer delivers.

Operation A: Insomnia RAT – A Cross-Platform Backdoor

Insomnia RAT simultaneously distributes two payloads:

  • An upgraded variant of a Node.js backdoor (reported by Walmart Global Tech in 2025)
  • A complementary Python backdoor

We have dubbed these twin payloads Insomnia RAT, due to the user-agent string used for C2 communications: insomnia/2023.4.0 Windows.

Figure 7 shows the full infection chain that delivers Insomnia RAT’s twin payloads.

A flowchart illustrating the new Insomnia RAT variant infection chain. It starts with a file loading.The flow continues through a domain, then to a hidden PowerShell downloader. The diagram also includes components like Node.js and Python 3.12. Arrows show how these components connect, with persistence strategies and rotating command and control (C2) server domain.
Figure 7. The new Insomnia RAT variant infection chain.

Eld0.exe drops the a.dll payload and spawns a hidden PowerShell process to download and execute t.ps1. This double-stage installer script disables Windows Defender protections, adds the entire C:\ drive as an exclusion, suppresses security notifications and deploys the two Insomnia RAT backdoors. t.ps1 also downloads and sets up the environment needed to execute both backdoors by installing Python and Node.js on the victim’s machine. Node.js is hidden from the system's Add/Remove Programs list by setting SystemComponent=1 in the registry.

The first part of Insomnia RAT is a Node.js agent downloaded from stryper[.]info/aa.js. While the prior variant targeted Windows, Linux and FreeBSD with a single payload, this iteration targets Windows and macOS using platform-specific C2 server lists. It also deploys a companion Python agent as a redundant fallback, ensuring persistent access if one runtime environment is detected or removed.

The backdoor collects the victim's MachineGuid, universally unique identifier (UUID), hostname and operating system details. It then contacts its C2 servers via an HTTPS POST request to /d using a User-Agent string, insomnia/2023.4.0 Windows to disguise itself. The C2 server responds with a JSON array containing commands. These specify a payload type (node, cmd, ps1, sh, or ow for a self-update) and a download URL. Results are reported back to the /e endpoint.

To establish persistence, the installer registers a scheduled task named Maps Performance Task under \Microsoft\Windows\Maps\. This mimics a legitimate Windows task, executing the backdoor hourly and at system startup under the SYSTEM account.

The same t.ps1 script installs a second, redundant agent. This Python script is downloaded from aa.amazingshield[.]xyz. The installer downloads a legitimate Python distribution and registers a second scheduled task, OOBETaskScheduler, under \Microsoft\Windows\Servicing\.

The Python agent is simpler than its Node.js sibling, but follows the same C2 protocol pattern: POST requests to /d for tasks and POST requests to /e for error reporting. The agent collects the MachineGuid, OS product name, hostname and processor architecture.

The Python agent used crowdstri[.]com as its C2 domain. This appears to be a deliberate typosquat of crowdstrike[.]com, designed to blend into logs and evade quick security reviews.

Operation B: ARKTunnel – A WebSocket RAT Hidden in a Bitmap

The eld1.exe chain terminates in a previously undocumented tunnel payload. The chain uses least-significant-bit (LSB) steganography to deploy the final payload. Figure 8 shows the full infection chain of Operation B.

A flowchart illustrating the ARKTunnel infection chain, a sequence of events involving multiple software entities. The flowchart highlights processes such as persistence, host reconnaissance, and the use of an autorun.
Figure 8. The ARKTunnel infection chain.

Rather than dropping an executable directly to disk, eld1.exe extracts a ZIP archive from a BMP image resource using LSB steganography. The result is the payload archive, ProcorTrex.zip, which contains wscl.exe, a previously unreported WebSocket-based tunneling RAT. We named this RAT ARKTunnel, based on the attacker's fabricated company name rotation of EarthKark and TamarkLark.

ARKTunnel installs itself as a Windows service named wscl-13 or msvcsrvc with a delayed autostart configuration. The RAT supports TCP and UDP tunneling, as well as file execution.

The C2 server address, reg.pcsdkflyer[.]ca, is decoded from a 39-byte configuration blob using Base64-decoding followed by an XOR decryption routine. The portable executable (PE) metadata of wscl.exe contains a fabricated company name, TamarkLark Corporation, and a fictitious product name, TamarkLark Manager, which led us to suspect that other ARKTunnel samples might use additional fabricated company names.

The investigation revealed at least 50 samples deployed over the course of a year. The developer rotated through at least two fake company identities while maintaining an identical icon, binary structure and deployment pattern:

  • EarthLink in May 2025: EarthLink is the name of a legitimate internet provider, however the attackers used this name coincidentally in the file version information. The attackers did not use or impersonate EarthLink resources or identity.
  • EarthChain from May 2025–April 2026: EarthChain is also real company name that the attackers used coincidentally. Likewise, also they did not use or impersonate the company’s resources or identity.
  • EarthKark: A fake identity, used from February 2026–June 2026
  • TamarkLark: A fake identity, used from March 2026–June 2026

All of the samples share the same wscl.exe filename pattern and GUID-based temp directory extraction pattern, indicating that they are variants of the same family.

Despite 50 samples spanning a full year of development and four identity rotations, ARKTunnel has attracted no public reporting or dedicated tracking, with each sample individually flagged as a generic Trojan rather than recognized as a tunneling implant.

Operation C: Docro Hijacker – Reviving Old Techniques

The eld2.exe payload installs a Chrome browser hijacker that we have named Docro Hijacker. The hijacker revives a browser-hijacking technique that has resurfaced periodically since 2015, now re-engineered to bypass updates to Chrome's integrity protections. While this iteration closely mirrors a proof-of-concept detailed by Synacktiv in 2025, this campaign marks the updated technique’s first documented instance of in-the-wild deployment.

Figure 9 shows the Docro Hijacker installation chain.

A flowchart illustrating the Docro Hijacker infection chain. The flow includes tampering with Chrome secure preferences. The process installs "Docro Hijacker," which connects to four domain indicating various malicious activities like script injection and telemetry.
Figure 9. The Docro Hijacker infection chain.

eld2.exe is an Inno Setup package, and much like its loader, it extracts and runs eld2.tmp which contacts the affiliate’s extentrack[.]com install tracker.

eld2.tmp drops and loads Adblock.dll, which bypasses Chrome's Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 integrity check. The DLL extracts Chrome's HMAC key from resources.pak, computes valid HMAC signatures for the modified preference values and writes them directly to the Secure Preferences file. This file functions as an anti-tamper mechanism for browsers by storing a validated copy of the user's settings.

This manipulation allows the malware to execute two primary actions:

  • Search hijacking: Changes the default search provider to mqsearch[.]com, a domain that masquerades as a search engine
  • Extension installation: Installs the docro extension, a Chrome Manifest V3 extension located at C:\ProgramData\DocsHelper\docro\

The docro extension uses Chrome's declarativeNetRequest API to dynamically rewrite network requests. Upon installation, it contacts vendralo[.]info to retrieve a unique per-victim UUID and fetch a set of network rewriting rules that are refreshed hourly.

These rules are used to hijack and monetize search results in the victim's browser. When the victim performs an internet search, across any of more than 190 Google country-code domains, the extension loads a script from drelto[.]info/farlix into the search results page. Because the script runs within the search engine's own origin context, it has full access to the page content. This enables the operator to inject advertisements into organic search results, rewrite affiliate links to capture referral revenue and/or redirect clicks to attacker-controlled destinations. These actions are functionally transparent to the user and visually indistinguishable from the legitimate search page.

The extension also checks vendralo[.]info for updates via /extensionInstaller/updateChromeExtension, allowing the operator to silently rotate to a new extension version at any time. Install telemetry is reported to finersto[.]com and extentrack[.]com.

With more than 50 unique samples contacting mqsearch[.]com according to VirusTotal, Docro Hijacker appears to be a mature, independent monetization module.

Conclusion

The actors behind CL-CRI-1171 did not use sophisticated evasion techniques, but focused their efforts on building a loader that is exceptionally difficult to track due to its clever gating mechanisms.

Our investigation highlights how the authors of OfferLoader, by being intentional about its simplicity and by hiding all of its functions as bytecode within a package, designed the malware to evade scrutiny while quietly building a massive, mature infection funnel.

Although OfferLoader was easy for defenders and security products to miss, its gating mechanisms were not, and the sheer number of them was our first clue that more widespread activity was occurring.

While a loader that just drops a payload is seemingly routine, this mechanism allowed possibly thousands of rotational malware bundles, including entirely new and undocumented malware families, to remain hidden from standard security attention. Ultimately, this case serves as a critical reminder for defenders: Treating commodity loader infections as minor, routine events overlooks the dangerous payloads and campaigns that might be tied to them.

Palo Alto Networks Protection and Mitigation

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected against the threats described in this report through the following products and services:

  • The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of the indicators shared in this research. Through continuous cloud-based analysis, Advanced WildFire is designed to proactively identify and block OfferLoader samples as well as downstream payloads, including Insomnia RAT, ARKTunnel, and Docro Hijacker.
  • Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known domains and URLs associated with this activity as malicious.
  • Cortex XDR and XSIAM can help detect and prevent the OfferLoader chain and all three payload branches described in this article. Cortex customers benefit from multiple layers of protection against this threat, including:
    • YARA-based signatures targeting the OfferLoader family and its staged payloads
    • Behavioral detection rules that help prevent:
      • Malicious Chrome extension setup
      • Untrusted service installations used for persistence
      • Trojanized installer execution patterns

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Indicators of Compromise

Initial Access and OfferLoader

SHA256 hash: 7f792c45de1e28fd42ac44c9444f157a2161742d130bac336c0e991aabbb112c
File name: windirstat.exe
File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup 6.7.1
File description: OfferLoader trojanized WinDirStat installer delivered via SEO-poisoning

SHA256 hash: fc485882626512e7ff82a1d7cd8e8fb3e9751b026d97e682d6908aefff1f2d73
File name: windirstat.tmp
File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup unpacked stage
File description: Unpacked WinDirStat stage

Operation A: Insomnia RAT

SHA256 hash: 3052bd320a34e12ee694811ed0578797477dfd480c664491e509ed15ce1a6961
File name: eld0.exe
File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup 6.3.0 SetupLdr
File description: Insomnia RAT initial loader

SHA256 hash: 25558ea78c4aa0fdd0f45fafcaa546d3115dc5806809d144a5801a40e48fd4c5
File name: eld0.tmp
File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup unpacked stage
File description: Unpacked loader stage

SHA256 hash: 9b0d9cbc0fd4a7bae8b78a15dfbe63052779414ad725845732c4a0083008da69
File name: a.dll
File type: PE32 DLL
File description: Executes the PowerShell downloader for the Node.js and Python second stages

SHA256 hash: ceb30a5eb9ad9d9c6712c80726df16f96f99d9fc0753be241b00b4d636eb576e
File name: t.ps1
File type: PowerShell
File description: Insomnia RAT PowerShell loader

SHA256 hash: cf184d04ca31fb2b6b7efd85399c29c1136b539153e137ceb3877b1b905791de
File name: <guid>.py
File type: Python script
File description: the Python-based component of the Insomnia RAT dual payload.

SHA256 hash: 62d49d0c78207ec2452cc8a30501db771c9edbae89889e41a7dd227551243e8e
File name: aa.js
File type: JavaScript
File description: the Node.js-based component of the Insomnia RAT dual payload.

URL: hxxps[:]//stryper[.]info/t.ps1
Description: Stage-2 PowerShell installer for the Node.js and Python agents

URL: hxxps[:]//stryper[.]info/aa.js
Description: Stage-3 Node.js agent

URL: hxxp[:]//aa.amazingshield[.]xyz/33244556546.py
Description: Stage-3 Python agent

Domain: stryper[.]info
Description: Second-stage PowerShell and Node.js agent host

Domain: aa.amazingshield[.]xyz
Description: Python agent host

Domain: crowdstri[.]com
Description: CrowdStrike-typosquat C2 for the Python agent

Operation B: ARKTunnel

SHA256 hash: aaebc8c07de485be6d1bfa956668c5e18aa1ff5588dfe84672e20ae90b4560f1
File name: eld1.exe
File type: PE32 executable
File description: LSB-steganography dropper. The attacker forged the PE version-info resource to mimic a popular test proctoring application.

SHA256 hash: e05bc22afbc5ddd50b49c85ee169dd13318000d38286de2b8bcff98217256a8d File size: 92,657 bytes
File name: procorTrex.zip
File location: C:\Users\Public\procorTrex.zip
File type: ZIP archive
File description: ZIP carved from the eld1.exe BMP steganography payload

SHA256 hash: b367762140ae7f5098230b8a5da738c9241f286281ec9439dd6ca581fc87989c File size: 245,248 bytes
File name: wscl.exe
File type: PE32 executable
File description: WebSocket tunneling RAT

ARKTunnel resource icons:
SHA256 hash: d8d783f8e050a6e394f3c0aa5e2bc73a38d822e55fbc39c0648cbff566de3cdf
File description: Resource Icon shared across ARKTunnel samples

SHA256 hash: 06e0afd01bbc6c9d5dc16c3165089b233dc071e1f251abd06235d1b9166cdac5
File description: Resource Icon shared across ARKTunnel samples

Domain: reg.pcsdkflyer[.]ca
Description: wscl.exe WebSocket RAT C2

Operation C: Docro Hijacker

SHA256 hash: 2c6e11027b011042c9a118fc20728f8f4ebb6be8795cc84cc9a45622c297d354
File name: eld2.exe
File type: PE32 executable, Inno Setup installer
File description: Branch C installer that drops Adblock.dll and the docro Chrome extension

SHA256 hash: 553ce594c9c6afdd4794fddc28c194e3bc3c1b052310e5099c58ac15bab72104
File name: eld2.tmp
File type: PE32 executable
File description: Inno Setup unpacked stage

SHA256 hash: fdcc95b7791c0d6590dcf1a412dc9fcc92ad2095818d1b78368b31efad012007
File size: 3,041,280 bytes
File name: Adblock.dll
File location: %TEMP%\Adblock.dll
File type: PE32 DLL
File description: Chrome Secure Preferences HMAC-SHA256 bypass DLL that sideloads the docro extension and hijacks the default search provider

Docro extension path:
File location: C:\ProgramData\DocsHelper\docro
File description: Manifest V3 Chrome extension sideloaded by Adblock.dll

Domain: vendralo[.]info
Description: Per-victim UUID and hourly rule delivery

Domain: finersto[.]com
Description: Extension install and start telemetry

Domain: drelto[.]info
Description: SERP-injection script host

Domain: mqsearch[.]com
Description: Hijacked the default search provider endpoint

Domain: extentrack[.]com
Description: Docs Helper install-success and install-failure callback

CL-CRI-1171 Rotational Infrastructure

Initial-Access Lure and SEO File-Locker Hosts

Domain Role
noiseship[.]cfd SEO-poison domain
atthelake[.]info Top referring SEO-poison domain
uy.basesfiles[.]com Fake file host
basesfile[.]com Sibling fake file host
igk.filexspace[.]com ikx.filexspace[.]com SEO file-locker lure hosts
filexstorage[.]site SEO file-locker lure host
filescloud[.]pro SEO file-locker lure host
zippyfiles[.]net SEO file-locker lure host
mifilesx[.]site SEO file-locker lure host
dw.xrsdownload[.]com SEO file-locker lure host
storage.ggclicker[.]com SEO file-locker / referrer host
watchadvance[.]com SEO-poisoning domain

Domains Used to Confirm OfferLoader Installations

Domain:

  • animalview[.]xyz
  • trickflag[.]info
  • suitstraw[.]info
  • connect.fuelleg[.]info
  • vesselsystem[.]xyz
  • minewave[.]info
  • collartitle[.]info
  • boardmagic[.]info
  • placespoon[.]xyz
  • needcherries[.]online

Payload-Handoff and Second-Stage Hosts

Install-Tracker Beacons (Operator Panel)

Domain Role
voyagemist[.]space PPI affiliate install tracker
statementtouch[.]xyz PPI affiliate install tracker
chawton[.]info PPI affiliate install tracker

YouTube Funnel – Burner Blogs and Custom-Domain Sites

Domain Name Persona Type
velfps.blogspot[.]com Velvox Blogspot burner
velvoxlab.blogspot[.]com Velvox Blogspot burner
venrx.blogspot[.]com Venrx Blogspot burner
venrxhub.blogspot[.]com Venrx Blogspot burner
venrx[.]xyz Venrx Custom-domain burner
ravexoffical.blogspot[.]com Ravex Blogspot burner
adex-blog.blogspot[.]com Adex Blogspot burner

Please note: While Velvox is a real company, the attackers used its name coincidentally. They did not use or impersonate the company’s resources or identity.

Additional Resources

Appendix A: CL-CRI-1171 Full Discovered Infrastructure Tables

Indicator Role
achievershelf[.]space Gate/landing
activitymeal[.]space Gate/landing
additionplot[.]cfd Gate/landing
adviceturn[.]xyz Gate/landing
afternoonscrew[.]space Gate/landing
agreementjuice[.]space Gate/landing
airplaneiron[.]xyz Gate/landing
airtwig[.]xyz Gate/landing
amountfuel[.]icu Gate/landing
animalrecord[.]xyz Gate/landing
apparatustruck[.]xyz Gate/landing
apparelplate[.]space Gate/landing
archairport[.]xyz Gate/landing
authoritykittens[.]info Gate/landing
babyvein[.]xyz Gate/landing
badgewing[.]xyz Gate/landing
bagcare[.]space Gate/landing
basinpleasure[.]xyz Gate/landing
basketballyear[.]xyz Gate/landing
baskethumor[.]xyz Gate/landing
bedroomdesire[.]xyz Gate/landing
beliefpicture[.]xyz Gate/landing
bellplayground[.]xyz Gate/landing
bikesdonkey[.]info Gate/landing
birthdaymagic[.]xyz Gate/landing
boatthought[.]xyz Gate/landing
boundarychickens[.]xyz Gate/landing
boytank[.]xyz Gate/landing
branchmorning[.]xyz Gate/landing
breathdoctor[.]xyz Gate/landing
bubbleslip[.]xyz Gate/landing
cabbagemeasure[.]xyz Gate/landing
cablecanvas[.]xyz Gate/landing
cardgrape[.]xyz Gate/landing
cattlegold[.]xyz Gate/landing
celeryerror[.]xyz Gate/landing
centscarf[.]xyz Gate/landing
chalkprose[.]xyz Gate/landing
cherriestruck[.]space Gate/landing
chesstail[.]xyz Gate/landing
chickensmine[.]space Gate/landing
churchpail[.]xyz Gate/landing
clothcrib[.]xyz Gate/landing
clothcurrent[.]xyz Gate/landing
coatberry[.]xyz Gate/landing
connect.activitykitty[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.apparatustaste[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.armcard[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.badgeterritory[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.baitmetal[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.beefteeth[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.believesisters[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.boundaryfly[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.bubbleappliance[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.cableland[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.chinexpert[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.conditiongrade[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.coppersummer[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.creatorcreator[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.dresstent[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.dropjeans[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.edgeplayground[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.exchangeclub[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.existencediscussion[.]info Install tracker
connect.expansionsalt[.]info Install tracker
connect.fangstitch[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.fogparcel[.]info Install tracker
connect.foodhook[.]info Install tracker
connect.forkcountry[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.geesepurpose[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.giantsdogs[.]info Install tracker
connect.giraffetoothpaste[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.guitarrobin[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.halllunch[.]info Install tracker
connect.harborclam[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.holecompany[.]info Install tracker
connect.knifesea[.]icu Install tracker
connect.monthsmoke[.]info Install tracker
connect.nosegovernor[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.pagesubstance[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.poisonblade[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.prosesalt[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.purposethings[.]info Install tracker
connect.quiltgirls[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.reactionbit[.]info Install tracker
connect.rewardrun[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.riceapparel[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.seashoreletters[.]info Install tracker
connect.selectiondogs[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.shapeboot[.]info Install tracker
connect.shoptax[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.stopfinger[.]info Install tracker
connect.structurekiss[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.tanksuggestion[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.thingbrass[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.thoughtslave[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.threadfuel[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.trailcontrol[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.trickbushes[.]info Install tracker
connect.vacationthought[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.viewschool[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.voyagelaugh[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.woolreward[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.yearicicle[.]xyz Install tracker
connect.zebratransport[.]xyz Install tracker
controlprice[.]xyz Gate/landing
coughcoal[.]icu Gate/landing
countrypipe[.]space Gate/landing
cowsfoot[.]xyz Gate/landing
crackfood[.]space Gate/landing
creamfurniture[.]space Gate/landing
creditchickens[.]xyz Gate/landing
crediteducation[.]cfd Gate/landing
crimestreet[.]xyz Gate/landing
crimesupport[.]cfd Gate/landing
curvebite[.]xyz Gate/landing
deathrock[.]xyz Gate/landing
deathshop[.]xyz Gate/landing
decisionreaction[.]xyz Gate/landing
dinosaursjam[.]cfd Gate/landing
distancebedroom[.]xyz Gate/landing
distributiontheory[.]cfd Gate/landing
dolldebt[.]xyz Gate/landing
doorsoap[.]cfd Gate/landing
dustprotest[.]icu Gate/landing
expansionsalt[.]info Gate/landing
fallbeginner[.]xyz Gate/landing
fangbear[.]xyz Gate/landing
filescenter[.]cloud Gate/landing
filesilo[.]cloud Gate/landing
fingerbasketball[.]xyz Gate/landing
flavorwood[.]xyz Gate/landing
fleshfrog[.]xyz Gate/landing
fleshplants[.]xyz Gate/landing
fleshproduce[.]xyz Gate/landing
foodrock[.]space Gate/landing
forkmice[.]xyz Gate/landing
friendjewel[.]cfd Gate/landing
geeseairport[.]xyz Gate/landing
girlsgrain[.]xyz Gate/landing
glassmove[.]xyz Gate/landing
goldsteel[.]cfd Gate/landing
governmentyard[.]cfd Gate/landing
grandfatherquiver[.]xyz Gate/landing
gripcollar[.]xyz Gate/landing
gripsleep[.]xyz Gate/landing
gunbear[.]xyz Gate/landing
hairreward[.]xyz Gate/landing
hatescale[.]info Gate/landing
healthiron[.]space Gate/landing
holemuscle[.]xyz Gate/landing
homecub[.]cfd Gate/landing
homefireman[.]xyz Gate/landing
honeyfear[.]xyz Gate/landing
ilesilo[.]cloud Gate/landing
instrumentvolcano[.]space Gate/landing
kittenschalk[.]xyz Gate/landing
kittensgrade[.]cfd Gate/landing
kittensrobin[.]info Gate/landing
landerror[.]xyz Gate/landing
lesilo[.]cloud Gate/landing
liptendency[.]info Gate/landing
liquidtoes[.]xyz Gate/landing
liquidwrench[.]cfd Gate/landing
lockettrail[.]xyz Gate/landing
lumberbaseball[.]xyz Gate/landing
memorycompany[.]xyz Gate/landing
micesisters[.]xyz Gate/landing
milkname[.]xyz Gate/landing
minuteblade[.]xyz Gate/landing
mountainsurprise[.]cfd Gate/landing
mouthfruit[.]cfd Gate/landing
noiseship[.]cfd Gate/landing
northbox[.]xyz Gate/landing
partpipe[.]xyz Gate/landing
partyfriends[.]cfd Gate/landing
passengerbrake[.]space Gate/landing
peacejewel[.]xyz Gate/landing
peacetongue[.]xyz Gate/landing
petminister[.]xyz Gate/landing
pictureporter[.]cfd Gate/landing
pieplant[.]space Gate/landing
pizzasthread[.]xyz Gate/landing
pleasurewaves[.]info Gate/landing
popcornregret[.]xyz Gate/landing
porterdebt[.]xyz Gate/landing
powerbushes[.]xyz Gate/landing
profitfact[.]xyz Gate/landing
prosetoothbrush[.]xyz Gate/landing
quincepage[.]xyz Gate/landing
raintexture[.]xyz Gate/landing
rakepurpose[.]xyz Gate/landing
raterake[.]cfd Gate/landing
readingscience[.]xyz Gate/landing
reasonachiever[.]xyz Gate/landing
recessgiraffe[.]xyz Gate/landing
recordhistory[.]xyz Gate/landing
regretsquirrel[.]xyz Gate/landing
restbucket[.]xyz Gate/landing
ricestar[.]xyz Gate/landing
rifledog[.]xyz Gate/landing
ringsparcel[.]xyz Gate/landing
roadyear[.]xyz Gate/landing
rockcredit[.]space Gate/landing
rollglass[.]xyz Gate/landing
roofbattle[.]xyz Gate/landing
roofreaction[.]xyz Gate/landing
rosegrip[.]xyz Gate/landing
routeletters[.]xyz Gate/landing
runhouses[.]xyz Gate/landing
scarecrowcare[.]xyz Gate/landing
scentrod[.]info Gate/landing
screwbirth[.]xyz Gate/landing
seatlace[.]space Gate/landing
seaword[.]xyz Gate/landing
servantadvice[.]xyz Gate/landing
shiptank[.]cfd Gate/landing
shirtexample[.]xyz Gate/landing
shoesearthquake[.]xyz Gate/landing
sinkwash[.]space Gate/landing
skirtloss[.]xyz Gate/landing
slipvegetable[.]xyz Gate/landing
smokecar[.]space Gate/landing
songtheory[.]xyz Gate/landing
spadeleg[.]xyz Gate/landing
sparkrice[.]space Gate/landing
sparkrub[.]xyz Gate/landing
spoonducks[.]cfd Gate/landing
springdogs[.]xyz Gate/landing
spybaseball[.]space Gate/landing
startmonkey[.]cfd Gate/landing
statementservant[.]xyz Gate/landing
statementtouch[.]xyz Gate/landing
steamhouses[.]cfd Gate/landing
stopzinc[.]xyz Gate/landing
structurelinen[.]xyz Gate/landing
suggestioncemetery[.]xyz Gate/landing
suitsoap[.]xyz Gate/landing
suitstraw[.]info Gate/landing
swimrest[.]xyz Gate/landing
tablechess[.]info Gate/landing
tailsilk[.]xyz Gate/landing
territorycaption[.]xyz Gate/landing
texturebadge[.]xyz Gate/landing
thrillducks[.]xyz Gate/landing
throneback[.]xyz Gate/landing
tinsofa[.]xyz Gate/landing
toespiders[.]xyz Gate/landing
toothpastesense[.]xyz Gate/landing
toothpastesun[.]xyz Gate/landing
townquiver[.]xyz Gate/landing
trampdonkey[.]icu Gate/landing
treesboard[.]xyz Gate/landing
truckpig[.]cfd Gate/landing
truckshat[.]xyz Gate/landing
turnclass[.]xyz Gate/landing
umbrellavessel[.]xyz Gate/landing
vacationengine[.]xyz Gate/landing
vesselsystem[.]xyz Gate/landing
vestthings[.]cfd Gate/landing
volcanopin[.]xyz Gate/landing
voyagemist[.]space Gate/landing
wastereading[.]xyz Gate/landing
wasteturkey[.]xyz Gate/landing
wastewine[.]xyz Gate/landing
wavepan[.]xyz Gate/landing
whistlebook[.]cfd Gate/landing
whistlesong[.]xyz Gate/landing
wormspark[.]xyz Gate/landing
woundsecretary[.]xyz Gate/landing
wrenobservation[.]xyz Gate/landing
yamsmell[.]xyz Gate/landing
yardvalue[.]cfd Gate/landing
zephyrhall[.]cfd Gate/landing

Appendix B: YouTube Channels Linked to CL-CRI-1171 Activity

(Channels were taken down after we notified Google.)

Persona Channel
Velvox @VelvoxYT
Venrx @Venrx
Ravex @RAVEX-wu1pg
Adex @adex915
Ripex @ripex
HASNZ TWEAKS @hasnzyt
Ontrendytt @OnTrendd
Trend Rise @trendrise
Reknotic Lab @Reknotic
NowFixTutorials @NowFixTutorials
f4fix @f4fix

Attackers Expose Ongoing AI Tool Use Targeting Organizations in Latin America

Posted on by Sheida Azimi

Executive Summary

We have analyzed two ongoing, multi-stage network intrusion and data-exfiltration campaigns targeting organizations in Latin America. Corroborating recent findings from the broader threat intelligence community, we observed attackers leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance their capabilities.

Our investigation categorizes this activity as follows:

  • Mexican transportation campaign: This campaign impacted a transportation organization, alongside federal government ministries and municipal water utilities in Mexico and Ecuador. Operators relied on living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques. They executed iterative batch scripts to manipulate and exfiltrate sensitive data, and self-hosted NextChat instances on operational infrastructure. We track the activity in this cluster as CL-CRI-1131.
  • Brazilian financial campaign: Attackers targeted the Brazilian financial sector. We observed an expansion of previously reported targeting of vulnerable web servers in a job-themed phishing campaign. The attackers employed custom remote access Trojans (RATs) and tunneling tools, including a Go-based SOCKS5 proxy with iterative filenames that suggest AI-enablement. We track the activity in this cluster as CL-CRI-1163.

We track them as two separate activity clusters with distinct geographic focuses. However, the technical and behavioral overlaps between CL-CRI-1131 and CL-CRI-1163 highlight shifting trends in Latin American targeting and threat actor tooling.

Both clusters have overlapping SOCKS5 relay infrastructure and they both rely on AI to orchestrate operations via commercial large language models (LLMs). This signals a broader evolution in the regional threat landscape. Rather than isolated incidents, these clusters demonstrate how diverse threat groups in Latin America are independently adopting advanced proxy networks and AI integration to streamline their execution.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed here through the following products and services:

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics AI, LLM, Phishing, RATs

CL-CRI-1131: Mexican Transportation Campaign

During an April 2026 compromise, the attacker’s host-based operations reflected the trial and error of LLM usage. Infrastructure associated with the campaign persisted into June 2026 and exposed targeting profiles of the attacker.

Initial Host-Based Footprint: Execution Challenges

During an intrusion as part of CL-CRI-1131 activity in April 2026, we observed the attacker struggling to gather sensitive data. After repeated attempts to dump the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive and the domain controller NTDS.dit file, the attacker created shadow copies across multiple drives before copying files, as shown in Figure 1.

A screenshot of a command-line interface showing commands for creating shadow copies on Windows drives C: and F: using "vssadmin create shadow" and executing a script located in the Windows Temp folder.
Figure 1. Volume shadow copy manipulation.

This occurred while the attacker used a series of numbered batch scripts to collect sensitive data from the compromised host, as shown in Figure 2.

A screenshot of a Windows command prompt window displaying a series of command lines. The commands include executing PowerShell scripts and handling text files.
Figure 2. Commands used for a series of batch scripts to collect sensitive data.

The attackers inserted a permissions check to ensure successful file writing to the collection directory. These trial-and-error actions and successive script fixes are consistent with LLM usage.

After struggling to collect these files, we observed attackers troubleshooting connectivity with infrastructure at 62.171.185[.]97.

Infrastructure Analysis: Tracing Exfiltration Commands to Exposed Certificates

Pivoting on 62.171.185[.]97, the IP address used in CL-CRI-1131 activity for data exfiltration, we discovered an active Let's Encrypt TLS certificate using the domain m-doxa-apodo.duckdns[.]org and following a unique dynamic DNS naming standard.

Shared Infrastructure: What the SSL Certificates Revealed

Searching for the m-doxa prefix revealed that attackers established the infrastructure for the campaign in February 2026 using a single, consolidated multi-Subject Alternative Name (SAN) certificate. This single certificate reveals five active subdomains. These subdomain names indicate their operational functions and intended Mexican federal government targets, as Table 1 shows.

Subdomain Interpretation
m-doxa-apodo.duckdns[.]org apodo = alias/nickname (Spanish)
m-doxa-geo.duckdns[.]org geo for geolocation
m-doxa-intel.duckdns[.]org intel for intelligence
m-doxa-vacunas.duckdns[.]org vacunas = vaccines (Spanish)

Table 1. Subdomains and their likely operational capabilities and targets.

In February 2026, following the initial window of activity reported by CloudSEK, attackers deployed a single-SAN certificate during this campaign. The certificate was configured to secure only one specific domain: m-doxa-apodo. However, as the operation evolved, so did the infrastructure.

By April 2026, and again in June 2026, attackers rotated their infrastructure and generated new multi-SAN certificates.

Table 2 shows, by date, the certificates and hosts used for CL-CRI-1131 activity, demonstrating a timeline for the associated infrastructure.

Date Certificate SHA-256 Hash SANs Host
Feb. 27, 2026 7d766942ef34542cee39c852286599958c4c2e23187010c4d38dbf88fcb40bf8 1 165.22.184[.]26
April 20, 2026 4e218e70afdbb116209ec0ebe8fc556e296e69648aa4e0425b83c0e863a8fee5 5 178.128.87[.]160
June 19, 2026 46ac289ce0c13666de616446f5d5a68da8bd150f4f065c3bec02f63776d3899c 5 178.128.87[.]160

Table 2. Certificate procurement timeline.

AI Integration: Discovering the Backend Troubleshooting Interface

In a previous report by Gambit, The AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico’s Government Infrastructure [PDF], the February 2026 activity was notable for using multiple LLMs. The report by CloudSEK linked above detailing activity from June 2026 tracks the activity we call CL-CRI-1131 as Operation Escaneo.

These reports describe attackers using multiple LLMs, including Claude and GPT-4.1 to troubleshoot issues faced by the attackers across their campaigns. We discuss the attackers using NextChat as part of their broader LLM process.

The IP address 178.128.87[.]160 was used in CL-CRI-1131 activity during the associated April and June 2026 compromises. This address hosted an instance of the open-source tool NextChat on TCP port 3000. Figure 3 shows an example of the associated NextChat user interface, as it would look from a web browser window.

A screenshot of a NextChat interface with a light blue sidebar that displays "New Conversation" and the date and time. The main area shows a white text box with the message "Hello! How can I assist you today?" A row of icons for sending and formatting messages is below the text box.
Figure 3. Example of a locally hosted NextChat window.

NextChat is an open-source web interface where users can load and interact with multiple models. NextChat allows operators to compare across models and ensure prompts are hosted on attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Beyond revealing new targets, tracking this infrastructure provided a critical window into the activity cluster's backend operations. Given the initial failures to extract data from the host combined with the NextChat interface on this backend, we assess that the attackers relied on LLMs to generate the required workaround scripts.

Integrating AI into the operational infrastructure is not unique to this incident. We observe an identical technical setup when pivoting to a secondary campaign targeting the Brazilian financial sector.

CL-CRI-1163: Brazilian Financial Service Campaign

Unlike the Mexican transportation campaign, the Brazilian financial campaign we track as CL-CRI-1163 involved homebrewed malware. We observed that the attackers behind CL-CRI-1163 likely gained initial access through a job-themed phishing compromise.

Despite trading built-in Windows utilities for custom-built implants, the underlying operational shift remains consistent in both campaigns. Exposed staging infrastructure revealed operational scripts with filenames that suggest an LLM dynamically generated them rather than a human developer.

The apparent presence of this AI setup, deployed alongside advanced proxy networks, reinforces the conclusion of a broader regional trend. Even for attackers capable of deploying custom malware, an AI-driven backend serves as a force multiplier to populate directories with exploit scripts, streamline execution and lower the barrier to entry for managing complex post-exploitation workflows.

Initial Access and Execution: Phishing and Automated Actions on Objectives

In February 2026, we observed that attackers associated with CL-CRI-1163 achieved initial access through a resume-themed phishing email attachment.

After attackers dropped multiple RATs, we observed a similar iterative naming structure, likely due to the attackers' failure to install their tool set. We observed attempts to install versions 1–8 of a Go-based reverse SOCKS5 tunneling tool named SockTz from a compromised WordPress site.

Figure 4 shows the attempt to execute version 8, named socktz_v8.exe.

A screenshot of a command prompt text shows a command to use 'certutil' to download and execute a file from a URL, followed by running it from the user's directory and displaying "DONE".
Figure 4. Attempt to retrieve SockTz version 8 from a compromised WordPress site.

Likely due to failure to install the SockTz malware and open a successful proxy connection, attackers behind CL-CRI-1163 pivoted to attacker-controlled infrastructure to retrieve version 9, named socktz_v9, as Figure 5 shows.

A screenshot of a command line interface displays a command executing `cartutil` with parameters to split a file and download SockTz version from a specific IP address to a user's directory.
Figure 5. Pivot to attacker-controlled infrastructure to retrieve SockTz version.

Infrastructure Inspection: Analyzing AI-Generated Naming Conventions in the Open Directory

Researchers previously identified this SockTz proxy tool and 167.148.195[.]53 tied to persistent targeting of vulnerable JBoss servers. Where previous reports identified different versions of this tool across campaigns, we observed installation attempts of versions 1–9 in a two-hour window.

SockTz installers were hosted along with hundreds of campaign scripts on an open directory at 167.148.195[.]53. Similar to the SockTz version numbers and the CL-CRI-1131 operations, the open directory associated with this CL-CRI-1163 activity exposed iterative scripts with appended identifier _output, indicating the attackers employed LLMs throughout the campaign. A partial list of the files is shown in Figure 6.

A screenshot of a list of file names displayed in blue text, each preceded by a bullet point. The files include scripts with ".sh" extensions such. There are also text files with ".txt" extensions, named sequentially.
Figure 6. Partial list of the campaign scripts hosted on an open directory at 167.148.195[.]53.
In addition to exposing scripts across multiple phases of the attack chain, attackers appended exploit filenames with descriptive adjectives. This suggests that the attackers employed iterative, language model-driven development: exploit_creative.py, exploit_careful.py and rce_focused.py.

The threat actors behind the CL-CRI-1131 and CL-CRI-1163 campaigns have enhanced their technical capabilities by incorporating commercial LLMs into their workflows. This integration enables them to author advanced proxy configurations and dynamically address complex execution failures. However, the infrastructure they deployed to leverage this AI became their Achilles' heel.

Exposing an open NextChat directory to the public internet reveals a fundamental lack of operational maturity. The AI provided the necessary tactical workaround to extract the Active Directory database, but the human operators failed to secure the staging server. This left their entire playbook, prompt history and staging scripts visible to threat researchers.

This highlights a critical vulnerability for defenders to exploit. As less skilled and experienced actors adopt AI to accelerate their attacks, their foundational operational security (OpSec) failures remain the most reliable way to track and dismantle their operations.

Conclusion

The CL-CRI-1131 and CL-CRI-1163 operations orchestrated in the Mexican transportation and Brazilian financial sector campaigns highlight a notable evolution in the regional threat landscape. Through these campaigns, we observe attackers leveraging AI to enhance their capabilities.

Whether manipulating built-in Windows utilities or deploying custom-built proxy networks, these operators rely on commercial LLMs to overcome tactical hurdles and streamline their execution. However, this rapid technical acceleration is offset by fundamental operational security failures. Exposed staging directories, unsecured NextChat interfaces and structured multi-SAN certificates provide defenders with a clear roadmap of the attacker's infrastructure.

By pivoting on these OpSec oversights, defenders can proactively track the activity and disrupt the attackers' campaigns.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products:

  • The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of the indicators shared in this research
  • Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known domains and URLs associated with this activity as malicious.
  • Cortex XDR and XSIAM are designed to help prevent the threats described in this article, by employing the Malware Prevention Engine. This approach combines several layers of protection, including Advanced WildFire, Behavioral Threat Protection and the Local Analysis module, intended to prevent both known and unknown malware from causing harm to endpoints.

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Indicators of Compromise

Mexican Transportation Campaign

Domains:

  • m-doxa-apodo.duckdns[.]org
  • m-doxa-geo.duckdns[.]org
  • m-doxa-intel.duckdns[.]org
  • m-doxa-repuve.duckdns[.]org
  • m-doxa-sre.duckdns[.]org
  • m-doxa-vacunas.duckdns[.]org

Certificate SHA-256 Hashes for Fingerprints and Corresponding Hosts:

  • 46ac289ce0c13666de616446f5d5a68da8bd150f4f065c3bec02f63776d3899c
    • 178.128.87[.]160
  • 4e218e70afdbb116209ec0ebe8fc556e296e69648aa4e0425b83c0e863a8fee5
    • 178.128.87[.]160
  • 7d766942ef34542cee39c852286599958c4c2e23187010c4d38dbf88fcb40bf8
    • 165.22.184[.]26

Brazilian Financial Campaign

SHA-256 hashes:

  • a38b2cf8beff32a276eed8783723ecf8cc53d7dc88669e1b998dddc4db6fe996
  • 87bf8bc8b4a2cf34f0af1afe161f123a3d200e77f6c6f41b81bf6ae66ee172ec

URL:

  • hxxp[:]//167.148.195[.]53:8888/socktz_v9.exe

Additional Resources

An AI-Assisted Cyber Attack: Inside a Unit 42 Investigation

Posted on by Ria Bhatia

Unit 42 responded to an incident where a human attacker used frontier AI to breach an enterprise network autonomously as part of a ransom attack. The agents breached the company's security layers in a methodical manner, each targeting a different layer of defense to achieve a shared goal. The impact was at the scale of a coordinated effort from multiple red teams, which would normally take human operators around two weeks.

The threat actor told us in negotiations that they leveraged frontier AI models and attack-specific agentic AI frameworks. By shifting execution to an automated loop, the attacker compressed weeks of methodical intrusion tradecraft (using more than 50 MITRE ATT&CK techniques) into less than 10 hours.

After they gained initial access, the attacker used agents to map the internal architecture, raid source repositories and seize root credentials. The agents also triggered unauthorized continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) builds and claimed master keys to the victim's cloud AI infrastructure.

What made the attack stand out was AI-assisted operational efficiency, without the need for a novel zero-day or super elite tradecraft. The attacker left tactical execution to AI agents that monitored, evaluated, acted and re-planned in real time, increasing speed throughout the attack chain.

The attacker also directed the agent to leave behind a “report” on the organization’s security posture: an 80-page, technical audit detailing dozens of exploited findings.

Inside the Machine-Speed Attack Chain

The adversary ran their operation using current AI-enabled software development processes. We observed multiple indicators consistent with AI usage:

  • LLM calls to multiple frontier AI agents in parallel
  • Structured Markdown files passing information between agents and sessions
  • Custom scripts (assessed with high confidence to be AI-generated due to UI elements) managing dynamic operations

The 10-hour operational timeline included the following:

  • Infiltration and mapping: The actor breached a publicly accessible web service to tunnel into the network, deploying an automated recon agent to map internal microservices.
  • Secrets harvesting: Sub-agents combed enterprise code repositories, extracting hard-coded tokens and service passwords.
  • Privilege takeover: Using exposed tokens, the actor infiltrated the secrets management system, harvesting master administrative credentials to seize control of root system access.
  • Pipeline exploitation: The actor hijacked an enterprise code application via custom workflows to exfiltrate cloud access keys. They attempted to plant backdoors in Terraform configurations, but hard branch-protection controls stopped this.
  • AI infrastructure hijacking: Using stolen cloud keys, the actor turned the victim’s AI endpoints into post-compromise infrastructure — using the company’s compute power to perpetrate future moves.

Figure 1 maps the AI-orchestrated workflow.

Figure 1. AI-orchestrated intrusion workflow. The actor sets objectives and makes consequential decisions. Specialized agents execute, share results and adapt in real time.

Unified Threat Framework Mapping

For illustration, Table 1 below maps some of the techniques used against the MITRE ATT&CK and ATLAS frameworks:

Intrusion Stage Threat Actor Action MITRE ATT&CK® Mapping MITRE ATLAS™ (AI-Specific) Mapping
Initial Access and Recon Publicly accessible web service breach; automated service mapping via service discovery tool T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application

T1046: Network Service Discovery

 AML.T0000: Initial Access

AML.T0002: AI-Automated Reconnaissance
Credential Access Code scraping for secrets across code repos T1552.001: Credentials In Files AML.T0014: Credentials Harvesting
Privilege Escalation Infiltrating secrets manager to harvest admin system secrets T1555: Credentials from Password Stores AML.T0016: Privilege Escalation via Automated Pivot
Pipeline Abuse Executing CI/CD actions; attempting cloud provisioning tool edits T1578: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure AML.T0010: ML/DevOps Pipeline Interception
AI Infrastructure Abuse Invoking cloud AI models via stolen keys T1078: Valid Accounts AML.T0043: LLM Invocations via Stolen API Keys

Table 1. Major MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE ATLAS techniques used by the attacker.

Key Lessons: Addressing Agentic Attacks

This incident exposes how an attacker who understands how to deploy frontier AI agents effectively can dramatically speed up the pace of their attack. We assess that attackers will increasingly add AI agents to their tool sets. Organizations should take note of the following to address agentic attacks:

  • AI agents reduce the time between steps in the attack flow: AI agents in this attack were designed to parse raw tool output and quickly take next steps, speeding up the overall attack flow.
  • AI agents leave recognizable indicators: Defenders can identify agentic attacks by watching for indicators such as the use of structured Markdown, Python caches and paired asset folders.
  • Attackers can use AI to establish redundant persistence across the environment: In this incident, the attacker used AI agents to efficiently establish overlapping persistence across SSH keys, serverless functions, container restart policies, cloud identities and CI/CD pipelines. Using AI agents can make it easier for an attacker to maintain and test this entire portfolio in parallel.
  • Attackers can use an organization’s AI tools as post-compromise infrastructure: Attackers can hijack enterprise AI services to assist in their attacks. This allows threat actors to hide orchestration traffic among expected traffic, and offload the financial cost onto the victim.

Defending Against Machine-Speed Attacks

Defending against automated agent loops requires matching the speed and adaptability of AI-driven attacks:

  • Execute synchronized containment: Deploy automated playbooks that simultaneously revoke credentials, terminate OAuth sessions, freeze CI/CD pipelines and isolate cloud accounts across all operational planes.
  • Govern AI as core infrastructure: Inventory every model endpoint, API key, Model Context Protocol (MCP) gateway and AI tool integration. Apply strict rate limits, least-privilege policies and diagnostic logging.
  • Detect behavioral loops: Hunt for operational loops including bursty API requests, rapid 401/200 HTTP state shifts, parallel authentications and sudden model usage from unexpected identities.
  • Lock down DevOps pipelines: Enforce mandatory, multi-party code reviews and immutable branch protection on all infrastructure-as-code repos to block automated backdoor injection.

Learn more about how Unit 42 can help defend against AI-driven threats through Unit 42 Frontier AI Defense.

Updated Sept. 3, 2026, at 5:25 a.m. PT to clarify that the attack was an intrusion, and not a ransomware attack. 

Updated Sept. 4, 2026, at 6:42 a.m. PT for minor clarifying copyedits. 

Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams

Posted on by Sheida Azimi

Executive Summary

Between January and April 2026, we uncovered a coordinated social engineering operation that leveraged external Microsoft Teams accounts to masquerade as IT help desk personnel. Our telemetry reveals that this operation targeted more than 150 employees across at least 10 companies in various industries. We call this activity Spring Ring.

What seems like a benign chat is in fact a voice phishing (vishing) call, during which adversaries try to coerce victims into executing remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools or custom malware. In a more advanced variant, attackers transitioned from a vishing call to a full-blown Microsoft NT LAN Manager (NTLM) relay attack aimed at an organization's domain controller (DC).

We provide a technical breakdown of this operation’s attack lifecycle across two observed campaigns, both illustrating vishing manipulation that resulted in the attempted payload delivery via two distinct attack vectors.

These two campaigns demonstrate the weaponization of communication platforms as identity becomes a primary attack vector.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats described here through the following products and services:

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics Phishing, Identity, Social Engineering

Overview: The Trust Gap

Spring Ring’s activity mirrors a broader trend in the threat landscape toward social engineering campaigns. According to our recently published Insights blog, threat actors have increasingly moved away from traditional phishing techniques toward trusted collaboration tools.

In the first four months of 2026, phishing alerts from collaboration tools represented 42% of all phishing alerts in Cortex, up from 30% of all phishing alerts in the preceding four months. In addition, according to KnowBe4’s Phishing Threat Trends Report, Teams-based attacks rose by 41% [PDF] between October 2025 and March 2026. They note that this surge is driven by attackers exploiting the platform's default “Chat with Anyone” feature to initiate direct chats with users outside their organization.

Previous Teams-based attacks, such as those by Cloaked Ursa (aka APT29), focused on credential harvesting and group chat-based social engineering. They often relied on malicious links or fake Entra ID tenants to appear legitimate.

Spring Ring’s approach relies on active human voice interaction. In this way, attackers can evade detection without a software exploit. Instead, they rely on exploiting the trust that employees place in software as a service (SaaS) collaboration platforms.

SaaS Applications: The New High-Value Target

SaaS applications are essential for business operations, storing an organization’s most critical and sensitive data. Unlike email, where users are trained to look for external sender banners or suspicious links, communications platforms provide a closed loop that attackers exploit by:

  • Leveraging platform trust: People are more likely to engage with a message from a help desk identity than a random email from an external domain
  • Exploiting human interaction: A professional voice on an audio call creates a level of trust that is difficult to manufacture in text, making the victim more susceptible to manipulation
  • Bypassing the monitoring gap: Voice calls are often less monitored, recorded or documented than employees’ digital file operations or email histories, providing attackers with a secluded environment to execute their lures

The Evolution of Collaboration Attacks

The Spring Ring operation represents an evolution from previous campaigns by merging vishing into the Teams workflow. This shift moves the attack from a passive click-and-harvest model to a real-time engagement.

Attackers can then pivot based on the victim's responses. Once the trust gap is crossed, the path to domain-level privileges via open-source tools like PetitPotam is short.

Figure 1 shows an example of the warning that Teams users get when an external identity creates a chat with them.

A screenshot of Microsoft Team's notification about being added to a group chat. A warning message indicates the person is from outside the organization, advising caution against sharing account information. Options to "Delete" or "Accept" are available.
Figure 1. External chat created, Delete/Accept screen.

Anatomy of Spring Ring: How Attackers Masquerade as Internal Support

The Spring Ring campaigns are a coordinated operation that relies on impersonating corporate IT structures. Attackers can drop their lures into a victim's primary communication channel using external Microsoft Teams accounts.

The Discovery: Spotting the Pattern

Our investigation into this activity began after the release of a new detection suite for Microsoft Teams. By monitoring these alerts, we identified a suspicious pattern of chat creation across multiple tenants. Further investigation into these alerts led to the initial discovery of 26 distinct identities approaching targets across different organizations.

The Initial Hook: Crafted Personas and Domains

The attack begins with creating a Microsoft Teams chat using identities designed to mirror legitimate internal support units. The attackers opt for professional, urgency-focused display names such as help desk, IT assistance or support staff.

To strengthen the impression of legitimacy, the attackers operate from external .onmicrosoft[.]com tenants. These are meant to resemble legitimate corporate infrastructure. They are used by attackers to provision Microsoft 365 tenants. The subdomains are controlled by the adversaries.

Threat actors frequently abuse or subvert legitimate products for malicious purposes. This does not indicate that the product itself is flawed or compromised. Unit 42 has no evidence of any compromise or vulnerability within Microsoft's product related to this campaign.

Here are examples of these subdomains:

  • ithelp@InternalSystemsDaily[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • HelpDesk@ITProtectionDepartment[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • itadmin@MandatoryNetworkMonitoring[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • Internal@InternalUSAHelpDeskIT[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ithelpdesk@CertifiedUpdateNetwork[.]onmicrosoft[.]com

In some instances, the actors went beyond generic role names and used specific names to increase the perceived authenticity of the technician on the other end of the line:

  • patrick[..]@infrastructureopsdesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • robert[..]@systemdeploymentcenter.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • clara[..]@systemsupportoperations.onmicrosoft[.]com

Names have been partially redacted because the attackers used specific names of legitimate industry personnel. The use of these names does not indicate a compromise of their accounts.

After the chat is created, the attacker initiates a voice call (the vishing element) to coerce the victim. After establishing a connection with what the victim believes is their own IT department, the attacker guides targeted employees through the steps to grant them remote control or execute malicious payloads.

The Scale of Spring Ring

Our telemetry reveals that these attackers often make several attempts — including leaving voicemails — before establishing a connection. We observed the attackers engaging victims in calls that varied in duration:

  • Many calls last only a few seconds or they are missed by the victim as the attacker cycles through targets
  • Successful calls often last between 10 and 15 minutes

Figure 2 shows several vishing attempts made by the same attacker identity on six different targets, with different conversation durations.

A screenshot of a table showing attacker call logs. Columns include Attacker Identity, Display Name, IP, and Call Duration. All Attacker Identities and Display Names are the same, with an IP address from Mullvad. Call Duration includes completed calls, missed calls, and voicemail, with times listed in hours, minutes, and seconds.
Figure 2. Examples of an attacker initiating calls with different targets, and different time durations.

The reach of these campaigns is significant:

  • More than 10 tenants were attacked: We observed the campaigns targeting many organizations across different industries
  • More than 150 targets were approached: The attackers contacted more than 150 individual employees
  • Persistent activity: We tracked the campaigns since January 2026 over a period of several weeks. According to our telemetry, these campaigns were active up until April 2026.

Technical Deep Dive: The RMM and Custom Dropper Combination

Once the attacker establishes trust through the initial vishing call, the Spring Ring campaigns transitioned into a technical execution phase designed to gain a permanent foothold. We provide a detailed analysis of two campaigns (Campaign A and Campaign B) that both began with a Microsoft Teams lure. They then diverged in their payload delivery, tool complexity and post-compromise activities.

Figure 3 shows the full attack flow of the two campaigns' attack methods.

a diagram illustrating Spring Ring attack flow, starting with creating a chat lure in Microsoft Teams. Two campaigns are shown: Campaign A leads to convincing the target to download RMM tools, then downloading obfuscated PowerShell-based malware. Campaign B involves convincing the target to download malware from a cloud endpoint, leading to persistence and environment enumeration, followed by attempted lateral movement using PetitPotam.
Figure 3. Full attack flow of the two Spring Ring campaigns.

Campaign A: From Support Tools to Obfuscated Payloads

In Campaign A, the attacker used a bring-your-own-tool approach, luring the victim to execute legitimate RMM software. The attacker posing as a technician walked the employee through launching built-in Windows tools like Quick Assist or downloading third-party RMM software. Once the RMM tool ran, the attacker could request remote control of the victim’s machine.

After gaining remote control, the attacker performed a series of basic enumeration commands to gain information on the host and domain. We observed them executing:

After confirming the environment's value, the attacker pivots to payload delivery. The attacker used a PowerShell command line to download an obfuscated PowerShell-based remote access Trojan (RAT) from the attacker-controlled domain, san-sid[.]com. This malware used variable manipulations and arithmetic obfuscation designed to evade automated security analysis and sandbox detection.

By leveraging advanced AI and pattern-matching algorithms, we were able to de-obfuscate the RAT. We started by stripping away anti-analysis bloat from the code that was used to cause a time-out for deobfuscation tools.

The actual payload is a tiny, nine-line command and control (C2) stager. The script disables Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) via the amsiInitFailed flag and executes a test scan to verify the bypass. Upon verification, the script encrypts host data and beacons out to san-sid[.]com to download and execute further payloads.

Figure 4 shows a snippet of the obfuscated PowerShell-based RAT.

A screenshot of the obfuscated PowerShell-based RAT code snippet with various programming elements such as loops, conditional statements, and arithmetic operations. The code includes variable names, mathematical calculations, and logical operators.
Figure 4. A snippet from the obfuscated PowerShell-based RAT.

This campaign was blocked by automated Cortex XDR Agent protections during the malware's execution phase.

Campaign B: The Tailored Cloud Execution Chain

The second campaign used a more customized delivery method. During the vishing call, the attacker directed the victim to a cloud endpoint. The attackers tailored the cloud infrastructure and filenames to match the targeted organization and the specific user, for example:

<company_name>-org-filters-update-<victim_name>.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws[.]com

When the victim clicked a link containing their own company's name and downloaded <company_name>-org-filters-update-<victim_name>[.]exe, it triggered an execution chain:

  1. Staging and persistence: The executable moved itself to the \Temp\ directory and spawned copies (e.g., vhlp-*.exe and scnr-*.exe) as a persistence mechanism
  2. Browser hijacking: The malware launched a hidden, headless instance of Microsoft Edge, and the attackers wrote to the disk and sideloaded an Edge extension
  3. Lateral movement and authentication coercion: The attackers used Python (C:\ProgramData\IntegrityData\python.exe) to initiate a lateral movement sequence:
    1. SMB scanning: Initiated port 445 traffic targeting internal servers
    2. NTLM authentication: Generated NTLM traffic targeting the organization's DC
    3. PetitPotam exploitation: The attacker attempted a PetitPotam attack to coerce the DC into authenticating back to an attacker-controlled machine. This NTLM relay attack was designed to grant the attacker domain-level privileges

After attempting to coerce the DC, the attacker's domain-takeover attempt was blocked by Unit 42 Managed Detection and Response.

Summary of Tactical Divergence

By comparing the two campaign paths, we can better understand the diversity of threats targeting collaboration platforms. Table 1 compares the campaigns' specific methods of attack.

Feature Campaign A Campaign B
Initial Lure Microsoft Teams vishing Microsoft Teams vishing
Primary Delivery RMM tools Tailored hosting infrastructure executables
Stealth Mechanism Obfuscated PowerShell Headless Microsoft Edge and sideloaded extension
Lateral Movement Basic enumeration only PetitPotam NTLM relay

Table 1. Comparing the two campaigns’ methods.

This comparison highlights an important point for defenders. A simple vishing hook can lead to either a standard malware infection, or to a serious domain-level breach if the attacker pivots to payload delivery.

Identifying Teams Impersonation and Identity-Based Anomalies

Recognizing campaigns like Spring Ring requires a strategy of profiling external and internal entity behaviors. The attackers behind these campaigns operate within a legitimate ecosystem, so detection hinges on identifying small anomalies in how external identities interact with your organization.

Profiling the Identity

The first line of defense is recognizing the markers of the external actor. Our research into these campaigns highlights several consistent patterns:

  • Spoofed domain naming: Attackers mostly use external .onmicrosoft[.]com tenants that include keywords like internal, certified, network or infrastructure to project authority
  • Persona mimicry: They use professional display names, like IT help desk or admin, to increase the perceived authenticity of the technician during vishing calls
  • Infrastructure red flag: The source IP addresses for these connections often originate from commercial VPN services to mask the attacker's true location

Behavioral Metrics of the Interaction

Our researchers were able to identify key markers of Spring Ring activity by analyzing the metadata of these interactions, despite the deceptive nature of the attacker’s initial lures:

  • The chat-to-call ratio: A primary indicator is the rapid transition from a 1:1 chat request to an unsolicited audio call
  • Call curation profiling: Attackers cycle through targets quickly. We observed call patterns ranging from 30-second initial attempts to 15-minute sessions.
  • Multiple approaches: These actors demonstrate high operational volume, often approaching 5-6 identities within a matter of minutes using one of their spoofed identities

Recognizing Post-Compromise Behavior

Upon a successful compromise, we observed endpoint activity characterized by:

  • Atypical execution of RMM tools by users who do not require remote support
  • Access to unknown links, including cloud storage URLs or other file hosting servers that victims might be lured to access

Organizations can identify the Spring Ring lifecycle before the attacker transitions from a chat to a domain-level attack, by profiling these signals, the origin of the tenant and the subsequent attack flow.

Figure 5 shows one example of a Cortex alert on a new suspicious conversation created in Microsoft Teams. This alert is based on behavioral and metadata analysis of a newly created chat.

A screenshot of a Cortex alert in an application interface. The alert is titled "An external user started a conversation in Microsoft Teams with a suspicious user or chat name." It shows details like the description of the incident, occurrence count, and affected assets. The description mentions a user creating a Microsoft Teams chat with two users in the organization. Status and assignee fields are visible, but not filled. Other tabs include Overview, Resolution, War Room, and XDR Analytics.
Figure 5. Example of a Cortex alert on the creation of a suspicious chat in Microsoft Teams.

Conclusion

The Spring Ring campaigns demonstrate a strategic pivot in social engineering, where attackers move beyond email phishing to enterprise collaboration tools. Attackers turn an important productivity tool into a conduit for domain-level exploitation, masquerading as internal help desk personnel through vishing calls.

This activity highlights an important shift in the security landscape. Identity is now a primary perimeter, and the platforms we rely on for daily communication are being weaponized.

Looking forward, attackers might further refine their ability to operate within SaaS ecosystems. These platforms are not just an initial access vector, they contain sensitive documentation, workflows and communication logs that could allow an adversary to advance their attack chain.

Our analysis of the Spring Ring operation reinforces several key lessons:

  • Trusted SaaS applications are not inherently safe: Attackers exploit the confidence that employees place in communications platforms
  • Attack vectors are simple and scalable: By using seemingly legitimate external tenants and professional vishing lures, attackers can target hundreds of employees across many industries with minimal friction
  • Adaptability is key: Attackers are evolving their methods, shifting from basic credential harvesting to human-led lateral movement

As these threats evolve, organizations must prioritize user education regarding unsolicited external communication across collaboration platforms. Robust behavioral monitoring can help identify identity-based anomalies before they escalate to lateral movement.

Palo Alto Networks Protection and Mitigation

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products:

  • Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known domains and URLs associated with this activity as malicious.
  • Cortex XDR and XSIAM can help prevent the execution of both known and unknown malware through Behavioral Threat Protection and machine learning powered by the Local Analysis module. Beyond stopping initial execution via malicious droppers, Cortex XDR actively halts post-exploitation activities, such as PetitPotam NTLM relay attacks, before adversaries can achieve lateral movement.
  • Cortex Cloud Identity Threat Detection  can help deliver real-time protection against identity-based threats across cloud providers, IdPs, and SaaS applications. Using advanced behavioral analytics on real-time telemetry, ITDR baselines access patterns to detect anomalies, track complex attack chains—such as the Spring Ring lifecycle and trigger automated responses to contain compromised credentials.
  • The Cortex Advanced Email Security module can help extend the power of the Cortex platform into cloud-hosted email environments, providing a scalable, AI-driven layer for detection, investigation, and response. By automatically stopping email threats and malicious communications across enterprise environments, it provides seamless protection across one of your most vulnerable attack vectors.
  • Idira Threat Detection and Response can help enable security teams to counter identity-based attacks targeting Idira Next Generation Identity (NGI) Platform and the identities it secures. Using near real-time detection, powered by CORA AI, and leveraging Idira’s visibility across multiple contexts (like PAM, authentication, SSO, cloud, endpoints, browsers, and more), Idira ITP can apply automated, tailored non-disruptive in-session response to contain and minimize potential identity-based threats.
  • Idira Endpoint Privilege Manager can help enable enterprises to reduce risk, satisfy compliance, and streamline operations. It helps implement least privilege via policy-driven elevation and removal of standing admin rights, and blocks risky actions, such as execution of unvetted applications and access to memory of other processes, while providing audit-ready evidence and unified identity governance. Automation and consolidation improve efficiency and support Zero Trust strategies, strengthening security without slowing the business.
  • Idira Privileged Access Management can help unify privileged access across human, machine, and agentic identities to secure cloud access across multi-cloud environments. Building on proven PAM, it delivers centralized secrets management alongside modern controls like Just-in-Time access and Zero Standing Privileges. This enforces consistent least-privilege security across on-premises, cloud, and SaaS targets.
  • Idira Secure Infrastructure Access can help enforce Zero Standing Privileges (ZSP) through Just-in-Time (JIT) provisioning which grants temporary, tightly scoped access only as needed. Backed by continuous session recording and real-time command monitoring, SIA can detect high risk actions before an attacker compromises critical systems.

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Indicators of Compromise

Attacker Identities Used in Vishing Attempts – Generic

  • helpcenter@ithelpcenter365[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • helpdesk@itprotectiondepartment[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • helpdesk@newsystemmaintenance[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • helpdesk@officedesk365[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • helpdesk@officesecures[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • helpdesk@tbcsschid[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • internal@internalusahelpdeskIT[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • it_assistance@teams0137[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • it@infrastructurefirewall[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • itadmin@mandatorynetworkmonitoring[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • itassistant@bilelonellc[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ithelp@certifiednetworksec[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ithelp@internalsystemsdaily[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ithelp@itprotectiondepartment[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ithelp@mandatorynetworkmonitoring.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ithelpdesk@certifiedupdatenetwork[.]onmicrosoft[.]com
  • support@bilelonellc[.]onmicrosoft[.]com

Attacker Identities Used in Vishing Attempts – Usernames

Names have been partially redacted to protect the users associated with accounts that were impersonated by the attackers.

  • andreas[..]@idigitalserviceoperation.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • andrew[..]@hapsinfrastructureops.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • brandon[..]@devsitoperationhub.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • brian[..]@appssupportsys.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • christopher[..]@adevpsitplatformops.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • christopher[..]@itplatformops.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • christopher[..]@helpaphelpitinfraops.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • clara[..]@systemsupportoperations.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • daniel[..]@opsnetsupportit.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • daniel[..]@apsitsupporthub.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • emily[..]@apsitechsupportdesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • eric[..]@appopshelp.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • henrik[..]@enterpriseoperationsflo.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • james[..]@helpitsupportcore.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • james[..]@itcoretechhelp.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • jonathan[..]@itservicedesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • justin[..]@techopshelpsupp.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • kevin[..]@itopsupportdesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • kevin[..]@netopsdeskhelp.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • leon[..]@netcorevdapp.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • lucas[..]@applicationoperationsunit.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • martin[..]@syslanevdapp.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • matthew[..]@supportopsupp.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • michael[..]@appdeploymentservices.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • michael[..]@infratechopsdesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • michael[..]@itopsdeskhelp.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • patrick[..]@infrastructureopsdesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • rachel[..]@ioseccloudsupport.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • rebecca[..]@infrastructureopsservice.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • robert[..]@systemdeploymentcenter.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ryan[..]@apstechopsdeskdev.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ryan[..]@helpssupportcloudops.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • ryan[..]@seqhelpitsuppnetops.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • sarah[..]@secinfrahelpdesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • sarah[..]@apsscloudopsdesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • sarah[..]@helpitdevsupportops.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • sarah[..]@itdevsupportops.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • scott[..]@cloudinfrastr.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • steven[..]@ittechnologyopsitdesk.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • thomas[..]@networkoperationsec.onmicrosoft[.]com
  • thomas[..]@seqapsitsupportops.onmicrosoft[.]com

Infrastructure Used in Vishing Attempts (VPNs and Proxies)

  • 193.32.248[.]251
  • 193.138.7[.]142
  • 185.65.134[.]209
  • 178.130.47[.]46
  • 5.181.3[.]106
  • 2.56.172[.]214
  • 185.234.67[.]53
  • 45.8.157[.]185
  • 80.66.72[.]215
  • 136.0.20[.]6
  • 185.213.155[.]226
  • 185.155.99[.]161
  • 92.118.232[.]131
  • 45.182.189[.]80
  • 185.65.133[.]51
  • 45.33.22[.]47

Malicious Files From Post-Compromise Activity (Campaign A)

  • SHA256 hash: 24ab9fe5d5be62d3bf055a0ca4508e8bca2996b6d78649dce8145d8a27bc1c5b (obfuscated PowerShell payload)

File description: Obfuscated PowerShell RAT dropper downloaded via Invoke-WebRequest

  • URL: hxxps[:]//san-sid[.]com/owners

Description: URL hosting obfuscated PowerShell payload used as RAT dropper

Cortex XDR Alerts and MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Table 2 lists the Cortex XDR alerts and the associated MITRE ATT&CK techniques these alerts detect.

Alert Name Alert Source MITRE ATT&CK Technique
External user started a Microsoft Teams conversation XDR Analytics, Identity Threats Phishing (T1566)
External user created a Microsoft Teams conversation with suspicious operations XDR Analytics, Identity Threats Phishing (T1566)
External user added a link to a Microsoft Teams chat XDR Analytics, Identity Threats Phishing (T1566)
External user call via Microsoft Teams XDR Analytics, Identity Threats Phishing: Spearphishing Voice (T1566.004)
Rare process execution by user XDR Analytics, UEBA User Execution (T1204)
Rare process execution in organization XDR Analytics, UEBA User Execution (T1204)
Multiple rare process executions in organization XDR Analytics, UEBA User Execution (T1204)
A process connected to an atypical rare cloud resource XDR Analytics Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002)
Uncommon local scheduled task created XDR Analytics Scheduled Task/Job (T1053)
A browser was forced to load an extension using a special command-line argument XDR Analytics Software Extensions: Browser Extensions (T1176.001)
Uncommon browser extension loaded XDR Analytics Software Extensions: Browser Extensions (T1176.001)
SMB traffic from non-standard process XDR Analytics Network Service Discovery (T1046)
Rare NTLM access by user to host XDR Analytics, UEBA Use Alternate Authentication Material (T1550)
Unusual Encrypting File System Remote Protocol call (EFSRPC) to domain controller XDR Analytics, UEBA Forced Authentication (T1187)

Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)
Possible authentication coercion to a sensitive server XDR Analytics, UEBA Forced Authentication (T1187)

Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)
Possible Distributed File System Namespace Management (DFSNM) abuse XDR Analytics Forced Authentication (T1187)

Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)
Possible authentication coercion XDR Analytics, UEBA Forced Authentication (T1187)

Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)

Table 2. Cortex XDR alerts and MITRE techniques.

Additional Resources

Perturbation Probing: A New Diagnostic for the Fragility of LLM Safety

Posted on by Yuhao Wu

Introducing a New Angle on LLM Safety

Our previous research on logit-gap steering demonstrated that the safety guardrails of an aligned LLM can be bypassed by closing a measurable gap in the model's output scores. That work answered the question of how an attacker bypasses alignment. A natural follow-up question is where inside the model the alignment lives in the first place — and how concentrated or how diffuse that defense actually is. The answer matters because it tells defenders whether safety is a thick perimeter or a thin layer of paint.

Modern LLMs are aligned through reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), a training stage that pushes the model toward refusing harmful prompts and complying with safe ones. Until now, no method has been able to point to the specific pieces of the network that carry that learned behavior cheaply enough to run on every model an enterprise deploys. Our new academic research presents a method that does exactly that, and it produces a result that should change how the industry talks about LLM safety.

Our Research: Perturbation Probing Findings and Technical Impact

Our research introduces a method called perturbation probing. With only two forward passes per prompt and a significantly lower computational cost, it identifies the small set of feed-forward neurons inside an aligned LLM that are causally responsible for a targeted behavior, such as refusing harmful requests.

The headline finding is striking. On open-source LLM Qwen3-4B, just 50 neurons out of 350,208 — about 0.014% of the model's feed-forward neurons — control the safety refusal template. Removing those 50 neurons changes the response format on 80% of 520 standard harmful-prompt benchmarks. The result was replicated on 200 prompts of a second standard benchmark. On a smaller model, Qwen3.5-2B, just 20 neurons were enough to stop the LLM from falsely agreeing with users in multi-turn conversations, dropping that behavior from 36.7% to 0% across 30 questions.

This concentration matters because it demonstrates that an aligned LLM's refusal behavior does not live in a robust, distributed defense. It lives in a thin template layer — a tiny fraction of the network that an attacker who can manipulate internals could disable, and that even a normal optimization run could shift. Relying on this thin layer alone is the LLM analog of relying on a single perimeter firewall: structurally insufficient. True AI safety demands a defense-in-depth strategy, with external content filters and runtime guardrails layered on top of whatever the base model was trained to do.

Beyond identifying the neurons, the same computation produces a diagnostic we call the FFN/Skip ratio: a single number, computable in seconds per model, that predicts whether a model's safety circuit can be easily steered with minimal modifications. Across the 13 models tested, this ratio explained 81% of the variance in how vulnerable each model's safety behavior was to a small targeted change. That makes it a candidate for a quantitative safety fragility score, a metric that allows security teams to compare models on alignment robustness without running adversarial red-team campaigns first.

Figure 1 displays these tests below. The horizontal axis measures how much a model routes decisions through a narrow internal pathway, and the vertical axis measures how much the model’s safety behavior changed when we disabled just 50 neurons. Models track the diagonal closely, which is why one number can predict the other.

Figure 1. Graph displaying the 13 tested models.

Building a Stronger Future for AI Safety

We hope that perturbation probing will serve two roles for the AI security community. First, as a pre-deployment diagnostic. Security teams can measure how much of a model's safety rests on a thin, easily removed layer before they put that model in production. In our experiments, amplifying just 10 identified neurons on a small model improved factual self-correction from 52% to 88% on 200 TruthfulQA prompts without any retraining. The same toolkit that exposes fragility can also be used to repair it.

We are sharing this research to empower the broader AI and security community to build LLMs whose safety properties can be measured, audited and reinforced, not merely asserted. We urge researchers to read the full paper on arXiv, “Perturbation Probing: A Two-Pass-per-Prompt Diagnostic for FFN Behavioral Circuits in Aligned LLMs.” We also recommend integrating fragility diagnostics into your own evaluation pipelines.

For organizations deploying LLMs today, Prisma AIRS Runtime Security provides the external content filters and inline guardrails that a thin template layer alone cannot. Unit 42's AI Security Assessment helps identify where AI adoption introduces governance and exposure risk. Together, they deliver the defense-in-depth posture that this research shows is necessary.

Additional Resources

Disclaimer

We used publicly available open-weight models under their respective licenses for local mechanistic and safety evaluation. The study reports aggregate rates, model-internal measurements, and non-operational summaries only. We do not release harmful generations, executable attack artifacts, jailbreak prompts or instructions that facilitate misuse. For models governed by acceptable-use or prohibited-use policies, experiments are framed as defensive safety evaluation and robustness measurement.

The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution

Posted on by Sheida Azimi

Executive Summary

To assess the impact of AI-enabled malware, we collected and analyzed over 400 malware samples that integrate AI in some capacity, from brand impersonation and large language model (LLM)-generated code to agentic execution loops. Our central finding was that the AI malware space is currently overwhelmingly composed of proof-of-concept code, security validation testing and researcher submissions that have never reached a production environment.

Of the 405 samples in our dataset, only 12 appeared in our telemetry on Cortex XDR-protected endpoints, and a small subset was forwarded through Next-Generation Firewalls to WildFire for analysis. Palo Alto Networks products detected and blocked every sample that attempted to reach a customer environment.

These numbers tell a story that sits between two poles in the current discourse. AI-enabled malware is real. However, the volume of genuine operational activity remains a fraction of what public sample repositories suggest. Approximately 97% of the samples we examined exist only in sandboxes and on VirusTotal.

For defenders, the practical takeaway is straightforward. Existing behavioral detection, cloud-based sandboxing and endpoint analytics catch these threats using the same mechanisms that stop conventional malware. The AI component does not evade detection. It changes how the code is authored, not how it executes.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected against the threats discussed in this article through the following products and services, which detected these AI-enabled malware threats out of the box:

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics LLM, Agentic AI, Malware

The Dataset

Our starting dataset consisted of 405 unique SHA-256 hashes collected from WildFire analysis reports, VirusTotal Intelligence and published open-source intelligence (OSINT) research.

The collection criteria were broad. We included any sample where AI integration was either a functional component of the malware, a feature of its delivery mechanism or part of its branding. This intentionally inclusive approach captured everything from LLM-powered ransomware agents to cryptocurrency miners that simply used “ChatGPT” in their filename.

We queried this dataset across multiple telemetry sources to measure real-world prevalence:

  • Endpoint presence: Cortex XDR agent telemetry from non-test tenants (December 2024–June 2025)
  • Network visibility: WildFire session data from samples forwarded by Next-Generation Firewalls and Cortex XDR agents (June 2024–June 2025)
  • Alert generation: Cortex XDR alert records for samples that triggered detection logic on endpoints
  • Sandbox verdicts: WildFire analysis results with malware classification

Table 1 summarizes the results of this dataset.

Telemetry Source Samples Queried Samples Discovered Prevalence in Production
Cortex XDR endpoints 405 12 3.0%
WildFire sessions 405 ~15–20 unique hashes ~4%
Cortex XDR alerts generated 12 12 100%

Table 1. Telemetry coverage across the AI malware dataset.

The disparity between the 405-sample dataset and the 12 samples observed in production environments is the most important number in this analysis. Approximately 97% of AI-enabled malware samples exist only in research repositories, sandbox environments and security validation platforms. We found no evidence that they reached a customer endpoint or traversed a customer firewall.

The following sections examine the characteristics of the dataset.

What the Other 97% Looks Like

The samples that never appeared in production telemetry fall into three categories:

  • Proof-of-concept and research code
  • Security validation and testing
  • AI-themed brand abuse

Proof-of-Concept and Research Code

The largest category consists of proof-of-concept implementations published to demonstrate a technique. These include:

  • LLM-powered ransomware frameworks with hard-coded test parameters (such as ransom addresses pointing to the Bitcoin Genesis Block, which cannot receive recoverable payments)
  • AI-assisted reconnaissance scripts designed for conference demonstrations
  • Modular attack frameworks built to test specific AI integration patterns rather than to compromise real targets

Many of these samples share common characteristics:

  • They target localhost or private IP address ranges in their configuration
  • They contain verbose debug logging that no operational threat actor would leave enabled
  • Their submission histories show a single upload from a security research organization or academic institution

Additionally, we found many of these samples in file paths that indicated malware analysis or research. They contained terms such as research, mal or analysis in their directory paths.

Security Validation and Testing

A second category comprises samples submitted by breach-and-attack simulation (BAS) platforms and internal security teams. These appear in WildFire and on VirusTotal because organizations deliberately test their detection capabilities against publicly reported AI malware samples.

The submission patterns are distinctive. They include multiple uploads of the same hash from the same organization within a short time window, often during business hours in a single time zone. They frequently come from IP addresses associated with known security testing infrastructure.

AI-Themed Brand Abuse

A third category uses AI branding without meaningful AI integration. Filenames reference popular AI companies or other AI products, but the payload is conventional malware wrapped in an installer that mimics an AI application.

The AI branding is a social engineering tactic, not a technical capability. These samples are real threats to the people who download them, but they do not represent a new category of AI-enabled attack.

The 3% Found on Endpoints

Twelve samples from the dataset appeared on Cortex XDR-protected endpoints across organizations in three countries. They span five distinct malware families, each representing a different pattern of AI integration or AI-themed delivery. These five families are:

  • FunkSec ransomware
  • A trojanized AI application
  • The Oyster backdoor
  • The Rhadamanthys stealer
  • A COM hijacking DLL

FunkSec Ransomware

The most represented family in our endpoint data is FunkSec, a ransomware strain that multiple researchers have assessed as partially generated with LLM assistance. Seven distinct variants appeared across production endpoints, compiled between Jan. 1–6, 2025. The variants share a common Rust codebase and use similar evasion techniques:

  • Disabling Windows Defender through PowerShell and registry modifications
  • Deleting volume shadow copies
  • Changing the desktop wallpaper to display a ransom note

The PDB paths embedded in the binaries reveal an active development cycle. Variants use project names including:

  • Dev.pdb
  • Funksec.pdb
  • Darkzone.pdb
  • Darkfunk.pdb

This is consistent with a developer iterating on the same codebase under multiple working names. Seven distinct builds in six days is a pace that suggests LLM-assisted development, where generating a new variant is closer to a prompt generation rather than a software development task.

WildFire classified all seven variants as malware. Cortex XDR generated alerts for every variant that executed on an endpoint.

Trojanized AI Application

The most widely encountered sample in the dataset is an NSIS installer that masquerades as a recipe-finding application called Recipe Lister. The binary is signed with a code-signing certificate issued to Global Tech Allies Ltd. — a certificate that has since been revoked. When executed, it extracts and runs a JavaScript backdoor from a temporary directory.

This sample generated the highest volume of telemetry in our dataset. It appeared across more than 50 organizations and generated over 6,500 endpoint profile records and 9,600 XDR alerts during the observation window. The alert data confirms that Cortex XDR blocked the binary across these environments through a combination of local analysis, behavioral protection and WildFire cloud verdicts. No execution succeeded on a protected endpoint.

The detection dynamics around this sample illustrate how layered defense handles AI-themed threats:

  • The code signature initially suppresses static detection, as the file appears legitimately signed
  • Behavioral analytics identify the threat through two secondary signals:
    • The signer is uncommon across the organization's fleet
    • The file entropy is near-maximum (0.999970), indicating packed or encrypted content
  • The WildFire cloud verdict, which arrives after the file is forwarded for sandbox analysis, provides the definitive classification and triggers the block action

Oyster Backdoor

One sample masquerades as a Dropbox installer and carries an Authenticode signature whose subject identity reads Dropbox, Inc. To the victim, this appears to be verified, publisher-signed software. In reality, the installer drops an AutoIt loader that side-loads the Oyster (aka CleanBoost) backdoor. The signed file is not Dropbox software, and the signature lends it false legitimacy.

Attackers are using AI tools to quickly generate the malicious code required for the initial access and delivery phases of the attack, lowering the barrier to entry and speeding up the deployment of loaders like this NSIS installer.

Rhadamanthys Stealer

A .NET executable named redist.exe delivers the Rhadamanthys information stealer with active command-and-control communication. According to previous reporting, this sample was part of an AI-enabled infection chain that ultimately delivered this sample of Rhadamanthys stealer.

COM Hijacking DLL

A DLL masquerading as a component of 360 Total Security named 360Util.dll implements persistence through COM object hijacking. The PDB path references 360Util.pdb, and the file metadata impersonates the Chinese-language product name. We included this sample in the dataset because it was delivered alongside AI-branded lures in campaigns we observed.

Conclusion

The gap between the volume of AI malware samples in public repositories and the volume observed in production environments reflects the current state of AI-enabled threats. AI lowers the barrier to creating malware, and the number of samples in our dataset confirms that many people are experimenting with the technique. But creating a sample and successfully deploying it against a defended environment are different problems, and malware authors have not to date succeeded at using AI to solve the second one.

The samples that did reach production environments were detected by the same mechanisms that catch conventional malware:

  • Sandbox detonation
  • Behavioral analytics
  • Code-signing anomaly detection
  • Entropy analysis

None of the AI-enabled samples in our dataset required a novel detection approach. The AI component influenced how the malware was written, but the resulting binary still exhibits the same behavioral indicators that existing detection logic targets.

This does not mean we can dismiss AI-enabled threats:

  • The development velocity visible in FunkSec's PDB paths suggests that LLM-assisted coding accelerates the iteration cycle for ransomware development
  • The trojanized AI application campaign demonstrates that AI brand recognition is an effective social engineering vector, with the sample reaching more than 50 organizations
  • The presence of legitimate code signatures on multiple samples shows that the delivery sophistication of AI-themed malware matches that of conventional threats

Telemetry data does not reveal statistically significant targeting patterns across the samples. The encounters span three countries and industries with no concentration in any single sector or geography. This is consistent with opportunistic operations rather than targeted campaigns directed at specific organizations or verticals.

The absence of targeting patterns is itself informative. AI-enabled malware, at this stage of adoption, follows the same distribution model as most offensive cyber activity. Threat actors are integrating AI capabilities into tools that they’ve deployed broadly rather than reserving them for operations against specific high-value targets.

When evaluating AI in the current malware landscape, it should not be categorized as mere hype or altogether dismissed. AI-enabled malware is a real and growing category, but our current defensive frameworks detect and block AI-enabled malware regardless of the role that use of AI played in its development. Organizations that maintain strong defense in depth are well positioned to detect these threats as they evolve.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products, which detected these AI-enabled malware threats out of the box:

  • The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques identify indicators shared in this research.
  • Cortex XDR and XSIAM are designed to prevent the execution of known malicious malware and prevent the execution of unknown malware using Behavioral Threat Protection and machine learning based on the Local Analysis module.

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Indicators of Compromise

Samples

Table 2 lists the samples assessed as genuine threat actor activity.

SHA256 hash Family
1619bcad3785be31ac2fdee0ab91392d08d9392032246e42673c3cb8964d4cb7 Trojanized application (RecipeLister)
5226ea8e0f516565ba825a1bbed10020982c16414750237068b602c5b4ac6abd FunkSec ransomware
dcf536edd67a98868759f4e72bcbd1f4404c70048a2a3257e77d8af06cb036ac FunkSec ransomware
66dbf939c00b09d8d22c692864b68c4a602e7a59c4b925b2e2bef57b1ad047bd FunkSec ransomware
c233aec7917cf34294c19dd60ff79a6e0fac5ed6f0cb57af98013c08201a7a1c FunkSec ransomware
e622f3b743c7fc0a011b07a2e656aa2b5e50a4876721bcf1f405d582ca4cda22 FunkSec ransomware
b1ef7b267d887e34bf0242a94b38e7dc9fd5e6f8b2c5c440ce4ec98cc74642fb FunkSec ransomware
20ed21bfdb7aa970b12e7368eba8e26a711752f1cc5416b6fd6629d0e2a44e5d FunkSec ransomware
dd15ce869aa79884753e3baad19b0437075202be86268b84f3ec2303e1ecd966 FunkSec ransomware
c398b3e06ef860670b9597daed85632834fa961aea87164b8ba8bb2f094a14ef COM hijacking DLL
bb932056cae8940742e50b4f2b994a802e703f7bc235e7dd647d085ae2b2baf7 Oyster backdoor/CleanBoost
4fb58687a364c3f6d6f7e0ca03654f9dec0f8832a499d61d40b0d424db1b1b14 Rhadamanthys stealer

Table 2. Samples observed on production endpoints.

Additional Resources

Analyzing the Current State of AI Use in Malware — Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42

Connecting the Dots: Securing the Overlooked Corners of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) Supply Chain

Posted on by Ria Bhatia

While supply chain threats have been quietly compounding over the past decade, the last 12–18 months have triggered a drastic shift in the scale and velocity of these attacks. Rather than just hunting for bugs in finished software, attackers are targeting the everyday tools and code developers rely on.

Unit 42 research shows this happening at every step of the building process. We've observed attackers spending years pretending to be helpful contributors just to hide backdoors in core software, as seen in the XZ Utils vulnerability (CVE-2024-3094). We've seen attackers hijack accounts to drop malware into popular libraries, like in the Axios supply chain attack. And we've seen them misuse setup scripts to automatically steal credentials using the Shai-Hulud npm worm.

Simply put, attackers are more focused on poisoning the digital factory that builds an application as opposed to the application itself. By targeting continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipelines and developer environments, they hijack software at the source before it ever hits production.

Threat Analysis: ChainDrop npm Worm

Consider the recent ChainDrop npm worm, which infected over 400 packages including massively popular libraries like keyv and cacheable-request using a highly evasive three-step chain:

  • The hook: Attackers modified package manifests with a malicious preinstall script that downloaded the legitimate Bun runtime to silently launch a 727 KB obfuscated payload in the background.
  • The theft: Rather than just scraping disk files, a hidden Python script directly read live process memory from GitHub Actions runners to steal temporary OpenID Connect (OIDC) tokens and secrets, alongside a massive sweep for local developer credentials.
  • The payload: The worm used those stolen npm and GitHub tokens to self-propagate, silently infecting and republishing additional packages while leaving their legitimate functionality perfectly intact so that developers don't notice.

ChainDrop secured long-term persistence by establishing cross-linked hooks directly inside developer tools like VS Code and Claude Code, while managing its entire command-and-control (C2) infrastructure dynamically through Ethereum blockchain transactions.

The malware triggers silently the second someone runs npm install by misusing npm's setup scripts (preinstall hooks). From there, it hits three distinct targets:

  1. Cloud secret harvesting: It searches build server memory to scrape unencrypted credentials and platform access tokens
  2. Local endpoint backdooring: It modifies local developer tool configs (like VS Code's tasks.json) so the attacker retains access even after the build finishes
  3. Automated propagation: It uses stolen tokens to automatically create rogue code repositories, turning compromised accounts into new launchpads to spread the worm

Package Visibility Across the SDLC

The main takeaway is that open-source and third-party packages touch every single phase of the software development lifecycle (SDLC). Modern applications aren't built from scratch, they are assembled. Because open-source code makes up 80-90% of modern codebases, the attack surface expands to developer laptops, CI/CD pipelines and cloud infrastructure.

Ten years ago, a project might have relied on a few dozen external libraries. Today, even a simple application pulls in thousands of indirect dependencies. Generating a software bill of materials (SBOM) at the end of a build is great for compliance, but an SBOM alone simply doesn't cut it anymore. An inventory list created at the finish line won't catch malware that was executed during the build process. To truly secure an environment, every single place a third-party package touches needs to be mapped.

The Endpoint Attack Surface

Developers today navigate an endless matrix of language-specific package managers. They routinely execute installations across a massive array of ecosystems — npm install, pip install, cargo build, go get, mvn install and many more — while simultaneously juggling 10–30 integrated development environment (IDE) extensions. Why are these attacks so effective? Because developer tools lack basic guardrails.

Think about your web browser. When you visit a website, the browser locks it in a safe container (a sandbox) so it can’t touch your computer. But setup scripts and code editor extensions don't have those walls. The second they run, they get the same permissions you have, giving malware total freedom to read your files, steal keys and run commands on your machine.

This massive, un-isolated weakness is exactly why registries and marketplaces have become prime targets, as seen in the recent GlassWorm campaign. Whether it’s a malicious script running silently during a routine dependency pull or a compromised IDE extension updating automatically in the background, an attacker instantly gains unrestricted execution rights on a developer's machine and access to valuable cloud knowledge.

CI/CD Pipelines

Build pipelines rely on numerous outside tools, plugins and helper scripts to assemble code. Attackers often target these build environments because they are packed with temporary passwords and cloud access keys. The compromise of Trivy highlights the potential attack surface of pipeline security tools. This means that only scanning app code is insufficient. A pipeline bill of materials (PBOM) is also needed, which is an inventory list of every single tool running inside your build system.

The Cloud Runtime

Finally, we can't forget the cloud. A standard application SBOM typically only lists the code libraries developers explicitly add to their software. However, cloud environments rely on containers, which require a broader approach. A container SBOM provides the full picture by tracking both the application code and the hidden operating system tools built into the container image such as basic security utilities and system libraries like OpenSSL. Standard application scans completely overlook these deeper system layers.

The danger of this weakness was starkly illustrated by the wave of OpenSSL zero-day vulnerabilities disclosed in early 2026. Because these critical flaws sit deep within the foundational cryptographic infrastructure of the container's operating system, the application-layer code will look perfectly clean and pass every repository scan, while the underlying cloud workload remains completely exposed to a remote takeover.

Given this extensive attack surface, relying on static, point-in-time gateway scans is an insufficient strategy. True supply chain resilience requires continuous visibility between local developer endpoints, automated pipelines and cloud runtime workloads. Correlating telemetry across all three domains is the only way to intercept malicious behaviors and halt a compromise before it propagates downstream.

Tips for Hardening Pipelines

Defending against automated supply chain attacks requires shifting from reactive code scanning to strict execution control across the entire build path. Because tools, IDE extensions and package managers run with high privileges, organizations must lock down the developer environment by disabling lifecycle install scripts (--ignore-scripts), enforcing package cooldown periods, restricting CI/CD egress traffic, using ephemeral CI/CD servers and pinning dependencies down to exact commit SHAs.

Beyond environment hardening, neutralizing autonomous malware like Shai-Hulud means eliminating the long-lived credentials that fuel them. By transitioning to brief OIDC authentication and enforcing end-to-end cryptographic provenance, teams can establish an unbroken chain of trust. This trust extends from signed commits at the developer endpoint to signed artifacts and SBOMs in production, helping stop self-propagating worms in their tracks.

Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels

Posted on by Sheida Azimi

Executive Summary

Identity has become a primary security boundary for most organizations, reducing the ability to solely trust other boundaries once associated with corporate networks. Users authenticate to cloud services using enterprise identities that provide access to collaboration platforms, business applications and sensitive data. With the adoption of software-as-a-service (SaaS) on the rise, people are shifting to platforms for communication and collaboration.

Threat actors have adapted to this shift. In addition to typical email-based phishing, attackers increasingly misuse trusted collaboration platforms to conduct identity phishing, impersonation, credential theft, malware delivery and social engineering. Over the last 12 months, our endpoint alerts of malicious activity associated with collaboration tools have more than quadrupled, as Figure 1 shows. This activity could involve compromised accounts, external federated organizations, guest accounts or trusted third-party relationships. In each case, the attackers seek to exploit the trust that people place in enterprise communication platforms.

 

A bar chart displaying the number of collaboration tool alerts from July 2025 to June 2026. The bars show a gradual increase over the months, starting at 1490 in July 2025 and peaking at 6799 in June 2026.
Figure 1. Collaboration tool alerts of severity low or higher per month.

This changes the role that collaboration platforms play within enterprise security. They are not just productivity applications, they have become part of the enterprise attack surface. Unit 42 researchers found that 99% of the alerts generated related to chat or voice phishing operations, indicating that attackers often gain access to these environments through targeted phishing operations. After a successful compromise, attackers can then communicate using the identity and privileges of the compromised user. This allows malicious activity to appear as normal collaboration activity.

Security controls typically remain focused on email and authentication events, often providing limited visibility into activity occurring within authenticated collaboration sessions.

We examine how threat actors leverage trusted communication channels and review identity abuse techniques. We also provide practical recommendations for detecting and defending against identity-focused attacks targeting enterprise collaboration platforms.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products and services:

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics Phishing, Identity, Credential Theft 

Understanding Trusted Communication Channels

Enterprise collaboration platforms have become integral to business operations. Employees use these platforms to exchange messages, share files, coordinate projects and communicate with colleagues, customers and business partners. Organizations typically connect collaboration platform access to their identity provider, and people rely on these platforms for trusted, authenticated communication.

Unlike email, collaboration platforms enable real-time conversations and support features such as external federation, guest access, shared workspaces and third-party integrations. These capabilities improve productivity but also create opportunities for misuse. Attackers can exploit compromised accounts, trusted business relationships or authorized external access to interact with victims through legitimate communication channels. Figure 2 shows common pathways for attackers to compromise identities in enterprise and cloud environments.

A flowchart illustrating a cyberattack sequence with five stages: "Threat Actor Access Method," "Trusted Communication Channel" (examples include Slack, Teams), "Identity-Focused Interaction," "Requested User Action," and "Identity Outcome." Each stage describes actions and examples, connected by red arrows denoting progression.
Figure 2. How attackers leverage collaboration platforms to compromise identities.

When a collaboration account is compromised, attackers inherit the identity context of that user, including their permissions, relationships and ongoing conversations. Requests that might appear suspicious in an email can appear routine when delivered through an authenticated collaboration platform. This reduces a target’s suspicion and increases the effectiveness of identity phishing, impersonation, credential theft and social engineering.

As organizations adopt more SaaS collaboration platforms, they should treat these environments as part of the identity attack surface. Protecting them requires both strong authentication, and visibility into how trusted identities and communication channels are used after authentication.

Real-World Misuse of Collaboration Platforms

Recent campaigns demonstrate that attackers use collaboration platforms in multiple stages of identity-focused attacks, from initial access to post-compromise operations. Table 1 summarizes these intrusion stages.

Intrusion Technique Campaign Misuse Pattern
Initial access: Phishing (T1566) Identity phishing through external collaboration channels
Stealth: Impersonation (T1684.001) Impersonation through legitimate platform notifications, hosted content and direct messages
Persistence: Modify Authentication Process (T1556) MFA removal and privileged credential exfiltration through a native Slack webhook integration

Table 1. Collaboration platform misuse by MITRE ATT&CK intrusion technique.

Initial Access

One of the most common techniques is identity phishing through enterprise collaboration platforms. In our Insights article, "When 'Hi, This Is IT' Comes Through Microsoft Teams", we discussed how APT29 used compromised Teams accounts to send links to credential-harvesting pages. We reported that attackers misuse external federation in Teams to initiate conversations with victims while impersonating IT support or other trusted personnel. These campaigns often begin with a request to chat, followed by instructions to visit a phishing site, approve a multifactor authentication (MFA) request, install remote access software or provide credentials.

Okta Threat Intelligence has also documented the technique of identity phishing through attacker-controlled Slack workspaces. The threat actor behind this activity impersonated administrators and employees from targeted organizations and sent phishing links through direct messages, channel mentions and legitimate notifications. The links redirected victims to adversary-in-the-middle phishing proxies designed to capture corporate credentials and MFA tokens.

Security teams might not detect the initial collaboration message directly. They could instead see the actions that follow. An example of this is shown in a process tree from a malicious chat scenario in Figure 3.

A process tree diagram showing a communication application launching a system process, which uses an archive utility to extract a DLL from a downloaded archive file.
Figure 3. Example of an initial access process tree.

In this case, the threat actor sent a RAR file via a link to a victim in a Teams chat. The victim downloaded the file to their Downloads folder. Note that attackers may avoid sending files through Teams because doing so creates an additional detection point through Safe Links/Safe Attachments, instead directing victims to websites or scripts during calls.

The victim then opened an Explorer window and double-clicked [REDACTED].rar, launching WinRAR.exe to open the archive. WinRAR extracted the malicious lpk.dll, which the victim’s endpoint security agent detected. The extracted lpk.dll is a known, older malicious DLL that masquerades as a legitimate Windows language pack DLL. Attackers use the file for DLL sideloading attacks. This recent event demonstrates that attackers continue to use older malware families in attacks delivered through collaboration platforms.

Unlike commonly-seen email phishing, some collaboration platforms support interactive communication. This enables attackers to respond to targets and adjust their social engineering tactics in real time. If successful, the attacker obtains a valid enterprise identity. The attacker can then access enterprise and cloud services with the privileges and identity context of the compromised user.

Impersonation and Identity Compromise

Attackers use impersonation to exploit trust in collaboration platforms and gain access to enterprise identities, posing as known individuals, trusted organizations or support personnel.

  • In January 2026, Fireblocks disclosed a recruitment-themed social engineering campaign in which attackers impersonated Fireblocks executives, recruiters and hiring managers to target technology workers. The attackers initially contacted targets through social media, provided professionally prepared recruiting materials and then scheduled interviews through Google Meet. During the video interviews, an individual presented as a Fireblocks HR manager discussed the candidate’s experience, compensation and other expected hiring topics before assigning a code review task for a fictitious Fireblocks project. Candidates were instructed to clone a GitHub repository and run standard setup commands, including npm install, which executed malicious code and downloaded malware onto their systems. The campaign used legitimate Google Meet communications and a convincing interview process to reinforce the Fireblocks impersonation and persuade victims to execute malicious code. Fireblocks assessed the activity as closely aligned with the North Korea-linked Contagious Interview campaign pattern.
  • In March 2026, a threat actor used a staged Slack workspace as part of a targeted social engineering campaign against the lead maintainer of the Axios npm package. The threat actor impersonated a legitimate company and created a convincing, simulated Slack environment with company branding, channels, users and message history. The interaction later moved to a meeting that was designed to look like Teams. During this meeting, the maintainer was convinced to install software that delivered a remote access Trojan. The threat actor then gained access to the maintainer’s npm account and published two poisoned Axios versions, causing projects that installed the affected releases to retrieve and execute a malicious dependency.
  • In April 2026, OpenSSF reported a campaign targeting members of the Linux Foundation TODO Group Slack workspace and related communities. The threat actor impersonated a known Linux Foundation community leader and contacted targets through Slack direct messages. The messages contained a Google Sites link that led to a fraudulent Google Workspace authentication process. The site requested the target’s email address and verification code. It then instructed the target to install a malicious root certificate. On macOS, the process also downloaded and executed a binary that could provide system access. The campaign used the identity of a recognized community member and an established Slack workspace to support credential collection and malware delivery.

Each of these campaigns used impersonation through trusted collaboration workflows. The attackers relied on recognized identities, legitimate services and familiar business processes to obtain credentials or persuade victims to take actions that enabled identity compromise.

Persistence

In a more novel approach, attackers have misused trusted collaboration services to maintain their access after identity compromise. In a December 2025 intrusion investigated by CERT Polska, a threat actor modified compromised firewall-VPN appliances at a manufacturing company in Poland. The threat actor used the appliances’ built-in scripting mechanism to create weekly scheduled tasks. One script retrieved the password of a privileged identity, and another script modified security settings and disabled two-factor authentication for a privileged account. A third script used the appliances’ native Slack notification capability to send the results to a Slack channel under the threat actor’s control. This activity combined identity persistence and credential exfiltration with a legitimate SaaS integration. It also avoided the need for a separate exfiltration tool. The case demonstrates how attackers can misuse built-in appliance features and trusted collaboration services during post-compromise operations.

The firewall event in Figure 4 shows an example of a Slack webhook request, a similar communication method to the one described in the CERT Polska report. The request used HTTP POST to hooks.slack[.]com with a curl user agent. The example event below is not malicious.

A screenshot of a desktop screen displaying two overlapping windows. The top window is a terminal displaying a cURL command to send a JSON payload with the text "Hello, World!" to a Slack webhook. The bottom window is Wireshark's "Follow HTTP Stream" feature, displaying HTTP request details for the Slack API.
Figure 4. Webhook firewall event.

Perimeter firewalls provide valuable visibility into webhook-related traffic exiting the organization. Many network and security appliances, including VPN appliances, operate behind a separate perimeter firewall and send outbound webhook requests through the enterprise egress path when configured for external alerting or automation. Security teams should review unexpected Slack webhook traffic, uncommon user agents and webhook activity from systems without an approved Slack integration. This type of activity should also be flagged in Microsoft Teams, which supports similar incoming webhook workflows for posting messages from external services.

These examples of initial access, impersonation and persistence demonstrate how attackers leverage trusted communication channels to support identity-focused attacks. Although the techniques differ, each example leverages legitimate platforms, authenticated identities or authorized communication paths to increase the likelihood of success. The common objective is to misuse the trust, access and identity context associated with enterprise collaboration platforms.

Defensive Measures for Securing Collaboration Platforms

Organizations should protect collaboration platforms with the same level of scrutiny applied to email and identity infrastructure. Because these platforms are integrated with enterprise identities, security controls should focus on both preventing identity compromise and detecting misuse after authentication.

Reduce Exposure

The first priority is reducing unnecessary exposure. Collaboration platform administrators should review external federation, guest access and third-party integrations to ensure they support legitimate business requirements. Where possible, limit external communications to trusted organizations, and implement a process to review guest accounts regularly and remove unnecessary access.

Comprehensive Identity Controls

Identity protections should also extend beyond authentication. MFA, conditional access and session risk evaluation help reduce the likelihood of account compromise, but they do not prevent an attacker from misusing a valid session. Security teams should monitor for behavior that could indicate identity compromise, including unusual messaging activity, unexpected file sharing or communications with unfamiliar external tenants.

Identity Verification Procedures

Identity and security teams should define and communicate verification procedures for security-sensitive requests received through collaboration platforms. Users should not approve MFA prompts, install remote access tools, share credentials, transfer files or modify access based only on a message. Instruct people to verify high-risk requests through an approved secondary channel, such as a known phone number, ticketing system or documented internal process.

User Awareness

User awareness remains an important part of effective verification procedures. People should treat collaboration messages, platform notifications and links to hosted content with the same caution as email. This is especially important when a request involves credentials, MFA approval, software installation, remote access tools or sensitive data.

Security training should make clear that content associated with an enterprise collaboration platform is not automatically trustworthy. An attacker can send a direct message, trigger a legitimate platform notification or use content hosted on an approved service to direct victims to a phishing site.

Security awareness teams should include these scenarios in phishing simulations and security awareness exercises. Many people recognize email phishing indicators but might not apply the same scrutiny to collaboration platforms and related notification workflows.

Active Monitoring

Security teams should incorporate collaboration platform telemetry into routine monitoring and incident response. Authentication logs, messaging activity, file sharing events and external tenant interactions provide valuable context for detecting identity abuse.

Network and security appliances should also be included in monitoring coverage. Firewalls, VPN appliances, load balancers and managed switches increasingly support automation, notification integrations and scheduled tasks. Attackers can potentially use these capabilities for malicious purposes following a compromise. To protect against such activity, security teams should monitor:

  • Administrative activity
  • Configuration changes
  • Outbound webhook usage
  • Unusual connections to collaboration or SaaS services

This telemetry should be ingested into a security information and event management (SIEM) system and correlated with identity, endpoint and collaboration platform data. This can improve visibility into malicious activity that might otherwise appear to originate from legitimate users or approved infrastructure.

Collaboration-based reporting must also be easy for users. Security teams should provide a clear process for reporting suspicious communications, notifications, hosted content and links associated with collaboration platforms. Each report should be triaged using identity telemetry, sign-in activity, endpoint alerts, file-sharing events and external tenant information. This helps to determine whether the activity reflects user error, external misuse or identity compromise.

Conclusion

Enterprise collaboration platforms are integrated with enterprise identity and access workflows. As organizations rely on these platforms for communication, attackers are exploiting the trust associated with authenticated users and sanctioned communication channels to conduct identity phishing, impersonation, credential theft and post-compromise operations.

Common security strategies have focused on protecting email and authentication systems. While these controls remain essential, they should be complemented by security measures that address collaboration platforms as part of the enterprise identity attack surface. Authentication alone is no longer sufficient to establish trust. Organizations must also understand how authenticated identities are communicating and recognize when trusted communication channels are being misused.

By extending identity security to include collaboration platforms, defenders can better detect identity abuse, reduce opportunities for compromise and strengthen their ability to respond to identity-focused attacks. As collaboration technologies evolve, organizations should monitor and protect them with the same controls they apply to other critical identity infrastructure.

Palo Alto Networks Protection and Mitigation

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products:

  • Cortex XDR and XSIAM help to prevent the threats described in this article, by employing the Malware Prevention Engine. This approach combines several layers of protection, including Advanced WildFire, Behavioral Threat Protection and the Local Analysis module, to prevent both known and unknown malware from causing harm to endpoints.
  • Idira Endpoint Privilege Manager (EPM) can enable enterprises to reduce risk, satisfy compliance, and streamline operations. It can help implement least privilege via policy-driven elevation and removal of standing admin rights, and block risky actions, such as execution of unvetted applications and access to memory of other processes, while providing audit-ready evidence.
  • Idira Secrets Manager centralizes the API keys, service account passwords, and webhook tokens that appliances, scheduled tasks, and pipelines depend on, so automation retrieves credentials at runtime instead of reading them from local scripts or device configuration. Automated rotation shortens the window in which a stolen credential stays valid, and universal workload identity replaces static credentials with short-lived SPIFFE-based workload identities where the environment supports it.
  • Idira Privileged Access Management (PAM) helps unify privileged access across human, machine, and agentic identities to secure cloud access across multi-cloud environments. Building on proven PAM, it delivers centralized secrets management alongside modern controls like Just-in-Time access and Zero Standing Privileges. This enforces consistent least-privilege security across on-premises, cloud, and SaaS targets.
  • Idira Secure Infrastructure Access (SIA) can help enforce Zero Standing Privileges (ZSP) through Just-in-Time (JIT) provisioning which grants temporary, tightly scoped access only as needed. Backed by continuous session recording and real-time command monitoring, SIA can detect high risk actions before an attacker compromises critical systems.
  • Idira Secure Cloud Access (SCA) can help enforce Zero Standing Privileges (ZSP) across multicloud environments by applying Just-in-Time (JIT) access controls to cloud consoles, command-line interfaces (CLIs), and the modern cloud infrastructure where workloads reside, including Managed Kubernetes clusters and elastic cloud workloads.

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Additional Resources

Threat Hunting Query

The query below is designed to help Palo Alto Networks customers hunt for, investigate and identify potentially suspicious activity using Cortex XDR. Results returned by this query should not be considered inherently malicious and require further analysis to determine their significance.

Query to Identify Collaboration Tool Spawning a Shell

This XQL query can help to identify where legitimate collaboration platforms — specifically Slack or Teams in this example — are used to execute system shells. The query inspects both the direct process hierarchy and the broader causality chain. It identifies instances where a collaboration tool is either the immediate parent process or an ancestor process that initiated the execution of a shell. Analysts can use this logic to identify:

  • Post-exploitation activity
  • Unauthorized command execution
  • Living-off-the-land techniques that originate from compromised user accounts or application integrations

The query can be modified to search for additional collaboration platforms or system shells.

Threat Brief: Mitigating Large-Scale Credential Attacks (Updated August 18)

Posted on by Unit 42

Executive Summary

Identity has effectively become the new perimeter, where cybercriminals are increasingly choosing to log in rather than break in. To accomplish this, attackers frequently gather previously leaked username and password pairs. Gathering these credentials can then allow them to pivot to password spraying against services exposed to the internet, gaining credentials for other products and services.

As this sort of attack occurs frequently, this article will be a resource repository of the following information about these attacks:

  • Details of noteworthy large scale credential attacks 
  • Actionable guidance for mitigating these attacks

TheHatman Attack

  • The Hatman attack: In August 2026, the actor TheHatman claimed to have stolen large volume of credentials from organizations' Microsoft Entra tenants

FortiBleed Attack

  • Fortibleed Credential Campaign: In June 2026, there was a large-scale password spraying campaign targeting Fortinet devices

Unit 42 recommends auditing remote access logs for suspicious activity with a focus on successful logins shortly after large volume password failure events. We also recommend reviewing and implementing the hardening guidance in this article for edge devices. 

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from this activity through our products and services, such as:

The Unit 42 Incident Response team can also be engaged to help with a compromise or to provide a proactive assessment to lower your risk.

Related Unit 42 Topics Fortibleed, Credential Theft

Activity From TheHatman

From Aug. 1–Aug. 17, 2026, an actor using the handle "TheHatman" made posts across multiple forums offering to sell employee information for multiple enterprises. TheHatman allegedly exfiltrated from organizations' Microsoft Entra tenants. While TheHatman has claimed this data was stolen using compromised credentials, we have been unable to verify a specific intrusion vector.

This activity was publicly reported as early as Aug. 16, 2026, and we have offered initial guidance through social media.

TheHatman claims to have sensitive or confidential information from several high-profile organizations, and this actor has claimed that they used compromised credentials through MFA fatigue and password spraying attacks to gain unauthorized access to these organizations. Unit 42 has not verified these claims.

FortiBleed Campaign

A large-scale password spraying and credential theft campaign (“FortiBleed”) against Fortinet devices was initially disclosed in June 2026. We observed attempts targeting MSSQL devices as well, and have seen reports of Sophos devices also being targeted. While this activity is not targeting Palo Alto Networks devices, we have blocked suspicious login attempts in customer telemetry.

The attackers have used a curated password list to attempt password spraying against services exposed to the internet. We assess that the initial password list for this activity was likely developed through a mix of previous breaches, including the successful exploitation of vulnerabilities. Once the attackers obtain credentials, they add them to their password list for future attempts against additional targets, as well as for logging into accounts they successfully compromised.

The attackers have leveraged a multi-stage process to gain persistent, high-privilege access:

  • Password spraying for initial access: Massive internet-wide scanning and password spraying attempts against Fortinet, Sophos and MSSQL services
  • Configuration extraction: Depending on the permissions of their initial access, the actor could exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability prior to pulling device configuration files, including stored credentials
  • Offline Cracking: Offline password cracking of the stolen credentials adds to the password list used in step one to target new devices, as well as to log into compromised devices to establish persistence as an administrator

We observed an initial access broker (IAB) on the Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit[.]in claiming responsibility for this campaign, referencing a CVE (no further information), and offering the harvested credentials for sale on June 16, 2026. We have not validated their claims at this time.

Unit 42 observed an initial access broker (IAB) on the Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit[.]in claiming responsibility for this campaign of large-scale credential attacks, referencing a CVE (no further information), and offering the harvested credentials for sale on June 16, 2026. Unit 42 has not validated their claims at this time.
Figure 1. Darkweb post of IAB selling credentials.
SOCRadar provided the initial reporting on the targeting of FortiGate devices. We observed attempts targeting MSSQL devices as well, and have seen reports of Sophos devices also being targeted.

Interim Guidance

Unit 42 recommends auditing remote access logs for suspicious activity with a focus on successful logins shortly after large volume password failure events. We also recommend reviewing and implementing the hardening guidance below for edge devices.

Palo Alto Networks customers receive assistance protecting against and mitigating credential attacks in the following ways:

Palo Alto Networks also recommends the following hardening guidelines:

  • Require MFA: Require strong phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for all remote services. NGFW customers can integrate several MFA platforms   (including Palo Alto Networks Idira MFA) and customize their Password Profiles and complexity to enhance their security posture.
  • Adopt zero trust architecture: Leverage “jump boxes” and Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) policies to ensure management interfaces are never exposed directly to the public internet, further narrowing the attack surface for configuration extraction.
  • Change default credentials: Change the credentials for default accounts, ensuring long, complex passwords are used to mitigate the risk of password guessing attempts. Ideally onboard accounts to Privileged Access Management system and rotate passwords automatically on-time and on-use.
  • Implement ITDR: Timely detect malicious access attempts and accelerate response with automated identity-centric actions.
  • Disable unused accounts: Run continuous discovery of privileged accounts. Onboard and disable unused accounts to limit the attack surface.
  • Update and patch: Ensure you have the latest software versions and patches installed to mitigate known vulnerabilities, including local privilege escalation vulnerabilities.

The Unit 42 Incident Response team can also be engaged to help with a compromise or to provide a proactive assessment to lower your risk.

Conclusion

We continue to monitor our threat landscape for this and other identity-based attacks. We encourage customers to implement the hunting and hardening recommendations to identify, mitigate, and prevent credential attacks against their networks.

Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members, including Fortinet. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected by our products, as listed below. We will update this threat brief as more relevant information becomes available.

Palo Alto Networks Product Protections For Large-Scale Credential Attacks

Palo Alto Networks customers can leverage a variety of product protections and consulting services to identify and defend against this threat.

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Deep and Darkweb Monitoring

Unit 42's Deep and Dark Web (DDW) monitoring is a service that assists clients in identifying sensitive information and leaked credentials that surface on the dark web, providing critical insights to reduce risk exposure and reduce the time between detection and response.

Cortex Cloud

Cortex Cloud Identity Security encompasses Cloud Infrastructure Entitlement Management (CIEM), Identity Security Posture Management (ISPM), Data Access Governance (DAG) as well as Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR) and provides clients with the necessary capabilities to improve their identity related security requirements. By providing visibility into cloud based identities, and their permissions, Cortex Cloud can detect misconfigurations, unwanted access to sensitive data and real-time analysis surrounding usage and access patterns. Additionally, Cortex Cloud provides protections against credentials that were compromised, lost or exposed being leveraged against cloud resources, such as those discussed within this article.

Idira Identity Threat Protection

Idira Identity Threat Protection enables security teams to counter identity-based attacks targeting Idira Next Generation Identity (NGI) Platform and the identities it secures. Using near real-time detection, powered by CORA AI, and leveraging Idira’s visibility across multiple contexts (like PAM, authentication, SSO, cloud, endpoints, browsers, and more), Idira ITP can apply automated, tailored non-disruptive in-session response to contain and minimize potential identity-based threats.

Idira Multi-Factor Authentication

Idira Multi-Factor Authentication helps protect organizations against password spraying, credential theft, and other identity-based attacks by verifying that the person signing in is the legitimate user, not just someone with a valid password. Using phishing-resistant MFA, including passkeys, biometrics, and FIDO2 security keys, along with adaptive, risk-based authentication, Idira evaluates signals such as device trust, location, and login behavior. When risk is detected, it requires additional verification before granting access, helping prevent account compromise while keeping access simple for trusted users.

Idira Privileged Access Management

Idira Privileged Access Management is a SaaS-delivered Privileged Access Management (PAM) solution that mitigates credential compromise and password spraying by prioritizing automated discovery, onboarding, and rotation. The platform continuously scans hybrid environments and infrastructure to detect unmanaged local, domain, service accounts and cloud roles. Discovered credentials are automatically onboarded into a hardened digital vault for centralized management. Privilege Cloud then enforces programmatic transactional credential rotation using complex, randomized strings. This eliminates the static, predictable passwords exploited during spraying attacks, removing standing privileges and blocking lateral movement across the network infrastructure and devices.

References

Updated June 26, 2026 at 1:00 p.m. PT to add product protection for Idira Security and Cortex Cloud, and more information to the hardening guidelines section.

Updated August 18, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. PT to add information about TheHatman attack. 

Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Botnet

Posted on by Asher Davila

Content Warning

We are providing a content warning because the following article contains usage of a racial slur by a threat actor, which Unit 42 does not condone in any instance. We have partially redacted the racial slur, but preserved some references to it in order to provide researchers with the ability to identify it and check IoCs as needed.

Executive Summary

We identified a new version (v7) of the Kimwolf Android/internet-of-things (IoT) botnet. This version upgrades its distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack capabilities and the resilience of its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Kimwolf primarily affects Android TV boxes and set-top boxes.

Kimwolf v7 adds an HTTP/2-based DDoS flood that constructs complete browser fingerprints. This makes attack traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate browsing.

The threat’s binary includes five hard-coded public Ethereum-based endpoints for resolving Ethereum Name Service (ENS) domains. ENS is a blockchain-based naming system used to obtain C2 addresses.

Kimwolf also carries a hard-coded Tor .onion hidden service as a backup and a local proxy architecture for flexible routing between clearnet and Tor. The malware developers added this function to directly respond to C2 server takedown efforts in December 2025.

We discovered this variant on Feb. 3, 2026, through threat hunting that followed public disclosures by XLab, Synthient, Infoblox, Cloudflare and others.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected through the following products and services:

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics Malware, Botnet, DDoS

Background

The Kimwolf botnet (also tracked as AISURU) has been active since August 2024. It initially targeted Linux IoT devices under the AISURU name. The botnet transitioned to Android TV boxes around August 2025.

This reflects two separate codebases under the same operators. AISURU covers the Linux IoT variants, and Kimwolf covers variants targeting Android.

Kimwolf spreads by misusing residential proxy services to reach unauthenticated Android Debug Bridge (ADB) instances on local networks. Some Android TV boxes ship with ADB enabled on port 5555. Once attackers tunnel through a proxy endpoint into the local network, they can install the malware without any authentication.

Kimwolf Sample Overview

The Kimwolf sample we analyzed as a baseline is a statically linked ARM Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) binary. The file was compiled with the Android Native Development Kit (NDK) using Clang and uses Bionic libc. It statically links BoringSSL for Transport Layer Security (TLS) operations and nghttp2 for HTTP/2 functionality.

The binary is stripped but retains some symbol information. It is not uncommon for malware authors to use racial slurs in their code. The Kimwolf malware family has historically included racial slurs. In our discussion of the v7 variant, we have partially redacted these slurs, but have left enough information present that defenders could identify the variant and check for IoCs.

Previous Kimwolf builds used the internal version strings such as n[redacted]boxv4 and n[redacted]boxv5, establishing the naming pattern for the family. The version string n[redacted]boxv7, shown in Figure 1, identifies this sample as version 7. The binary creates a Unix domain socket @n[redacted]boxv7 to ensure only one instance runs at a time. 

A screenshot of a hexadecimal code in columns, with highlighted values in orange and yellow on the left. The visible ASCII values on the right are lowercase letters "b", "o", "x", and the digit "7".
Figure 1. The n[redacted]boxv7 version string.
On execution, the malware masks its process name as netd_service to blend in with legitimate Android system processes.

We identified six ELF samples that we clustered together based on multiple indicators:

  • They share an identical ELF section layout produced by a common Android NDK build environment, and the same hard-coded set of Ethereum remote procedure call (RPC) endpoints
  • Overlapping C2 infrastructure within the same hosting provider
  • Consistent process-name masquerading behavior

HTTP/2 Flood with Browser Fingerprint Spoofing

One of the most notable new capabilities in Kimwolf v7 is an HTTP/2 flood powered by the nghttp2 library. The function that performs the attack_case17_http2_flood constructs complete browser fingerprints. ​​This makes the flood traffic difficult to distinguish from legitimate browser requests.

Figure 2 shows the header construction logic in the decompiled binary.

A screenshot of code in a development environment. The code is written in a dark-themed editor and contains various programming elements, such as functions, variables, and libraries. Mentions of "Google Chrome" and "Safari" are visible in the code.
Figure 2. Fingerprint header construction in build_http2_attack_headers.

Three-Tier C2 Infrastructure

Kimwolf v7 uses a layered C2 resolution system designed to survive the domain takedowns that disrupted the botnet twice in December 2025.

This isn't the last time operation of this malware faced disruption. On March 19, 2026, the U.S. Justice Department and international partners announced a court-authorized operation that seized C2 infrastructure used by the Aisuru, KimWolf, JackSkid and Mossad botnets.

Ethereum Name Service Resolution

The binary contains five hard-coded public Ethereum RPC endpoints stored in plaintext, shown in Figure 3:

  1. hxxps[:]//0xrpc[.]io/eth
  2. hxxps[:]//eth.llamarpc[.]com
  3. hxxps[:]//ethereum-rpc.publicnode[.]com
  4. hxxps[:]//eth-protect.rpc.blxrbdn[.]com
  5. hxxps[:]//eth.merkle[.]io
A screenshot of a code snippet showing allocation of strings to different variables. Each variable is assigned a URL from various platforms.
Figure 3. Hard-coded public Ethereum RPC endpoints.

These endpoints are legitimate public Ethereum RPC services. The malware misuses them to query ENS domain records and resolve C2 addresses. Organizations should monitor for unusual Ethereum RPC traffic from IoT and Android devices rather than blocking these endpoints outright.

The malware shuffles these endpoints using a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) before each resolution attempt. The five-way redundancy makes blocking ENS-based C2 resolution harder.

Operator RPC Facade

While the five public RPC endpoints in the baseline binary are third-party services, our infrastructure investigation identified a sixth endpoint that we assess with moderate confidence to be under the operator's control: eth[.]rpcuniverse[.]com.

Several properties distinguish it from the legitimate providers:

  • The legitimate endpoints are established services with significant traffic and resolve to multiple anycast IP addresses across major cloud delivery network (CDN) and cloud providers
  • They have apex domains registered between 2005 and 2022
  • The rpcuniverse[.]com domain has no global traffic ranking
    • It resolves to a single IP address on a low-cost virtual private server (VPS) that was registered on Dec. 12, 2023
    • Its TLS certificate first appeared on the hosting IP address days later
    • Reverse passive DNS shows the IP address hosts only rpcuniverse[.]com subdomains with no other tenants
  • Two Kimwolf samples hardcode eth[.]rpcuniverse[.]com as an additional RPC endpoint alongside the five legitimate providers
    • Both ELF and Android APK variants contact the hosting IP address directly
    • We did not observe this direct-to-IP address contact pattern with any of the legitimate RPC endpoints

We cannot confirm domain ownership. However, the dedicated single-tenant hosting, the timing of its registration relative to Kimwolf activity and its exclusive presence in Kimwolf binaries suggest it is an operator-controlled facade rather than a public service.

Tor Hidden Service Backup

When ENS resolution fails, the v7 binary falls back to a hard-coded v3 Tor .onion address (edctgwib2n5l34t525zkxqzk5bqb6e5il2yiq5r6zu7gtlxa4uosn3qd[.]onion). Figure 4 shows the hard-coded address in the binary.

A screenshot of a code snippet displayed in a text editor, showcasing a function related to building and sending SOCKS CONNECT requests to hidden services. The code includes C++ elements such as variables, hex codes, and the construction of a domain name with ".onion" at the end. The text is color-coded to differentiate elements like functions, operators, and comments.
Figure 4. Hard-coded .onion address.

A function (tor_proxy_state_machine) manages the protocol states. To do this, it performs the following activities:

  • Sending the greeting (0x05 0x01 0x00)
  • Building a CONNECT request with domain type 0x03 and the 62-byte .onion address
  • Waiting for the response and performing a TLS handshake over the tunnel

Figure 5 shows the greeting and TLS handshake states.

A screenshot of computer code in a programming environment. The code includes socket programming and comments related to network communication. The code is shown in multiple colors, likely indicating syntax highlighting, with sections in black for code, orange for comments, and some red highlighting.
Figure 5. Greetings.

Additionally, it uses a local proxy architecture. All C2 traffic routes through a local proxy at 127.0.0[.]1:23075 shown in Figure 6, regardless of whether it is destined for clearnet or Tor. This modular design allows the proxy component to be updated independently from the main bot binary. ​​

A screenshot of a code snippet showing a function definition related to a SOCKS5 proxy with specific values and addresses. The code includes comments and standard programming syntax elements like variables, operators, and function calls.
Figure 6. Local proxy connection.

C2 Infrastructure Clustering

Analysis of Kimwolf v7 samples revealed C2 connections to several IP addresses, including:

  • 212.193.31[.]119 and 212.193.31[.]122 on TCP port 13
  • 212.193.31[.]92 and 212.193.31[.]158 on TCP port 443

None of these IP addresses had prior indicators of malicious activity or associations with public threat intelligence.

During infrastructure analysis, we observed that these hosts presented the same SSH host key. Pivoting on that shared key revealed 22 total IP addresses within the same range, presenting the identical key between Dec. 18, 2025, and Feb. 3, 2026. No hosts outside this range shared the key.

IP address 212.193.31[.]102 was the first host observed with this key on Dec. 18, 2025, and it was the seed from which the configuration propagated. The remaining 21 hosts appeared over the following six weeks, with the last addition on Jan. 31, 2026. All 22 hosts reside in AS202799, geolocated to Saint Petersburg, Russia.

High-Performance UDP Flood

Kimwolf implements a dedicated high-performance UDP flood function that uses a Xorshift256 PRNG seeded from /dev/urandom. It (prng_seed_from_urandom) reads 32 bytes (four 64-bit state words) to initialize the full 256-bit state. A SplitMix64 fallback initializer activates if /dev/urandom is unavailable.

The flood function accelerates IP/UDP checksum computation with ARM NEON single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) instructions. The vectorized checksum loop processes four 16-bit halfwords simultaneously using VLD1.16, VADDW.U16 and VADD.I32 instructions.

This optimization is tailored for the ARM processors found in Android TV boxes. It reduces per-packet checksum overhead to maximize throughput.

Figure 7 shows the NEON SIMD instructions in the disassembled binary.

A screenshot of assembly code from a disassembler tool. The code includes instructions such as ADD, LDR, BIC, and VADD, along with memory addresses and registers. It contains comments referencing "NEON SIMD checksum computation" with labeled sections.
Figure 7. NEON SIMD instructions.

Complete Attack Method Inventory

The dispatch table supports 15 DDoS methods across Layers 3–7 of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. Cases 8, 11 and 13 are absent from the switch statement, suggesting they are either reserved for future use or were removed during consolidation from the 43 text-named methods in prior versions.

Table 1 lists all 15 attack methods.

Case number Function Description
0 attack_case0_tcp_socket_flood TCP socket-based flood
1 attack_case1_udp_flood_v1 UDP flood variant 1
2 attack_case2_game_server_udp Game server UDP flood (port 27015)
3 attack_case3_dns_flood DNS query flood
4 attack_case4_udp_flood_v2 UDP flood variant 2
5 attack_case5_tcp_syn_flood TCP SYN flood
6 attack_case6_tcp_ack_flood TCP ACK flood
7 a​​ttack_case7_tcp_synack_flood TCP SYN-ACK flood
9 attack_case9_udp_async_flood Asynchronous UDP flood
10 attack_case10_tcp_rst_flood TCP RST flood
12 udp_flood_attack High-performance UDP flood (NEON SIMD)
14 attack_case14_icmp_flood ICMP flood
15 attack_case15_tcp_connection_flood epoll-based TCP connection flood
16 attack_case16_tls_https_flood TLS/HTTPS flood (BoringSSL)
17 attack_case17_http2_flood HTTP/2 flood with Chrome fingerprints (nghttp2)

Table 1. Kimwolf v7 DDoS attack methods.

What Changed From Prior Versions

In Kimwolf v7, malware authors consolidated the attack count to 15 numbered methods. They removed all scanning, exploitation and brute-force functionality. The new additions target:

  • DDoS stealth through HTTP/2 with browser fingerprinting
  • C2 resilience through ENS, Tor and the local proxy

The removal of the scanner and exploit modules suggests the operators have separated the propagation pipeline from the DDoS bot. External loaders now handle initial access while the Kimwolf binary handles attacks and proxy relay.

The earliest dropped sample, targeting the x86 architecture with a Dirty COW exploit, suggests the family evolved from traditional Linux exploitation toward the current ADB-based Android propagation model. The transition from libn[redacted]kernel.so to the less conspicuous libdevice.so filename in November 2025, followed by a revert in December, indicates active operational security adjustments.

Android APK Variants

Alongside the standalone ELF payloads, the Kimwolf operators distribute Android APK packages that bundle an ELF kernel payload inside a Java wrapper. We identified eight APK samples spanning October through December 2025, all sharing the component class systemservice0644.N[redacted]Kernel.

These APKs masquerade as a system service called SystemService. On execution, they probe for root access and execute the embedded ELF kernel with commands shown below in Figure 8.

A screenshot of a computer terminal displaying two command lines related to a system service.
Figure 8. Commands used to execute the embedded ELF kernel.

The earliest build (October 2025) used the com. Android prefix and bundled three kernel variants in a single APK. By late October, the package name shifted to com.n2.systemservice0644, and the kernel was consolidated to a single binary. In November, the kernel filename changed from libn[redacted]kernel.so to libdevice.so, then reverted in the December builds.

Three signing certificates appear across the cluster:

  • The original Kimwolf APK certificate (C=CN, CN=a) used by the com.android.logcatd variants
  • An Android Debug certificate used during development
  • A self-signed certificate with subject C=XK, ST=lol, L=lol, O=lol, OU=lol, CN=lol (country code XK for Kosovo, all other fields set to lol) used by five of the eight N[redacted]Kernel APK files

Dropped ELF Kernel Payloads

The APK wrapper drops one of three ELF kernel payloads, depending on the build. These are listed in Table 2.

SHA256 Hash Filename Architecture
9470c68f9b6fe5f90d61891b95623afd7b4298815b0f95e25610e1c09008dc24 libn[redacted]kernel.so ARM
8242443dfcec66e3fe04cbfa2fbd211ad34065ee07aa93813d792a437caab212 libdevice.so ARM
421111a57b0a4224c052fa4108d90429d579974b5b5111ed2e58516ba09422ca libn[redacted]kernel.so (v1) x86

Table 2. Dropped ELF kernel payloads.

The earliest sample (first seen Sept. 2, 2025) is notable for two reasons:

  • It targets x86 architecture rather than ARM
    • This indicates that the botnet originally targeted x86 Linux systems before pivoting to ARM-based IoT and Android devices
  • It drops a file named libcow.so, and renames its process to inetd to blend in with Unix network services
    • The name libcow.so is likely a reference to the Dirty COW privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2016-5195)

The libdevice.so sample renames its process to TVHelper, which explicitly targets Android TV set-top boxes by mimicking a legitimate TV helper service.

Neither the libn[redacted]kernel.so nor libdevice.so kernels embed the Ethereum RPC endpoints found in the standalone ELF builds. The C2 resolution layer resides in the outer APK wrapper or the standalone ELF binary, while the kernel handles lower-level bot operations.

Conclusion

Kimwolf v7 is a focused evolution of an already large-scale botnet. The HTTP/2 flood with Chrome browser fingerprinting complicates application-layer DDoS mitigation, as attack traffic now mirrors legitimate browser behavior at the protocol and header level.

The three-tier C2 system (Ethereum ENS, Tor .onion, local proxy) indicates that the operators are investing in infrastructure built to withstand takedown operations. Organizations should monitor for the following behavioral indicators of Kimwolf compromise on IoT and Android devices:

  • Outbound HTTPS connections to public Ethereum RPC endpoints (e.g., 0xrpc[.]io) from devices that typically do not interact with blockchain services
  • Tor circuit establishment or SOCKS5 proxy traffic from Android TV boxes or IoT devices
  • Connections to port 23075 on localhost
  • A process named netd_service running on consumer Android devices

Organizations should treat Android TV boxes as untrusted and segment them from enterprise networks. Disabling ADB or restricting it to USB-only access removes the primary propagation vector for this botnet.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected through the following products and services:

  • The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of the indicators shared in this research,
  • Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known domains and URLs associated with this activity as malicious.
  • Device Security is designed to proactively protect the entire device attack surface, from IT to IoT and OT, with a unified platform that helps deliver comprehensive visibility, actionable risk insights and adaptive security enforcement.

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Indicators of Compromise

SHA256 hash: 406647de09a0ffa279756b4ccb344b1b76a333320c5b50fd367901fa006cf0ff
MD5 hash: d759364844d78a728505fb0485c3adbc
File size: 1,720,108 bytes
File type: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, statically linked, stripped
File description: Kimwolf v7 bot payload (baseline analyzed sample); version string n[recacted]boxv7

SHA256 hash: 345222bca004595977f971d76900b0c65fd9bf9d91c50cd0c5bf5a93f1ad9e49
MD5 hash: 036bcb62be72c4663b9564955f93b05f
File size: 1,712,624 bytes
File type: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, statically linked, stripped
File description: Kimwolf v7 bot payload

SHA256 hash: 2ec2e85b0358e0c681cb5067489a9086ec97dbbf7e3c952dd9cd496b319d5af5
MD5 hash: 33faca1e0090f6b12eff703daf4606e4
File size: 1,720,108 bytes
File type: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, statically linked, stripped
File description: Kimwolf v7 bot payload; hard codes eth.rpcuniverse[.]com in the binary

SHA256 hash: 951c94809aa6c7ab587125f9d4df30fa6a49ee0cbba76a4b7ceedaaa0e5dcd36
File type: Android APK
Package name: com.android.logcatd
File type: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, statically linked, stripped
File description: Kimwolf Android variant; masquerades as system logcat daemon; includes TorService and BootReceiver persistence; contacts 23.94.221[.]104

SHA256 hash: f07821e313c16cbbd82def45094a22c8d474164051bdbc7648d6869e012014b4
File type: Android APK
Package name: com.android.logcatd
File type: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, statically linked, stripped
File description: Kimwolf Android variant; sibling of the above, same signing certificate and package; contacts 23.94.221[.]104

VHash: 76554ad09897ac723a850eaf8c525efa
Description: Structural hash shared by the three Kimwolf v7 ELF samples (5 total matches across VirusTotal)

APK signing certificate (SHA-1 thumbprint): 2a1d96f1b066877812587ac94f45f82dfff5f5f9
Subject: C=CN, CN=a
Description: Self-signed certificate used to sign both Kimwolf Android samples

TLS certificate (SHA256 hash): f3e8a55a2a3ea7c7b6676e90f4f49a2c55b13065b68ee50c51cc35fe2b5c3237
Issuer: Let's Encrypt
Description: Certificate issued for eth.rpcuniverse[.]com, observed on 23.94.221[.]104 between Dec. 13, 2023, and March 12, 2024

Domain: rpcuniverse[.]com
Description: Multi-chain RPC service; apex registered Dec. 9, 2023 (Namecheap); resolves to 23.94.221[.]104; hard-coded subdomain present in Kimwolf sample

Domain: eth.rpcuniverse[.]com
Description: RPC subdomain hard-coded in Kimwolf sample 2ec2e85b...

Domain: avax.rpcuniverse[.]com
Description: RPC subdomain resolving to 23.94.221[.]104

IP address: 23.94.221[.]104
Description: Operator host (AS36352 RackNerd, Dallas); hosts rpcuniverse[.]com; contacted by Kimwolf ELF and APK samplesng

IP address:port: 212.193.31[.]158:443
Description: HTTPS C2 traffic (AS202799 SYSECT, Russia); offline after Jan. 31, 2026

IP address:port: 212.193.31[.]119:13
Description: C2 traffic

IP address:port: 212.193.31[.]122:13
Description: C2 traffic

IP address: 212.193.31[.]102
Description: C2 host (linked via shared SSH host key with .158

IP address:port: 212.193.31[.]92:443
Description: HTTPS C2 traffic (AS202799 SYSECT, Russia)

Tor hidden service: edctgwib2n5l34t525zkxqzk5bqb6e5il2yiq5r6zu7gtlxa4uosn3qd[.]onion
Description: v7 hidden-service C2 fallback

Additional Resources

Updated August 13 2026 at 2:00 p.m. PT to add information on the U.S. Justice Department and international partner operation seizing C2 domains used by KimWolf and related botnets.

The Permanent Threat: Analyzing Aeternum’s Blockchain-Based C2 Operations and Communications

Posted on by Chris Navarrete

Executive Summary

Aeternum is a recently discovered C++ botnet loader that shifts its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure entirely to the public Polygon blockchain. Instead of relying on centralized servers or domains, threat actors operate Aeternum by writing encrypted and plaintext instructions directly using smart contracts. A smart contract is a self-executing program stored on a blockchain that automatically runs when specific conditions are met.

Infected devices continuously query public remote procedure call (RPC) endpoints to retrieve and execute these on-chain commands.

The Aeternum botnet uses decentralized networks and evasion techniques, such as virtual machine detection and antivirus scanning, to operate effectively. This combination establishes a highly resilient, low-cost threat that complicates existing law enforcement takedown methods.

In this article, we analyze three malware cases linked to the Aeternum botnet:

  • Aeternum’s loader, C2 and downloader communications
  • Related Python-based malware using the Telegram API for C2
  • A blended threat consisting of XWorm RAT, the XMRig cryptocurrency miner and data exfiltration

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed in this article through the following products and services:

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics Malware, Blockchain, C2 

Background on Aeternum

This article builds upon research by the Ctrl-Alt-Intel team on the Aeternum C2 architecture and the loader binary. That previous research primarily focused on host-based activity.

This malware advertises itself as Aeternum C2 BotNet Loader, and security researchers call it either Aeternum C2 or Aeternum loader.

Our analysis focuses on three malware samples associated with Aeternum activity. Our first sample is the Aeternum loader.

Sample One: Aeternum Loader

SHA256 hash: 5bfb25b8255b61e5ffdf6804451534bcfa9f1dfd225e6c8cdcefb5f50d846898

Sample Characteristics

This Aeternum loader sample is named Build.exe. It is the initial UPX-packed 32-bit portable executable (PE) Windows malware file compiled in C++. Its primary functions are to establish a persistent presence, perform reconnaissance and communicate with the decentralized Polygon blockchain to retrieve encrypted C2 commands.

Behavioral Analysis

The overall flow of this sample executes in multiple stages:

  1. Initial execution and self-unpacking
    1. Build.exe executes a multi-stage self-unpacking sequence
  2. Persistence and setup
    1. Creates a folder under the user's AppData\Local directory and copies itself to it
    2. Creates a Windows shortcut under the program menu's Startup directory (Wmi_Framework_APIKEY_wmsnet_<random_value>.lnk) to ensure auto-launch upon reboot
    3. Executes supporting binaries (wmiframework.exe, ZrvEsJQzWQ.exe, STAAAAAS.exe)
  3. Configuration retrieval and network communications
    1. Deobfuscates global configuration data to produce parameters used to construct network endpoint strings
    2. Sends JSON-RPC requests to Polygon RPC endpoints (decentralized C2 communication)
    3. Queries immutable smart contract addresses using the contract method 0xb68d1809 to retrieve encrypted C2 commands
    4. Decrypts the payload using a weak PBKDF2HMAC/AES-GCM routine
  4. Downloader and payload execution
    1. Downloads files as instructed by the C2 server, such as a clean putty.exe and the malicious DotNetZip.dll, from GitHub repositories
    2. Executes the malicious DLL, which uses hard-coded credentials to connect to a Telegram C2 bot (DLLSendC2Bot)
  5. Exfiltration
    1. Packages the stolen information for exfiltration over encrypted channels to trusted domains, code-hosting platforms and the Telegram API

Static Deobfuscation (XOR)

The pattern of encryption keys for the Aeternum loader (i.e., \x00\x00\x00[ENC bytes]\x00[KEY bytes]\x00\x00\x00) consists of:

  • Three null bytes followed by the encrypted payload bytes
  • A null byte, followed by the key bytes
  • Three null bytes

Since the pattern is known, a script can identify the different number of occurrences along with its offsets. When found, we can then use the key to deobfuscate the hidden information.

Figure 1 shows two examples of the decryption process against two different obfuscated string matches and their deobfuscated values. These values consist of the JSON object strings used for HTTP-based C2 communication during the execution of the malware and its subsequent interaction with the Polygon blockchain.

A screenshot of a command line interface displaying SSH key exchanges and messages labeled 'Push 133' and 'Push 232'
Figure 1. Deobfuscated (XOR) blockchain RPC request Information.

Additional deobfuscated strings also include:

  • Polygon RPC endpoints (i.e., hxxps[:]//polygon-mumbai-bor-rpc.publicnode[.]com)
  • File extensions (.e.g, .ps1, .dll, .exe)
  • HTTP header information (i.e., User-Agent)
  • C2 command information (e.g., hwid, args, ping)
  • Smart contract method (i.e., 0xb68d1809)

However, we suspect that this particular sample differs from others, since we did not find the smart contract addresses either through deobfuscation or plain-text pattern search. During network analysis, this sample used 22 different smart contract addresses during C2 communications.

The full table of deobfuscated strings can be found in the Indicators of Compromise section of this article.

Network Traffic

The Aeternum loader performed the following activities as part of its downloading and C2 communications:

  • Communicating with the Polygon blockchain network
  • Downloading files from GitHub repositories
  • Interacting with social media via Telegram’s API (api.telegram[.]org)

Figure 2 shows an example of the communications traffic filtered in Wireshark.

A screenshot of Aeternum C2 and downloader activity log showing multiple entries of HTTP requests. Details include timestamps, ports, protocols, hosts, and request methods.
Figure 2. Aeternum C2 and downloader network traffic activity.

Aeternum Polygon Blockchain C2 Communications

This section explores how Aeternum performed C2 communications on the Polygon blockchain and how it uses different smart contract addresses to retrieve C2 commands.

Polygon’s JSON-RPC (HTTP Request Analysis)

This sample made a JSON-RPC request using HTTP to the Polygon blockchain. Figure 3 shows the TCP stream of an HTTP POST request to the Polygon RPC endpoint, which includes a JSON object with two important fields: to and data. The to field contains the contract address, and the data field contains the Polygon contract's getDomain() method 0xb68d1809.

A screenshot of Wireshark displaying HTTP stream details. It shows HTTP headers and payload in hexadecimal and ASCII formats. Red annotations point to a "32 byte offset," "266 byte length," "payload starts," and "padding".
Figure 3. Example of Aeternum C2 blockchain HTTP communication (request and response).
Polygon’s JSON-RPC (HTTP Response Analysis)

Following the JSON-RPC request, if the RPC response is an HTTP 200 OK, it will include a JSON object containing the result field with its corresponding payload. This is structured with the following byte sequence:

  • Offset (0x20 = 32 bytes)
  • Payload length (0x10a = 266 bytes)
  • Payload (variable values)
  • Padding (variable length)

Weak Encryption Implementation

Building on existing research, we observed that Aeternum implements a substandard encryption scheme. Specifically, it uses a self-salting password.

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) considers a self-salting password a critical cryptographic flaw via predictable salt and public key derivation source, in their remediation standard: NIST SP 800-132. This oversight allows the decryption of the malicious payload by using two known variables: the smart contract address and the payload.

The main decryption logic corresponds to the following operations:

  • PBKDF2HMAC (key stretching): This function uses the SHA256 algorithm to repeatedly hash the password, using the password itself as the salt
  • Key derivation: The kdf.derive(password) performs the key derivation. It takes the encoded password and transforms it into a high-entropy 32-byte (256-bit) cryptographic key.
  • Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) initialization: The derived key is used to initialize an AES/GCM object
  • Decryption: The decryption of the ciphertext uses the provided initialization vector (IV) and the payload, resulting in a UTF-8 encoded string

We used a custom Python script to automate the decryption process, which expects the two values passed to it: the contract address and the hex-string payload, as mentioned above. Figure 4 shows the results of this script run on an encrypted Aeternum blockchain value.

A screenshot of a command prompt window displaying encrypted text and a Python decryption process. The text includes contract address details and a GitHub URL, ending with a process marked "SUCCESS!" with an address and iterations noted.
Figure 4. Decryption script run on an encrypted Aeternum blockchain value.

In this case, the decrypted string contains the Aeternum command all:url:<URI for putty.exe>, which is a command used to instruct the botnet to proceed and fetch the target file.

Although the analyzed sample uses encryption, we found additional samples using plain-text C2 commands, as well as an unknown encrypted payload.

Aeternum Downloader Activity

The malware download requested two different files, putty.exe and DotNetZip.dll, as Figure 5 below shows.

"A screenshot of a network log featuring requests made to GitHub. The log displays columns for Time, TCP Port, Protocol, Host, and Info. The Info column includes file paths and HTTP request methods like GET.
Figure 5. Aeternum downloader activity.

While investigating the malware’s downloader activity, we found requests for file artifacts hosted on GitHub in two different Github projects. Figure 6 shows the malicious DLL in an October 2025 commit from one repository.

A screenshot of a file explorer showing a folder titled "1" containing a file with a size of 49 KB. A note below states, 'Binary file not shown'.
Figure 6. Malicious DLL file hosted on GitHub.

The hosted putty.exe file is a copy of a legitimate installer for PuTTY version 0.83. The DotNetZip.dll file is a malicious DLL file.

While this Aeternum loader sample retrieved legitimate files like PuTTY, this is likely for testing. Attackers could easily swap files in these repositories for malware using the same filename, instantly compromising the safety of anyone who downloads them.

Exfiltration via the Telegram API: Aeternum

After successfully downloading DotNetZip.dll from GitHub and executing it, the malware sample initiated new communications to an endpoint at Telegram’s API (api.telegram[.]org).

As a DLL, the malware's entry point DllMain() first checks for a specific condition by comparing fwReason to 1 to confirm it is being called. Then it invokes the CollectAndSendSystemInfo() function, as shown below in Figure 7.

A screenshot of disassembled code in a software analysis tool. The image shows function details and call flow of the code. The main function displayed calls another function named CollectAndSendSystemInfo. There are annotations indicating exported entries and attributes, with arrows displaying the sequence of calls.
Figure 7. Disassembled code from the malicious DLL.

This function is in charge of all the information gathering and data exfiltration from the compromised machine. The most notable information about this sample is its lack of obfuscation or encryption, as both the chat_id value (-4991861036) and the bot’s API token (8305917772:AAHAou...) are hard-coded, as Figure 8 shows in the disassembled code.

A screenshot of a disassembled code snippet from a software analysis tool. The code includes labeled memory addresses, assembly instructions like "push" and "mov," and data reference.
Figure 8. Hard-coded chat_id value and Telegram bot API token.

Once the malware has collected all the information, it constructs an HTTP request to exfiltrate the information. The structure of this HTTPS request through the Telegram API follows:

  • HTTP Method
    • POST (submission of the collected information)
  • Base path and bot token
    • /bot prefix (required for all Telegram bot API calls)
    • Concatenated bot API token (8305917772:AAHAou…)
  • API Method (URI path)
    • /sendDocument (tells Telegram what action the bot should perform. In this case, it is attempting to send a file (e.g., PDF, ZIP) to a chat)
  • Protocol
    • HTTP/1.1 (indicates the version of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol being used for the communication)
  • HTTP Headers
    • User-agent (set to SystemInfo Bot/2.0)
    • Content-Type (set as multipart/form-data with a boundary set as systeminfoboundary)
  • HTTP Request Body
    • Form-data, containing the names:
      • chat_id (The unique identifier for the target chat)
      • caption (Text to accompany the file)
      • document (The file to be sent, which in this case is a PNG file named screenshot.png)

The content of the exfiltrated information contains different information from the compromised machine, including:

  • CPU
  • RAM
  • Disk
  • GPU
  • Administrator rights check
  • Windows User Account Control (UAC) status

Figure 9 shows an exfiltration request revealed using Burp Suite that contains an example of the data collected by the malware sample.

A screenshot of a "POST" request sent to a Telegram server. The details include connection information, user-agent, and content type. The system information shows the OS as Windows 10 Enterprise, CPU as Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3470, and memory status with 1.9GB available out of 8GB. Other technical details about proxy and wireless configurations are visible.
Figure 9. Data exfiltration through the Telegram bot API.

The text in the image is in Russian (i.e., ДОПОЛНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ, which translates to Additional Information) and uses Cyrillic characters, which require specific encodings like UTF-8 to properly decode.

Sample Two: XWorm + XMRig CoinMinder + Data Exfiltration

SHA256 hash: f2a326cff405299e4ebdfaac955c52fc7e496544eaa0921ecad4816cb3ae3a27

Pivoting on characteristics of the first sample, we found several matches using specific patterns based on the smart contract method function (0xb68d1809). Among these, we identified a 64-bit Windows PE sample that leverages the Aeternum botnet to simultaneously drop an XWorm binary, an XMRig cryptocurrency miner and a data exfiltrator.

The sample is named XBinderOutput_protected.exe and written in C/C++. This PE file is a PyInstaller-packed application containing a Python 3.14 script named XBinderOutput_protected_temp.py.

The embedded script implements multi-layer cryptographic decryption using ChaCha20, AES-CTR and AES-CBC to recover an encrypted payload. The payload is then written to the temporary directory as esewurmgvbqt.exe and executed with a hidden window. The script includes anti-analysis checks for virtual machine environments and debugger presence.

Like the previous sample for Aeternum loader, once executed, this second sample made a JSON-RPC request using HTTP to the Polygon blockchain containing Aeternum’s to and data values. An HTTP 200 OK response was returned as expected, indicating that a command payload was found and its content returned. Figure 10 shows an example of this traffic.

A screenshot of a Wireshark window showing an HTTP POST request. The window displays headers and raw data and specific details. There are fields like "content-type: application/json" and "x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN." The bottom shows options for filtering and export, with a search button labeled "Find text.
Figure 10. Polygon’s blockchain JSON-RPC request and response.

This time, the hexadecimal value response is not encrypted but converts directly to plain text. After translating the hexadecimal values to ASCII, we found a Pastebin URL as noted below in Figure 11.

A hexadecimal data table with offset values on the left and decoded text on the right. The decoded text includes a URL among other characters.
Figure 11. Decoding Aeternum’s C2 command.

This URL contains the /raw/ URI path that is designed to return the data as-is, without any further processing by the service. Thus, the malware has less work to do in terms of parsing or processing the retrieved information. This URL returned configuration data for the XMRig cryptocurrency miner.

After the malware retrieved data from the Pastebin URL, it started two binaries it had dropped to the infected host, one for an Xworm client and one for an XMRig cryptocurrency miner.

XMRig CoinMiner Analysis and Configuration

The Pastebin URL returned the XMRig cryptocurrency miner configuration data as a JSON object containing different fields. These fields included mining-based settings such as:

  • Algorithm
  • API-endpoint
  • Max CPU
  • Password
  • Pool
  • Wallet address

It also included two behavior-based options:

  • The stealth-target option that enables evasive behavior by blocklisting system monitoring utilities. It triggers a process suspension and its related mining activity upon the execution of diagnostic tools (e.g., Process Hacker) to mask the miner’s footprint and resource consumption.
  • The kill-targets option that implements process termination as a persistence and resource-optimization strategy. It identifies and kills active processes associated with endpoint security software and distributed computing programs to prevent system remediation and ensure maximum CPU allocation for the miner.

The associated Pastebin URL occasionally returns different data for the XMRig configuration. Despite these changes, the data structure remains identical. Figure 12 displays an example of the XMRig configuration data seen in June 2026.

A screenshot of a programming code snippet displayed in a browser window on the pastebin.com website. The code includes parameters for a mining pool, password, and other configurations such as keepalive, SSL, and API endpoints. It lists processes and stealth targets related to a server setup.
Figure 12. Pastebin XMRig cryptocurrency miner configuration structure.

XWorm RAT Analysis and Network Activity

In addition to the XMRig cryptocurrency miner, the main sample dropped an XWorm client named XWormclient.exe. This filename is the default name used when using the XWorm v7.4 builder, indicating that the author generated and bound it into the malicious package.

We extracted the Xworm sample's configuration using CAPE’s community parser for XWorm. This dump of information contains configuration information as shown below in Figure 13, including:

  • Version of the builder (XWorm v7.4)
  • Mutex
  • C2 server
  • IP address
  • Port
  • Key
A command prompt window showing a script execution. The details include various IP addresses, ports, and paths. Mentions of "Python," "CAPE," and "USB" are visible.
Figure 13. XWorm configuration extraction using the CAPE parser.

Armed with this information, specifically the C2 server key, C2 communication port and XWorm version values, we tricked the sample into connecting to a controlled instance of the matching XWorm panel version. Figure 14 shows a screenshot of the C2 panel after the XWorm sample connected to our controlled instance.

A screenshot of XWorm V7.4, with open windows displaying system information and processes. Details include IP addresses, usernames, and software versions, with CPU and RAM usage at the top.
Figure 14. XWorm bot panel controlling a compromised host.

Data Exfiltration From the Compromised Host

During the final stage of this Aeternum sample's execution, the injected system process starts an information gathering and encryption process.

Figure 15 shows an outbound connection HTTP POST request to a C2 server at 193.221.200[.]219 with a custom user-agent (cpp-httplib/0.18.3) and JSON values containing two keys with Base64-encoded values.

A screenshot of a Wireshark interface displaying HTTP stream data. The window shows a POST request to an API endpoint with headers, including content type and user agent details, followed by JSON data containing encoded information. The interface includes options for data representation and search functions at the bottom.
Figure 15. HTTP C2 exfiltration with base64-encoded data.

After further analysis and reverse engineering to understand the meaning of those two keys, we discovered that the uqhash value contains an AES-128 encryption key. We also discovered the data value contains the exfiltrated data in an encrypted blob form.

The following section explains the encryption details and the decryption process we followed to reveal the exfiltrated information.

Encryption Routine

The encryption routine takes raw input bytes and pads them with 0x00 until the length is a multiple of 16 bytes. It then derives a fixed 16-byte key by truncating or zero-extending the provided hexadecimal input. The data is processed block-by-block using a 16-byte block cipher in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, producing a deterministic ciphertext where each block is independently encrypted. The result is written out without any IV, chaining or authentication, closely matching a typical minimal malware-style encryption wrapper.

The encryption routine has the following characteristics:

  • Algorithm used: AES-128 (16-byte block cipher) in ECB mode
  • Key properties: no IV, deterministic output, zero padding (non-standard), identical plaintext blocks → identical ciphertext blocks
  • Context in this test: binary data from a file is padded and encrypted in-place using a fixed 16-byte key derived from CLI hexadecimal input, mimicking a simple malware/configuration protection routine

Decryption Routine

To decrypt the required information, we developed a script to reverse the encryption process identified during our analysis and reverse engineering. This script takes two parameters:

  1. The encrypted payload file dump
  2. The hexadecimal representation of the Base64-decoded AES-128 key as a single concatenated string

Figure 16 shows the execution of the decryption script, which in this case generated a 580-byte data dump.

A screenshot of a terminal window displaying a Python decryption command. It shows the file path and commands with input and output file details.
Figure 16. Automated payload decryption using a Python script.

By viewing the contents of the output file, the exfiltrated data is revealed as shown below in Figure 17.

A screenshot of a terminal window displaying the decryption process of an encrypted file. Information includes status code, computer name, username, hash rate, pool details, CPU specifications, client details, and other technical parameters.
Figure 17. Decrypted Information exfiltrated to the C2 server.

Certain behavior (i.e., drop of a .sys file) and network patterns (e.g., URI path, JSON object attributes) match with ZingoStealer reported by Cisco Talos on April 13, 2022. However, we cannot fully attribute this activity to ZingoStealer.

Sample Three: Python Malware Source Code Analysis

SHA256 hash: ea1b6ff3a0c1a749b9f09d66789973321d63d8896b48f7345193bdad512950a2

Python Source Code Analysis

Our third sample is a Python script file containing the source code for the Aeternum malware. The key element used to confirm its association with the Aeternum operation is the data value 0xb68d1809, which functions as the unique function selector used to query the Polygon smart contract.

The code contains a blockchain-based fall-back mechanism to counter infrastructure takedowns. By executing a read-only eth_call to a specific Polygon smart contract, the malware can retrieve and decrypt new C2 domains on the fly. This decentralized dead-drop resolver, combined with the Star Drop space-themed Telegram formatting, highlights an operation designed for resilience and stealth. Figure 18 below shows a section of the Python script illustrating this.

A screenshot of Python code defining a function. It includes JSON-RPC request setup, error handling with response checks, and data conversion for domain retrieval. The code retrieves and decodes a domain, highlighting text processing and exception handling.
Figure 18. The get_domain() function used to retrieve C2 domains from the smart contract.

Analysis of the malware’s source code reveals a multi-staged infection chain that begins with a social engineering lure impersonating a DBeaver installer. To ensure it only executes on high-value targets, the code includes rigorous anti-analysis routines that check for specific sandbox usernames, machine names and a minimum of 8 GB of RAM.

Notably, it validates the presence of Zone.Identifier alternate data streams in a user account's Downloads folder to confirm the system is not a pristine, empty virtual machine. Once validated, the malware establishes persistence by creating a disguised shortcut in the Windows Startup folder and employs an Early Bird APC injection technique.

This technique involves spawning a suspended, signed binary (dpapimig.exe) and injecting shellcode into its address space, effectively executing the malicious payload before security hooks are fully initialized. Figure 19 below shows a section of the Python script representing this.

A screenshot of a code snippet written in Python. It features lists of usernames and computer names, as well as checks for system information such as platform use and RAM size. The code includes functions and conditional statements, and the name "dbeaver" is mentioned as a build.
Figure 19. Block-listed user and computer names with memory check.

Exfiltration via the Telegram API: Python Source Code

The source code further details an aggressive focus on cryptocurrency data exfiltration. It features hard-coded routines to harvest credentials from over 55 cryptocurrency browser extensions and 10 popular desktop wallets. Data exfiltration and C2 communication are handled via a hybrid architecture.

While primary reconnaissance is sent via Telegram, the main C2 loop uses obfuscated JSON payloads padded with junk data to break traffic signatures. Figure 20 below illustrates this in a section of Python script.

A screenshot of a Python script for web scraping and automation. The code retrieves the computer name, IP address and gathers system information like OS platform and Windows Defender status. It also initializes a Telegram bot communication and attempts to scrape extensions and wallet information. The script utilizes libraries such as `os`, `platform`, and `requests`.
Figure 20. The send_tg() function used for data exfiltration via Telegram.

The full table of the malware indicators can be found in the Indicators of Compromise section of this article.

Blockchain Reconnaissance

The key to tracking the Aeternum botnet lies in the Polygon smart contract's function selector, 0xb68d1809, which resolves to the getDomain() function. The malware calls this public function to retrieve an XOR key and Base64-encrypted C2 domain stored in the contract's storage slot. The permanence of this 4-byte selector across all Aeternum malware samples provides a reliable cryptographic fingerprint, which ties all related activity back to the same campaign.

The smart contract architecture is simple but resilient, using storage slot 0 for the admin (deployer's wallet) address and slot 1 for the encrypted domain. While the getDomain() function is public for malware retrieval, a second critical selector, 0xb249cd2d (updateDomain), is an admin-only function used to rotate the C2 domain. Transactions linked to the primary operator's smart contract address, associated with the moniker LenAI, confirmed they actively use this updateDomain() method to push new C2 information, such as hxxps[:]//cdnjsdelivr[.]beer/, to the blockchain.

Figure 21 below shows a flowchart of this operation.

A flowchart illustrating a security breach pattern. Two nodes labeled "updateDomainA" lead to the same destination. One transition shows encrypted code leading to "getDomainA". The other shows code leading to the same endpoint. The endpoint displays a red bug icon, symbolizing a vulnerability or malware.
Figure 21. Aeternum blockchain operation.

Static analysis of the Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) bytecode from all three samples indicates a single threat group is iteratively refining the codebase. Despite variations in deployment addresses and sequential compiler upgrades (from solc 0.8.0 to 0.8.30), the contracts maintain an identical state-management architecture and share the three fundamental function selectors (0xb249cd2d, 0xb68d1809 and 0xf851a440).

These technical details, including progressive gas optimization and updated error messages, prove attackers are refining and redeploying this same codebase over time. This establishes Aeternum as an evolving threat infrastructure.

Conclusion

The Aeternum botnet is one of the latest threats leveraging blockchain-based botnets. Attackers are migrating from conventional self-hosted C2 mechanisms to more evasive and resilient alternatives. They are hiding malicious payloads in smart contracts, such as those on the Polygon blockchain, a trend exemplified by Aeternum.

This investigation shows that malware developers are leveraging the blockchain as a decentralized communication mechanism for their operations. They are also leveraging Aeternum as a botnet selection for the C2 management console. We expect this trend to continue.

Throughout the duration of this study, our Advanced Threat Prevention security solution successfully identified and recorded more than 29,000 detection events (as of June 4, 2026).

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from the threats discussed above through the following products and services:

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Indicators of Compromise

Table 1 contains indicators for the Aeternum loader (Sample 1).

Type Value Description
SHA256 hash 5bfb25b8255b61e5ffdf6804451534bcfa9f1dfd225e6c8cdcefb5f50d846898 Aeternum C++ loader executable
SHA256 hash 1505eda3da68e2ff9919b55a31018bd30a991236f041aee835f3bc4e430ce505 Malicious downloaded DotNetZip.dll
Filename DotNetZip.dll Malicious payload executed by the loader
Filename putty.exe Benign file downloaded for testing/staging
Filename Wmi_Framework_APIKEY_wmsnet_<random_value>.lnk Startup link for persistence
Filename wmiframework.exe, ZrvEsJQzWQ.exe, STAAAAAS.exe Supporting binaries
Domain api.telegram[.]org Telegram API endpoint for exfiltration/C2 (used in DLL). (This domain is not inherently malicious, but could be viewed as part of a potential pattern of suspicious activity.)
Repository hxxps[:]//github[.]com/lencod/ Repository hosting malicious file artifacts
Repository hxxps[:]//github[.]com/Mash3Do/ Repository hosting malicious file artifacts
Telegram ID -4991861036 Hard-coded chat-id for Telegram C2 bot
Telegram Token 8305917772:AAHAou... Hard-coded Telegram bot API token
Contract Address 0x04E25a563f159308FC3E15fE9Ccc9D2CF623D0cc Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x16dA95799CB8aB203f83e01AFC030B1217198Da4 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x1D50703722729dD68e89D819F69eFc5Fb206bBe7 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x27c7c36981c1ed5cFA2DCDb4B43C27A6BaF6bEa8 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x4dcE7d4b1229F3705BDB70341484cF2EEE36432e Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x55b4F951d5Ac035C21B170C73C0A930a641b718C Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x6da31EB2A016074ffd5519326573E78E2677E4C8 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x737791081A398151195a753Fb49f9c1b8bc1fCDB Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x7D2D8A4A6E8D89cf5C151C4f68A521490D9779B0 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0x8d2BaEc2687F59eE1EE7BFd322D33325f5E004ee Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xb3EF2D08Bf25a7daB9d8b98d64E564eA1f6Db924 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xb8fB2bfb182A172b29C365AD6CF743449975C418 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xbD6e817Cc510EC3DA5651B5a3AC595d34C0CF1af Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xC37fB924cF5996C9e676BBA399bDfc5F936B3572 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xC41342908f98E813862EDFe47Ac3af676F8098C9 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xc7199C1dbCd82c4E002327Aa3EC9158F434a6aCE Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xCE476E6f4d83a7a086Cbcdf0FE2E8f221e47e81C Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xD69A36439FffD145ADAcacB94fDe6f8b3546a361 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xf9438b4E3200AE1611eD3d03310c803FDdf67672 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xfbC267200f9e5749045f32dbB55BB16615f1CE5F Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xFDB8b139EeacD17ea7c10c256eA77Ba6Dff18D7d Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
Contract Address 0xFdfB8c4e827c2d053749C8F2f2058548dde0d073 Sample 1 Polygon smart contract address
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon.rpc.hypersync[.]xyz/ Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-mumbai.g.alchemy[.]com/v2/demo Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-mumbai-bor-rpc.publicnode[.]com Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//api.noderpc[.]xyz/rpc-polygon-pos/public Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-mumbai[.]gateway.tenderly[.]co Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//public.stackup[.]sh/api/v1/node/polygon-mainnet Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//gateway.tenderly[.]co/public/polygon Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-amoy.gateway.tenderly[.]co Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//rpc[.]poolz[.]finance/polygon Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//gateway.tenderly[.]co/public/polygon-mumbai Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//api.zan[.]top/polygon-amoy Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//endpoints.omniatech[.]io/v1/polygon-zkevm/testnet/public Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps://rpc[.]polygon-zkevm[.]gateway[.]fm Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-pokt.nodies[.]app/ Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-amoy.therpc[.]io Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//rpc.polygonsupernet.public.arianee[.]net Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//public.stackup[.]sh/api/v1/node/polygon-mumbai Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-zkevm-mainnet[.]public.blastapi[.]io Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygontestapi.terminet[.]io/rpc Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-mainnet.g.alchemy[.]com/v2/demo Polygon RPC endpoint
RPC Endpoint hxxps[:]//polygon-zkevm.drpc[.]org Polygon RPC endpoint

Table 1. Indicators associated with Aeternum loader (sample 1).

Table 2 contains indicators for XWorm and XMRig cryptocurrency miner, and C2 exfiltration activity (sample 2).

Type Value Description
SHA256 hash f2a326cff405299e4ebdfaac955c52fc7e496544eaa0921ecad4816cb3ae3a27 XBinderOutput_protected.exe (Main sample)
SHA256 hash 4e24bbd0fabac6c3efcec943046afbfd332b2c0108a13becfda23a0e26f9ff5f XWormClient.exe executable
SHA256 hash 81bb80d9c5a97dc41b65f6248c131963c91346eb4fb672836b3d53ae67564d9f XMRig coin miner (miner.exe)
Domain gulf.moneroocean[.]stream XMRig mining pool
Wallet Address 82pNS8tBnvZ5cmV1iU9cXdQmhGz95P18fZpASBrxtaSF1ToTmZtf3HGHrdXMt1Znuu8BLU17koPs2hTXxTajdTviLcgbbAi XMRig Monero wallet
IP Address:Port 193.221.200[.]219 HTTP C2 exfiltration IP address
C2 URL hxxp[:]//sekirolegion.duckdns[.]org/api/endpoint.php C2 contacted by malware (linked to exfiltration IP)
Contract Address 0x75cD25791A60ab3451E2d2feB5ec46c6f541C2B8 Sample 2 Polygon smart contract address

Table 2. Indicators for XWorm + XMRig cryptocurrency miner + C2 exfiltration (sample 2).

Table 3 contains indicators for the Python malware (sample 3).

Type Value Description
SHA256 hash ea1b6ff3a0c1a749b9f09d66789973321d63d8896b48f7345193bdad512950a2 Python script sample
Staging Domain download.sftp-api-group-wechat[.]com Staging domain for malware components
C2 Domain update.constant-path[.]xyz C2 domain (retrieved from contract)
C2 Domain update-launcher[.]xyz C2 domain (retrieved from contract)
C2 Domain test-steve[.]cyou C2 domain (retrieved from contract)
Telegram Bot 7356125890:AAF5ncBIc2pJrEfYPAmy2g9YS7B5NjmtwTc Telegram bot token for exfiltration/C2
Telegram Chats -1002535992165, -1002144122983 Telegram chat IDs
Contract Address 0xb0874252a7359AA701F3F144A1f03A6e0DA8aE6D Sample 3 Polygon Smart Contract address
XOR Key helo1 XOR key for C2
XOR Key $m7*rYpry3 XOR key for domain decryption
Persistence PythonLauncher-*.lnk Shortcut created in Windows Startup folder
Injected Process dpapimig.exe Signed binary used for Early Bird APC injection
Disguised Binary WmiPrvSE.exe Disguised binary

Table 3. Indicators for the Python malware (sample 3).

Table 4 contains the shared blockchain indicators.

Type Value Description
Function Selector 0xb68d1809 getDomain() function selector (used by all samples)
Function Selector 0xb249cd2d updateDomain() function selector (admin only)
Function Selector 0xf851a440 admin() function selector (auto-getter)
Operator Address 0xcaf2c54e400437da717cf215181b170f65187abf LenAI's primary smart contract address
C2 Domain hxxps[:]//cdnjsdelivr[.]beer/ New C2 domain pushed by LenAI via updateDomain transaction

Table 4. Shared blockchain indicators.

Additional Resources

Inside the Modern SOC: The Identity Front Door

Posted on by Ria Bhatia

The Identity Gap: Why Trust Has Become the New Attack Surface

In The 72-Minute Race, we explored how attackers are compressing the time between initial access and business impact. But as attacks continue to accelerate, another trend has emerged: Attackers are increasingly gaining access through compromised identities rather than exploiting technology vulnerabilities.

According to the 2026 Unit 42 Global Incident Response Report, identity weaknesses played a role in nearly 90% of incidents investigated by Unit 42. The report also found that 65% of initial access activity involved identity-based techniques, underscoring how credential theft, multifactor authentication (MFA) manipulation, session hijacking and social engineering have become some of the most effective ways to gain access to enterprise environments.

Anatomy of a Modern Identity-Driven Compromise

Across recent Unit 42 investigations, we see a consistent pattern. Attackers often gain initial access through:

  • Phishing campaigns
  • Social engineering calls
  • MFA fatigue attacks
  • Compromised third-party accounts
  • Misuse of help desk processes

Once inside, attackers establish persistence, elevate privileges and move laterally across various environments. These activities often resemble legitimate administrative behavior. Malicious activity can remain hidden long enough for attackers to broaden their foothold before security teams recognize the full scope of the incident.

The Attacker's Playbook in Action

A social-first entry: Threat groups such as Muddled Libra (aka Scattered Spider) demonstrate how many attackers increasingly rely on social engineering and identity abuse as part of their toolkit.

Expansion through identity: Once inside, attackers exploit identity weaknesses to establish persistence, compromise additional accounts and escalate privileges to strengthen their foothold. Each action expands their access and makes the compromise more difficult to contain.

The escalating access: As highlighted in the 2026 Unit 42 Global Incident Response Report, 87% of incidents span multiple attack surfaces. An initial compromised identity can quickly become a multi-domain investigation that requires defenders to connect activity across the environment.

The objective: Whether the objective is ransomware deployment, data theft, financial fraud or long-term persistence, identity compromise often serves as the foundation for broader attacker objectives.

From a tooling perspective, the warning signs are often already present across the organization’s security controls. Without automated correlation, these signals can appear low priority in isolation, allowing attackers to expand their access before defenders recognize the full scope of the incident.

How Our Unit 42 Managed Services Team Responds

When investigating identity-driven attacks, our Unit 42 analysts use the Cortex SecOps platform to unify security telemetry into a single investigative view, allowing them to quickly validate suspicious activity and understand the full scope of the attack. Our 24/7 Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team continuously investigates suspicious activity while our threat hunters proactively search for signs of identity compromise that may not yet have generated an alert. AI-driven correlation, behavioral context and Unit 42 threat intelligence help our teams quickly validate high-confidence incidents and determine the full scope of attacker activity.

Organizations using Managed XSIAM extend this approach through AI-driven correlation, integrated investigation and response workflows and continuous SOC engineering delivered by Unit 42 experts. Rather than requiring internal teams to continuously engineer and optimize the platform as attacker techniques evolve, our experts refine:

  • Data integrations
  • Custom detections
  • Correlation rules
  • Automated response playbooks

This helps organizations identify identity-driven attacks earlier and accelerate response before attackers can expand their access.

Advice for SOC Leaders: Look Beyond the Login

As identity attacks continue to evolve, security leaders should focus on the operational challenges that often prevent teams from detecting identity-driven attacks early.

Prioritize Identity Context

A successful login alone is not enough to indicate normal user activity. Correlating identity activity with endpoint, cloud, SaaS and network telemetry provides the behavioral context needed to distinguish legitimate users from compromised accounts.

Reduce Manual Investigation

Consolidate telemetry and investigations into a unified view to reduce analyst pivots between disconnected tools. Centralized visibility enables security teams to identify attacker activity faster and respond with greater confidence.

Continuously Improve Detection

Attackers continuously adapt their techniques. Regularly refining detections, correlation rules and response playbooks helps ensure defenses evolve alongside emerging identity-based threats.

Protect Time for Threat Hunting

Dedicated threat hunting helps uncover credential abuse, privilege escalation and hidden persistence before they escalate into larger incidents.

What's Next

In our next entry in this series, we'll examine why modern attacks increasingly cross security domains and why unified visibility has become essential for detecting and stopping multi-surface attacks before they escalate into business impact.

The Unit 42 Managed Services Edge

Identity attacks have become one of the most effective ways for adversaries to bypass traditional security controls. Unit 42 combines expert-led Managed Detection and Response (MDR), proactive threat hunting, continuous SOC engineering and frontline incident response expertise to help organizations identify identity-driven attacks earlier and respond with greater confidence.

Learn more about Unit 42 Managed Services.

ChainDrop: Inside a Self-Propagating npm Worm

Posted on by Unit 42

Executive Summary

A self-propagating npm worm nicknamed ChainDrop infected over 400 packages that are collectively downloaded hundreds of millions of times each week. This includes malicious versions of widely used packages such as keyv and cacheable-request. Unit 42 has unique observations of this attack.

The attackers behind ChainDrop potentially exposed developer workstations, continuous integration (CI) pipelines, cloud environments and downstream software users across a large number of organizations.

Once installed, ChainDrop steals:

  • Cloud credentials
  • npm and GitHub tokens
  • SSH keys
  • Other sensitive developer data

It can also extract temporary credentials from GitHub Actions runner memory and use stolen npm publishing tokens to infect and republish additional packages while preserving their legitimate functionality.

We have observed active attempted operations, which were detected out of the box by our existing products.

During our investigation into this attack, we identified 453 public GitHub repositories across five accounts matching the worm’s exfiltration patterns. We also detected ChainDrop execution across 10 distinct environments. At the time of publication, these repos were removed.

We have deobfuscated the malware and identified:

  • Persistence through developer and AI coding tools
  • Blockchain-based command-and-control (C2) resolution
  • Its ability to execute additional attacker-supplied code

Additionally, late on Aug. 4, 2026, we observed the adversary silently reconfiguring the worm's entire C2 infrastructure through a single Ethereum transaction, without requiring any update to the deployed malware.

This attack is the latest in a series of threats to the security of the npm ecosystem.

Unit 42 recommends:

  • Identifying installations of affected npm package versions
  • Removing affected package versions
  • Investigating developer workstations and CI runners for signs of compromise
  • Reviewing unexpected npm publishing and GitHub repository activity.
  • Revoking and rotating potentially exposed npm, GitHub, cloud, SSH and automation credentials.
  • Removing identified persistence mechanisms
  • Blocking both the domain-based and GitHub-based exfiltration channels

The Koi Agentic Endpoint Security risk engine flagged the malicious package activity as the attack unfolded. Cortex XDR detected and alerted on the worm’s execution using out-of-the-box behavioral detections.

Palo Alto Networks customers can use Koi Agentic Endpoint Security to help identify and control malicious packages across developer endpoints.

The Cortex AgentiX Threat Intel agent can help allow analysts to extract, enrich, and search IoCs using natural language to quickly determine organizational impact.

Cortex Cloud Endpoint Protection leverages AI-enabled analytics to help detect and prevent threats targeting Linux endpoints, containers, and associated cloud IAM policies.

Cortex XDR and XSIAM provide behavioral detection, investigation and response that can help organizations address ChainDrop activity executing in development environments.

Idira Secrets Manager and Secrets Hub eliminate hard-coded credentials from configure files and  source code by automating zero-downtime rotation, and dynamically delivering just-in-time access to non-human identities across multi-cloud and DevOps environments.

The Unit 42 Cloud Security Assessment is an evaluation service that reviews cloud infrastructure to identify misconfigurations and security gaps.

The Unit 42 Incident Response team can also be engaged to help with a compromise or to provide a proactive assessment to lower your risk.

Related Unit 42 Topics AI, Malware, Supply Chain, npm Packages 

Details of the ChainDrop npm Worm

Indicators and Behavior of the ChainDrop Worm

We analyzed the contents from one of the infected packages to understand the full attack chain.

The package contained the legitimate software development kit (SDK) code that a user would expect, including the source, dependencies and documentation. But it also contained small indicators of the ChainDrop worm: two extra top-level files and one lifecycle hook.

The indicators of the worm can be subtle, as illustrated in the following example.

One of the indicators is an infected npm package's package.json file containing code with the preinstall command, as shown in Figure 1.

A screenshot of a JSON script section showing a "preinstall" script with the command "node setup.mjs".
Figure 1. An infected npm package's package.json file containing code with the preinstall command.

That preinstall line is the only modification the worm makes to this package's manifest. It points to setup.mjs, a dropper that checks whether Bun (a lightweight JavaScript runtime and package manager alternative to Node.js) is on PATH. It downloads Bun 1.3.13 from the legitimate Oven GitHub repository if it isn't present. Then it feeds Bun a 727 KB obfuscated JavaScript payload (math_init.js) compressed into two source lines.

To be clear: Bun is not compromised. The attacker is using a legitimate runtime as a portable execution vehicle.

The payload spawns a detached background process, sets _NODE_RUNTIME_INIT=1 to prevent recursive relaunch and lets the install finish cleanly. No errors. No warnings.

Most developers would move on without noticing a key detail: The worm is already running.

The worm detaches when it is not in CI. If it detects a CI environment it runs inline in the job instead, which means its own debug output lands in the workflow log. This is useful for defenders looking for indicators because the worm is chatty.

One further gate runs before the worm engages in any collection. This gate is a locale check that, on a Russian-language host, prints “Exiting as russian language detected!” and exits cleanly. The worm spares those machines.

Everything It Steals

The background payload begins a sweep of the infected machine to harvest credentials from the environment. These include the following categories:

  • Cloud credentials:
    • Multiple major cloud infrastructure platforms
      • The worm queries metadata endpoints and token endpoints across both compute instances and container services to harvest temporary identity and access management (IAM) role credentials, extending scope to short-lived identity tokens used by automated integration runners
  • Developer tooling:
    • Docker and Helm configurations
    • Git credentials
    • Mount listings
    • npm and GitHub tokens
    • Poetry and PyPI credentials
    • RubyGems tokens
    • SSH keys
    • Terraform state
    • Vault tokens
  • AI tools:
    • AI-assisted coding tools
    • Cloud-based development platforms
    • Open-source coding assistant configurations and authentication artifacts
  • Everything else:
    • .env files
    • .netrc
    • Application configuration scattered across the home directory
    • Bitcoin and Electrum wallet files
    • Jenkins encrypted credential material
    • Kubernetes service-account tokens and kubeconfigs
    • Shell histories

ChainDrop harvests credentials, but also a wide variety of other information about the systems and environment it’s running on.

Some of the information stolen is vital for the worm’s survival. The npm and GitHub tokens it finds are what it needs to keep spreading.

It Reads CI Runner Memory

An embedded Python helper hidden inside an encrypted blob in the payload locates the Runner.Worker process on GitHub Actions runners, opens /proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/mem, and searches live process memory for OpenID Connect (OIDC) tokens and runner secrets.

The flow of this GitHub Actions runner memory scraping is illustrated in Figure 2.

A flowchart diagram illustrating GitHub Actions Runner Memory Scraping Flow with four main sections. 1. Runner: Worker process. - Displays GitHub Actions runner process icon. 2. Find - Shows a file directory icon to locate mapped memory regions. 3. Scrape - Illustrates a magnifying glass over a document to read live process memory. 4. Extract - Depicts a box with icons for OIDC tokens, runner secrets, and other in-memory credentials. Bottom text mentions a Python helper locating runner processes, inspecting memory maps and searching live memory for sensitive tokens.
Figure 2. Diagram showing the GitHub Actions runner memory scraping flow.

Rather than waiting for a file to be written to disk, the worm searches memory. In the process, it captures secrets that may have been designed to vanish when a job finishes.

Organizations should be aware that CI runners are credential targets and can be exfiltrated through attacks on process memory.

Persistence Mechanisms

The worm establishes several persistence mechanisms, but two of them deserve special attention:

  • Cross-linked persistence through VS Code and Claude Code
  • A latent capability for OS-level persistence

It writes a .vscode/tasks.json file with a task labeled Environment Setup and sets it to run when the folder opens — meaning it executes automatically whenever a developer opens the project in VS Code. That task runs node .claude/setup.mjs, a copy of the dropper that is byte-identical to the setup.mjs shipped in the package itself.

It also writes a .claude/settings.json file with a SessionStart command hook, meaning it executes whenever Claude Code starts a session in the project. That hook runs node .vscode/setup.mjs, a second copy of the same dropper.

Figure 3 shows the cross-linked persistence through both .vscode/tasks.json and .claude/settings.json files.

A diagram illustrating cross-linked persistence between VS Code and Claude Code. On the left, a VS Code tasks.json configuration is shown, triggering a script when the folder opens. On the right, a Claude Code settings.json configuration runs the same script during a session. Arrows highlight the execution flow between VS Code and Claude Code. A note states that neither config triggers the other; only the VS Code path executes a specific payload.
Figure 3. Cross-linked persistence.

Neither file triggers the other. Each one runs the dropper copy sitting in the other's directory, and the actual trigger in both cases is a developer action: opening the folder, or starting a Claude Code session. Cross-referencing is a naming trick that makes each artifact look like it belongs to the other tool.

The payload is only ever written as .claude/math_init.js, and setup.mjs resolves math_init.js relative to its own location. .vscode/setup.mjs goes looking for a .vscode/math_init.js that the malware never dropped. In this build, only the VS Code path reaches a payload at all.

The full set of dropped files is:

  • .claude/math_init.js
  • .claude/settings.json
  • .claude/setup.mjs
  • .vscode/setup.mjs
  • .vscode/tasks.json

Deleting either directory outright breaks both paths. However, defenders should remove all five files to be sure the worm is disabled.

The worm also carries an installer for a macOS LaunchAgent (com.user.gh-token-monitor) and a Linux systemd user service (gh-token-monitor.service). In this sample, the installer was decrypted but never invoked. The routine that pipes it to bash has no call site, so treat OS-level persistence as latent capability, not observed behavior.

The attacker is turning a trusted developer and AI-tool configuration into execution infrastructure. These aren't files most developers think to audit.

Propagation and Exfiltration

Once the worm has an npm token, it:

  • Identifies every package the account can publish
  • Downloads or reconstructs each package
  • Adds preinstall: node setup.mjs to the package.json file
  • Writes the dropper (setup.mjs) and the obfuscated payload (math_init.js)
  • Increments the patch version
  • Republishes the infected package as the current npm package

The infected package still works. The original source code is intact. As in the sample we analyzed, the only additions are the two top-level files and the lifecycle hook.

The worm also plants a .github/workflows/codeql_analysis.yml file that serializes ${{ toJSON(secrets) }} and uploads it as an Actions artifact, another path to exfiltrate repository secrets. And it creates public repositories under the victim's GitHub account with the description Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again and Dune-themed names, using them as an additional exfiltration channel.

It Was Waiting for One Specific Repository

Everything above is a relatively loud and more obvious propagation path. There is a second typosquatting method that is much quieter and it only appears in a single place.

Before collecting anything, the worm checks three environment variables. If these three variables are set:

  • GITHUB_ACTIONS
  • GITHUB_REPOSITORY to contain /opensearch-js
  • GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF to contain release-drafter.yml

The worm runs a static routine of republishing the repo and exits. No collection takes place.

Also, If the worm is placed in a repo that contains /opensearch-js, but does not contain release-drafter.yml, it exits and steals nothing at all. It stays silent in the runs a maintainer is most likely to be reading.

Inside this second method, the worm does not need a stolen npm token. It asks the runner for an OIDC token with the audience npm:registry.npmjs.org and trades it at npm's own trusted-publishing exchange endpoint for a real publish credential. The repository's legitimate release identity becomes the attacker's.

Then it modifies the package, and not the way it modifies everything else. This path never touches scripts. It downloads the latest @opensearch-project/opensearch tarball, bumps the patch version and adds one line to the package.json file shown below in Figure 4.

A screenshot of a code snippet showing a JSON object with an "optionalDependencies" key. It specifies a GitHub project related to OpenSearch with a setup path.
Figure 4. Line added to the package.json file in the @opensearch-project/opensearch tarball.

The dependency name typosquats the project's own @opensearch-project scope and points at a pinned commit of the project's own repository. In a diff it reads like an internal helper. Detections built around preinstall hooks could easily miss it.

And then the worm signs the result.

Before publishing, the worm:

  • Requests a second OIDC token (audience sigstore this time)
  • Obtains a Fulcio certificate
  • Builds an in-toto SLSA v1 provenance statement over the tarball's SHA-512 hash
  • DSSE-signs it with an ephemeral P-256 key
  • Uploads the entry to the public Rekor transparency log
  • Attaches the bundle to the publish as <name>-<version>.sigstore
  • Logs the resulting search.sigstore.dev URL as it goes

This is not forged provenance. The attestation says the tarball was built in that repository by that workflow, and that is true.

That breaks a control many teams are currently leaning on. Given the reality of today’s npm supply chain threats, a package having valid npm provenance does not mean the package is clean. It only means the tarball came out of the workflow named in the certificate. If that workflow is running attacker code, valid provenance is what you should expect to see. Pivot on the Rekor log index and the workflow identity inside the certificate, not on whether the signature checks out.

We did not observe this path execute, and it cannot execute anywhere except in release-drafter.yml inside the opensearch-project/opensearch-js workflow. But it is fully implemented, reachable from the payload's main entry point, and it names its target in cleartext once the string layers come off. This repository is not typosquatted. The typosquat is the injected dependency name @opensearch/setup, which imitates the real @opensearch-project scope.

The Blockchain Router

The worm doesn't contain a hard-coded C2 domain. Instead, it calls an Ethereum smart contract to ask where to send stolen data.

The contract sits at 0xE1f2395ee43e45A1556EC6438a88c31B83493103. This contract is a small StringListStore with three functions: return all domains, return owner and an owner-only setter. It emits no events, so domain rotation is a silent state write. Defenders who block today's domain may not notice when the operator changes it unless they're polling the contract.

The worm rotates through roughly 60 public Ethereum RPC endpoints until one answers, making it resilient to any single provider blocking the request.

When the contract was first configured, the operator wrote three domains:

  • npm-cache[.]com
  • pypi-get[.]com
  • js-mirror[.]com

Two hours and 35 minutes later, they replaced the list with only npm-cache[.]com. As of our analysis, that's still the active C2.

If contract-resolved domains fail, the worm falls back to searching GitHub commits for the marker thebeautifulmarchoftime, expecting a signed record containing a backup domain. During our query, the fallback was unarmed. No valid operator record existed. However, the mechanism is built and waiting.

The primary C2 domain, npm-cache[.]com, sits behind an edge computing and reverse-proxy service, so its published addresses are shared edge addresses rather than attacker-owned hosts, so block on domain or SNI. Blocking these IP addresses will not reach the origin and will affect unrelated traffic.

The Server Can Answer Back

After sending stolen data, the worm reads the HTTP response, parses it as JSON and evaluates whatever comes back. The JavaScript code to accomplish this is shown below in Figure 5.

A screenshot of a code snippet showing JavaScript logic. It awaits a response text, checks if it's present, parses it as JSON, and evaluates a code property.
Figure 5. The worm's code to read, parse and evaluate the HTTP response.

There is no fixed second-stage payload baked into the worm. The operator chooses the next stage at request time. Because each exfiltration request includes a host-derived UUID, the response can be targeted per victim and never written to disk.

During our analysis, we sent a correctly formatted synthetic envelope using the worm's exact encryption scheme with dummy data to the live C2 endpoint. The server returned an HTTP 200 OK with an empty body. No code field was served to our probe.

That means the remote code execution (RCE) channel was either disarmed at test time, selectively gated on victim attributes or asynchronous.

Encrypted Exfiltration

Stolen data is JSON-serialized, gzipped, encrypted with a random AES-256-GCM key and wrapped with RSA-OAEP-SHA256 using an embedded public key. The worm sends the code shown below in Figure 6.

A screenshot of a code snippet showing a JSON object with three keys: "envelope" containing a base64 encrypted string, "key" containing a base64 RSA-wrapped AES key, and "uuid" with a host fingerprint.
Figure 6. Code sent by the worm.

Everything goes to hxxps://npm-cache[.]com:443/router over TLS. Network capture can prove that data left the machine and estimate its volume, but recovering the plaintext requires the operator's private RSA key.

Only the domain-based sender evaluates returned code. Blocking the domain prevents an arbitrary RCE stage if the functionality is enabled. But the GitHub fallback can still exfiltrate data through victim-owned repositories, which means full containment requires addressing both channels.

It Publishes Stolen Tokens in Public Commit Messages

There is a third situation that we describe in this section, and it is the strangest one. When the GitHub sender carries a stolen token, the worm Base64-encodes that token twice and makes the result the commit message, prefixed with a fixed marker:

IfYouBlockThisAPIKeyItWillCrashTheLiveProductionServersOfAllThirdPartyClients

A separate routine in the same payload searches GitHub's commit API for that marker, double-decodes every match and keeps any token that passes a repository-scope check. One victim's stolen credentials become a usable resource for every other running copy of the worm.

Despite the claims made in the marker, defenders should grep for it. It is long enough and strange enough that a full match is highly unlikely to be a false positive. A live hit means a credential is sitting in a public commit and needs revoking.

We Followed the Money

The three C2 domains were registered through one registrar within eight seconds of each other on May 22, 2026:

  • js-mirror[.]com - 13:40:28 UTC
  • npm-cache[.]com - 13:40:32 UTC
  • pypi-get[.]com - 13:40:36 UTC

All three use the same nameservers.

Fourteen minutes and 23 seconds after the last registration, FixedFloat transferred 0.01805723 ETH to the operator's wallet (0x55F9780e…f31cD).

Three days later, on May 25, the wallet deployed the Ethereum resolver contract, wrote all three domains into it, and 2 hours and 35 minutes after that narrowed the list to just npm-cache[.]com. The next morning it transferred 0.00436 ETH to a Binance-labeled deposit address. The accounting reconciles to the wei.

A timeline showing the deployment of the campaign infrastructure is shown below in Figure 7.

A Campaign Infrastructure Timeline flowchart with six steps depicted in labeled boxes and arrows. Step 1: Domain registration with multiple domains. Step 2: FixedFloat funding occurring 14 minutes later. Step 3: Resolver deployment on May 25. Step 4: Three-domain write with domains written to resolver. Step 5: Single-domain reduction to npm-cache. Step 6: Binance transfer. The process involves domains first being registered, then funded shortly afterward.
Figure 7. Campaign infrastructure timeline.

FixedFloat is a shared exchange wallet with millions of transactions. This wallet tells us the funding rail, not the operator's identity. The Binance deposit address is the strongest identity pivot.

C2 Domain Rotation via Ethereum Smart Contract

On Aug. 4, 2026, the attacker executed an on-chain transaction 0xc55920f1bd0531b6738153068a666c080ddded47e6256f1fd980d51c0b507c91 to modify the StringListStore in smart contract 0xE1f2395ee43e45A1556EC6438a88c31B83493103, rotating the active C2 domain from npm-cache[.]com to a newly registered domain, awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu. The transaction was submitted by wallet 0x55F9780ef31cD, the same wallet that originally deployed the C2 smart contract on May 25, 2026.

The new domain awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu was registered via NameSilo, LLC at 15:15:26 UTC on Aug. 4, 2026, and was operationally active within the hour as the earliest observed connection observed by Unit 42 researchers occurred at 16:10:03 UTC.

The domain exhibits characteristics consistent with domain generation algorithm (DGA) output: a randomized 12-character string on the .icu top-level domain (TLD), flagged as DGA by the VirusTotal community. This represents a shift from the previous C2 domain npm-cache.com, which used a naming convention that mimicked a developer ecosystem and was registered through a different registrar (Tucows/OpenSRS).

Despite the change in registrar and naming convention, both awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu and npm-cache[.]com are proxied through Cloudflare's cloud delivery network (CDN) infrastructure. Both domains serve the identical Cloudflare default CDN-CGI stylesheet d30b4ea6f68456672f5abb35e9dcf7d54226372b66e9d60a7ee26b7a52568e74, confirming shared use of the Cloudflare proxy layer.

The new domain was issued a TLS certificate by Google Trust Services (WE1), which is valid from Aug. 4–Nov. 2, 2026, with Subject Alternative Names (SAN) covering both awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu and *.awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu.

Within approximately 19 hours of the domain becoming active, we witnessed network traffic to victim environments. The affected infrastructure spans four continents: North America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The destination IP addresses for this C2 domain include 104.21.91[.]101 and 172.67.215[.]154. The geographic and organizational breadth of these connections is consistent with the indiscriminate, worm-driven propagation model of ChainDrop.

This C2 rotation demonstrates the adversary's ability to silently reconfigure the worm's entire C2 infrastructure through a single Ethereum transaction, without requiring any update to the deployed malware. Monitoring the smart contract for future setStrings() calls would provide early warning of subsequent domain rotations.

Is This Shai-Hulud?

Multiple indicators point to this being the Shai-Hulud toolchain documented by JFrog:

  • The PBKDF2-based string decoder
  • The Bun 1.3.13 pin
  • The _NODE_RUNTIME_INIT detached-relaunch pattern
  • The self-applied Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again marker
  • The npm self-propagation and GitHub exfiltration architecture

However, these indicators don’t prove the same attackers are behind the campaign. Because the Shai-Hulud source was published in May 2026, the implementation can be reused by anyone.

This sample also mixes characteristics that don't match any previously published variant:

  • Public victim-owned exfiltration repositories with Dune-themed names
  • Ethereum-based domain resolution, thebeautifulmarchoftime commit-search fallback
  • A Russian-language exclusion check
  • A repository-gated npm trusted-publishing path that mints genuine Sigstore provenance
  • preinstall delivery rather than the binding.gyp technique reported in earlier waves

The ChainDrop worm is clearly part of the Shai-Hulud code lineage. However, we cannot yet say whether it's operated by the group known as TeamPCP, or by another group adapting the published toolkit for their own purposes.

Detecting ChainDrop

We detected ChainDrop operations across 10 distinct environments using out-of-the-box XDR detections focused on JavaScript runtime events. In one instance, as illustrated in the process execution in Figure 8, the threat activity originated within a developer's VS Code environment. The threat actors leveraged Bun to execute the malicious payload Math_Symbol.js from within the cacheable node modules directory. This script then spawned cmd.exe to invoke gh auth token to capture the user's GitHub authentication credentials.

A screenshot of a command line interface displays a series of file paths related to Microsoft VS Code, a temporary executable file, a redacted JS file, and the Windows system32 command.
Figure 8. ChainDrop theft of GitHub PAT in development environment.

Breaking Through Obfuscation and Encryption to Reach the Payload

The 727 KB payload was protected by three nested layers of obfuscation and encryption. We broke through all of them. No unexplained blob remains in the sample.

Layer 1 used Base91 encoding with 73 function-specific alphabets and a 14-position array rotation. We recovered 4,613 hidden string entries.

Layer 2 used a custom byte-permutation cipher built on PBKDF2-SHA256 with 200,000 iterations and seeded Fisher-Yates shuffles. We recovered 727 additional hidden strings.

Layer 3 used AES-256-GCM encryption plus gzip to protect 10 large encrypted blobs. These blobs contained:

  • Bash and Python helpers
  • Persistence installers
  • The GitHub Actions memory scraper
  • Malicious workflow templates
  • VS Code and Claude persistence files
  • RSA public keys
  • Additional dropper copies

These three layers are shown below in Figure 9.

"A diagram illustrating three obfuscation layers and recovered payloads. Layer 1 features ""basE91 + rotation"" with 73 functions and alphanumeric support. Layer 2 highlights a ""custom permutation cipher"" with specific hashing functions and shuffling. Layer 3 shows 10 encrypted blobs. Recovered payloads listed include bash helpers, Python helpers, sensitive files, GitHub Actions memory scraper, and others.
Figure 9. Three layers of obfuscation or encryption used to protect the payloads.

Current Scope of the Attack

During our analysis, at approximately 12:20 UTC on Aug. 4, 2026, we searched GitHub for public repositories matching the worm's exact exfiltration marker: the description Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again.

We found 453 public repositories across five accounts.

The earliest was created on May 11. The newest had been created roughly 25 minutes before our query. The names followed the pattern that matched the worm's Dune-themed generator exactly, with combinations like sardaukar-futar-421 and harkonnen-ghola-669.

These five accounts are candidate victim accounts, not confirmed victims. The 453 repository counts might be only a starting point for possible compromises. In addition to public matches, there may be private repositories compromised as well. But the naming, description and creation patterns match the worm's behavior, and new repositories were still appearing while we watched.

Three accounts held most of the total repos that we discovered.

The attackers are not only actively compromising repositories, they are also rapidly releasing new versions of compromised packages.

We analyzed one compromised package, but then noticed that a newer version of the package had landed six minutes after the compromised package. Another landed 70 minutes after that.

The threat actors are actively, and rapidly, creating new repositories, versions and patch numbers, which will propagate the worm more efficiently. Because CI/CD pipelines are often configured to pull the latest patch or version, if there are several rapid fire versions, and they are compromised, the CI pipelines are more likely to grab an infected package.

Defenders may not be taking the most effective approach to removing the worm’s infection. It is critical to ensure poisoned packages and their files are fully removed from potentially compromised systems. Unit 42 researchers found that a previously compromised system was rolled back to the latest tag pointing at the latest clean version. This fixed the tagging issue.

However, it didn't fix the poisoned lockfiles, caches, mirrors or tarballs already sitting in a CI image. Even after updating the latest tag to point to a secure version, machines that installed the package during the compromise will not automatically receive the fix. Because lockfiles retain the compromised version, these systems remain vulnerable until administrators actively clear the lockfiles and fetch the updated release.

Interim Guidance

Assume the potential impact is wider than what we know now. The worm attempts to republish itself through packages writable by compromised npm tokens. If a developer installed an affected release, enumerate every package their npm credentials could modify.

Block and Monitor Infrastructure

Add npm-cache[.]com, pypi-get[.]com and js-mirror[.]com to DNS and TLS SNI blocklists. Prefer sinkholing over an HTTP block page, because the worm treats HTTP 400 and 404 as a healthy C2 response. Monitor the resolver contract for domain changes.

Rotate Exposed Credentials

Revoke or rotate npm tokens, GitHub PATs and deploy keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes service-account tokens, Vault tokens, SSH keys and AI-provider credentials accessible to confirmed infected hosts. Treat CI runners as potentially compromised if the worm executed there.

Hunt for Repository Modifications

Search accessible repositories for:

  • .vscode/tasks.json invoking .claude/setup.mjs
  • .claude/settings.json invoking .vscode/setup.mjs
  • .github/workflows/codeql_analysis.yml containing toJSON(secrets)
  • Math_Symbol.js
  • math_init.js
  • setup.mjs
  • router_runtime.js

Hunt for Latent OS-Level Artifacts

Although the installer was not invoked on the analyzed main execution path, search for:

  • ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist
  • ~/.config/systemd/user/gh-token-monitor.service
  • ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh
  • ~/.config/gh-token-monitor/

Hunt on the Network

Look for HTTP GET or POST requests to /router on the three C2 domains, Ethereum JSON-RPC eth_call requests targeting 0xE1f2395ee43e45A1556EC6438a88c31B83493103, and GitHub commit searches containing thebeautifulmarchoftime or IfYouBlockThisAPIKeyItWillCrashTheLiveProductionServersOfAllThirdPartyClients.

Hunt Your Own Commit History

Search accessible repositories for commit messages containing IfYouBlockThisAPIKeyItWillCrashTheLiveProductionServersOfAllThirdPartyClients, and for the dead-drop record prefix thebeautifulsnadsoftime.

A match on the first is a leaked credential requiring immediate revocation. A match on the second is a planted backup C2 domain.

Audit Your Supply Chain

Compare recently published patch releases for new preinstall hooks, replaced scripts objects, setup.mjs files and large minified JavaScript bundles. Do not scope to listed packages. The worm is designed to spread to unrelated packages writable by stolen tokens.

Tips for Hardening Pipelines

Here is a practical playbook for AppSec engineers and developers:

  • Bind authentication to the workload: The stealer targeted HashiCorp Vault tokens alongside npm, GitHub, AWS and Kubernetes credentials. A vault does not help when the token authenticating to it is a bearer string in a dotfile. Use credentials bound to the workload itself, such as mutual TLS with a SPIFFE identity, a cloud IAM role, or a projected service account token with an audience claim, so replay from attacker infrastructure fails.
  • Use ephemeral CI runners: Persistent self-hosted runners accumulate credentials and caches across jobs that often belong to different teams, so one poisoned install contaminates everything that runs after it. Single-use runners limit exposure to one job.
  • Plant canary credentials: Use decoys produce high-confidence signals with low false positives. Place non-functional keys in ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc, and an .env file across build images and workstations, then enable high alert on any use.

Egress filtering in CI/CD: Most npm-based malware attempts to send ~/.npmrc tokens or ~/.ssh keys to a C2 server. Apply strict egress network policies to your CI runners. Only allow connections to your private registry and known deployment targets.

Unit 42 Managed Threat Hunting Queries

The Unit 42 Managed Threat Hunting team continues to track any attempts to exploit these issues across our customers, using Cortex XDR and the XQL queries below. Cortex XDR customers can also use these XQL queries to search for signs of exploitation.

Conclusion

ChainDrop demonstrates how a compromised open-source package can become an entry point into developer workstations, CI pipelines, cloud environments and the broader software supply chain. By stealing publishing credentials and automatically republishing infected packages, the worm can continue spreading through trusted dependencies while leaving their legitimate functionality intact. Its ability to extract ephemeral credentials directly from CI runner memory also means that investigations limited to files stored on developer endpoints may miss critical exposure.

  • Unit 42 recommends:
  • Identifying installations of affected npm package versions
  • Removing affected package versions
  • Investigating developer workstations and CI runners for signs of compromise
  • Reviewing unexpected npm publishing and GitHub repository activity.
  • Revoking and rotating potentially exposed npm, GitHub, cloud, SSH and automation credentials.
  • Removing identified persistence mechanisms
  • Blocking both the domain-based and GitHub-based exfiltration channels

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected through the products described below. Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 will continue monitoring this campaign for changes in infrastructure, new affected packages and evidence of additional activity, and we will update this threat brief as relevant information becomes available.

Palo Alto Networks Product Protections for ChainDrop

Palo Alto Networks customers can leverage a variety of product protections and updates to identify and defend against this threat.

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Advanced WildFire

The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been reviewed and updated in light of the indicators shared in this research.

Cloud-Delivered Security Services for the Next-Generation Firewall

Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security identify known C2 domains associated with this activity as malicious.

Cortex

Koi Agentic Endpoint Security

Koi Agentic Endpoint Security is designed to help discover every AI artifact and AI agent’s activity across the agentic endpoint, assess its risk, enforce prevention & runtime controls, and remediate violations.

Cortex AgentiX

Security analysts can use natural language to prompt the Cortex AgentiX Threat Intel agent to extract indicators of compromise (IoCs) from this threat brief. Customers can then enrich the indicators, check for sightings in their Cortex tenant and related alerts and provide a summary of the impact to the organization.

Cortex XDR and XSIAM

Cortex XDR and XSIAM help to prevent the threats described in this article, by employing the Malware Prevention Engine. This approach combines several layers of protection, including Advanced WildFire, Behavioral Threat Protection and the Local Analysis module, to prevent both known and unknown malware from causing harm to endpoints.

Specifically, we observed out-of-the-box prevention on Windows via Behavioral Threat Protection. In addition, as part of our continuous cross-platform threat research, targeted behavioral protections for macOS and Linux environments have also been deployed in content version 2370-39889.

We advise customers to upgrade agents to supported versions and the latest content update to receive the best protection

Cortex Cloud

Cortex Cloud Endpoint Protection can help protect organizations from threats expressed within this article. Cortex Cloud 2.1 can detect and prevent malicious operations using behavioral and AI-enabled analytics to detect when Linux endpoints, including containers and virtual machines, are targeted. Additionally, it can detect when cloud platform IAM policies associated with those targeted endpoints are being misused and alert teams when assets are vulnerable to these threats.

Palo Alto Networks Software Supply Chain Security, integrated into Cortex Cloud, helps provide comprehensive visibility across the entire development ecosystem by tracking developer tools, code identities, registries and SBOMs. The solution can effectively harden development pipelines, and helps enforce out-of-the-box security policies to prevent unauthorized tampering or malicious code injection. By automating compliance reporting and governance, it can better empower organizations to mitigate application risks early and deploy secure code with confidence.

Idira Secrets Manager

Idira Secrets Manager limits blast radius by dynamically injecting them into build steps or local environments at runtime via API, CLI, or container sidecars, avoiding long-lived static configuration files on disk.

By pairing Idira Privilege Cloud with Idira Secrets Manager, raw credentials bypass environment variables and process memory entirely. Secretless Manager proxies outbound connections to databases, cloud APIs, and registries, injecting credentials directly into the network stream on the fly. When supply chain worms scan your build runners, there is simply nothing in memory to steal.

Idira Secrets Manager, integrated with Idira Privilege Cloud, handles automated policy-based rotation of credentials and enforces short lived secrets. Secrets requested by build pipelines are dynamically generated or rotated immediately after job completion.

Indicators of Compromise

File Hashes (SHA-256)

  • Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js: 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc
  • setup.mjs (First variant): 54dc7ea54a1317cca0e890a2770630cf7fa6c97813e0cb9d2caa93012b350668
  • setup.mjs (Second variant): fd3ca4007b225fdf8de7af4345a19179d5efa8c4bb9205f88cda806e5684b1eb
  • setup.mjs.malicious (Variant of setup.mjs based on TLSH pivot): b27b82afa5f15512f3856e549fb83d873fd0049759a4b62ce64c8d7d4dc2c678

Malicious Domains

  • awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu - new C2 domain pulled from Ethereum contract
  • npm-cache[.]com - active during analysis
  • pypi-get[.]com - historical C2, returned from the Ethereum contract in the past
  • js-mirror[.]com - historical C2, returned from the Ethereum contract in the past

C2 Endpoint

  • hxxps://npm-cache[.]com:443/router
  • hxxp://awqhnjewqjkl[.]icu/cdn-cgi/rum?

Ethereum

  • Resolver contract: 0xE1f2395ee43e45A1556EC6438a88c31B83493103
  • Changed C2 Transaction: 0xc55920f1bd0531b6738153068a666c080ddded47e6256f1fd980d51c0b507c91
  • Owner wallet: 0x55f9780e1492344b7417fa723aedc4d0b97f31cd
  • Binance deposit pivot: 0x35477b7b2df3174B9FE8A681750A7E3fbA20F39B
  • Getter selector: 0x53ed5143
  • Setter selector: 0xd3c159e5

GitHub Markers

  • Repository description: Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again
  • Commit search token: thebeautifulmarchoftime
  • Signed record prefix: thebeautifulsnadsoftime
  • Dune-themed name terms: sardaukar, mentat, fremen, atreides, harkonnen

Latent Persistence Artifacts

The sample embeds an installer for these artifacts, but we did not identify a call site on its main execution path:

  • ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh
  • ~/.config/gh-token-monitor/
  • ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist
  • ~/.config/systemd/user/gh-token-monitor.service

Compromised Packages

A list of compromised packages is available at a page on our GitHub repository.

Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Could Be Stealing Your AI Resources

Posted on by Unit 42

Executive Summary

It’s three a.m., do you know what your AI agent is doing? Unit 42 has responded to a growing number of AI token jacking cases resulting in staggering financial losses.

The financial loss comes from criminals gaining access to API keys used by legitimate developers for access to popular AI platforms. These keys are known as tokens, and their theft is called token hijacking, or token jacking for short.

The unrelenting frenzy of AI adoption and soaring costs of model access are converging into an irresistible opportunity for cybercriminals. Premium pricing on scarce AI processing power means stolen access via tokens can generate a quick and easy profit for attackers. Complex, patchwork billing management and limitless scaling by default can lead to massive financial losses in short periods.

Good security hygiene, combined with cutting-edge native AI protection tools, can prevent losses before they begin.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected through the following products and services:

The Unit 42 AI Security Assessment can help empower safe AI use and development.

If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, contact the Unit 42 Incident Response team.

Related Unit 42 Topics AI, LLM, Supply Chain 

How Tokens Work

Token jacking is a new AI-oriented spin on an old technique of stealing access to computing resources.

Establishing a session in service-based computing typically requires authentication, usually involving a username and password, and sometimes a secondary verification method. Many services allow an authenticated user to then generate keys that programs can use on a user's behalf to establish sessions without going through an interactive login to support automated processes. Within a session, the service provider and user have agreed on a structured way to pay to use their service to achieve a pre-defined objective.

AI — in particular, large language models (LLMs) — typically does not have pre-defined objectives. Users can and do carry on long conversations of widely varying complexity, which can consume enormous amounts of the provider’s computing resources. Automated processes also use LLMs to produce iterative content, which they then further process and return to the LLM with additional, related prompts.

To best support this freeform usage, providers typically break both the input prompt and the output data into small chunks called tokens. Regardless of the objective, billing is then based on how many of these tokens are consumed during the session.

Newer and more complex AI models charge more per token, ostensibly because more resources are required to deliver the output. To avoid interruptions in unpredictable workstreams, many providers do not limit the number of tokens an account can consume, instead tallying usage and billing on a cycle.

If an attacker can steal one of these keys, they may find themselves with unlimited programmatic access to tokens that they can then use themselves or resell to other users. Since billing occurs cyclically, the victim might not even be aware of the theft until the attacker has consumed a massive number of tokens.

Transfer Stations

To better understand token jacking, we must understand transfer stations. Skyrocketing token costs for frontier AI models and regional usage restrictions have spawned a massive gray market of fly-by-night vendors selling AI computing capacity at a fraction of the retail cost.

Figure 1 below shows an example of these advertisements. These services are commonly called transfer stations.

A screenshot of an advertisement for "Gemini 3.1 Pro," featuring a decorative background with colorful pinpoints of light. There is text in Chinese with a price listed as ¥32.9 on the side. The product offers various features such as Veo 3.1 Pro support, Nanobanana model generation, and Canvas deep thinking, among others.
Figure 1. Advertisement for gray-market frontier model access.

Third parties acting as intermediaries between official AI providers and end users sell these transfer stations. Many of these advertisements appear on Chinese-language marketplaces like Taobao. They promise access to multiple AI services with seller-issued custom credits that are purchased anonymously. Earlier this year, a researcher named Harshal Singh posted a fascinating deep dive into this world.

A large number of these transfer stations run on just a few open-source software platforms like new-api or one-api, which act as proxy services to official AI APIs. These proxy services handle:

  • Obfuscation
  • Rotation and authentication of real credentials
  • Billing
  • Model routing
  • Normalization of prompts

In many cases, users of these transfer station services are developers seeking inexpensive AI access. Other use cases are less benign.

Competing nation-states can use these transfer stations' proxy services to access cutting-edge frontier models to train and refine their own models at a fraction of the cost that AI development normally incurs. Transfer stations require access to legitimate API tokens for the associated AI models. Attackers often steal or hijack these tokens from a variety of legitimate sources.

How Transfer Stations Obtain Tokens

For transfer stations to be cost-effective, their operators require access to a large pool of discounted legitimate tokens for each frontier AI model offered. Purchasing tokens at full price to simply resell them at a discount isn’t profitable, so many operators turn to stolen credentials.

Attackers can use privileged corporate developer accounts they’ve harvested via information stealers or through phishing campaigns to perform the following activities:

  • Creating new API keys
  • Provisioning models
  • Removing billing limits
  • Disabling critical usage alerts and logging

These developer accounts are readily available for sale by access brokers on dark web marketplaces.

However, a more direct approach is to steal already provisioned access keys. Attackers can harvest these like they do credentials. They can also mine keys from improperly secured file shares or code repositories.

More recently, attackers have stolen these keys using poisoned, self-propagating npm packages downloaded by unsuspecting developers. Once installed, these packages infect any other code releases the developer builds. They steal credentials and access tokens from each environment along the way, amplifying the impact.

Particularly concerning are npm supply chain attacks like Shai-Hulud and Miasma. Attackers could use the huge number of credentials stolen in these campaigns to fuel transfer stations for years.

Impact of Transfer Stations' Token Jacking

The financial impact of token jacking can be catastrophic to organizations. Transfer stations can generate tens of millions of API calls per day, resulting in hundreds of thousands of dollars in usage fees.

We’ve responded to cases where attackers stole inadvertently exposed credentials and integrated them into a transfer station within minutes. This led to nearly a million dollars in charges before discovery and containment.

In some of these cases, we connected massive numbers of malicious API queries to domains hosting the new-api proxy service. Figure 2 shows an example of a transfer station frontend marketplace hosted on an IP address running an instance of new-api and connected to an attack.

A screenshot of a tranfer station website, displaying a list of AI models with their names, descriptions, and compatibility information. The interface includes options to filter and sort models based on various criteria.
Figure 2. Webpage from a transfer station site with prices for different AI models.

Organizations impacted by token jacking have very little recourse to recover funds billed by the AI services for using their API tokens. The cost can derail budgets or even force smaller businesses into bankruptcy.

Even unsuspecting developers trying to use transfer stations for legitimate development risk having their prompts routed to inferior models. Furthermore, developers risk having their sessions monitored and mined for sensitive data that could turn them into future victims.

Mitigation

Organizations can protect themselves against token jacking through various methods.

  • Implement spending limits for AI usage
    • Ensure that these limits alert organizations if usage changes drastically from an established baseline
  • Review all privileged accounts that can be used to provision resources or adjust spending limits
  • Migrate from long-term access keys to short-term bearer tokens to limit the potential window of damage
  • Use an AI gateway in combination with a machine authentication platform
    • This can help ensure that all LLM traffic is tied to a verified and managed machine identity, allowing for real-time monitoring of traffic and usage anomalies
  • Ensure that compute resources include network boundaries where available
    • This restricts access to corporate infrastructure, preventing compromised keys from being used in a transfer station scenario
  • Tightly manage development environments to ensure malicious packages do not enter the development pipeline

Conclusion

AI adoption is accelerating at an unprecedented pace. A mindset of “fail fast and break things” has never been more true — or more risky — than it is today.

This mindset brings with it an opportunity for cybercriminals to target vulnerable organizations through token jacking and to cause staggering losses. While innovation cannot be at the mercy of security, there are ways defenders can manage their risk.

Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected through the following products and services:

Prisma AIRS AI Gateway

The Prisma AIRS AI Gateway helps provide a central control plane to secure and govern enterprise AI traffic. By managing API keys centrally, it removes sensitive credentials from developer environments and build systems. Platform teams can gain full visibility into model usage, agent actions, and token spend across teams. Security teams get integrated guardrails that can enforce access policies, prevent data leaks, and set proactive budget limits.

Idira Agentic Identity Security

Idira Agentic Identity Security helps provide a comprehensive identity security solution for discovery, control and governance of agentic identities. It provides a central registry of agents with cryptographically verifiable identities, enforces strong authentication and zero standing privileges for agents and provides comprehensive audit trails of agent actions. It also enables agents to secretly retrieve and use secrets and API tokens just in time thereby reducing the attack surface.

Koi Agentic Endpoint Security

Koi Agentic Endpoint Security helps discover all software on your endpoints, both binary and non-binary, from installed applications to code packages and AI artifacts. From there you can govern it, whether that means removing a risky or malicious item, or holding new package versions back until they've had time to establish a reputation under public scrutiny.

Cortex Cloud, XDR and XSIAM

Cortex Cloud, XDR, and XSIAM customers are better protected from the topics discussed within this article with cloud runtime security operations monitoring their continuous integration and continuous development (CI/CD) pipelines to ensure that the latest npm packages integrated into test and production environments are monitoring for and preventing malicious code execution.

Cortex Cloud Identity Security

Using Cortex Cloud’s Identity Security which includes Cloud Infrastructure Entitlement Management (CIEM), Identity Security Posture Management (ISPM), Data Access Governance (DAG) as well as Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR), allows clients to monitor cloud identities which may have been compromised as a result of the techniques discussed in this article. Enabling these features helps protect cloud identities.

Advanced URL Filtering

Advanced URL Filtering identifies known domains and URLs associated with this activity as malicious.

The Unit 42 AI Security Assessment can help empower safe AI use and development.

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

  • North America: Toll Free: +1 (866) 486-4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
  • UK: +44.20.3743.3660
  • Europe and Middle East: +31.20.299.3130
  • Asia: +65.6983.8730
  • Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
  • Australia: +61.2.4062.7950
  • India: 000 800 050 45107
  • South Korea: +82.080.467.8774

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Indicators of Compromise

Table 1 contains indicators associated with recent token jacking activity.

Indicator Context
Go-http-client/2.0,gzip(gfe) User Agent associated with malicious API calls
3.235.109[.]125 Malicious API calls
116.105.166[.]148 Malicious API calls
172.96.142[.]186 Malicious API calls
38.46.219[.]166 Malicious API calls
38.46.219[.]163 Malicious API calls
38.46.219[.]162 Malicious API calls
23.237.196[.]170 Malicious API calls
15.204.106[.]173 Malicious API calls
104.243.42[.]117 Malicious API calls
198.255.70[.]210 Malicious API calls
47.88.103[.]81 Malicious API calls
47.251.72[.]239 Malicious API calls
117.72.74[.]48 Malicious login (Credential Theft)
207.246.106[.]162 Malicious login (Credential Theft)
23.236.182[.]215 Malicious login (Credential Theft)
95.214.112[.]26 Malicious login (Credential Theft)
amutes[.]com Transfer station infrastructure
abb1[.]life Transfer station infrastructure

Table 1. Indicators of token jacking activity.

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